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WAR DEPARTMENT

DETERMINATION OF FIGHTING STRENGTH, U.S.S.R


<c»


VOLUME I - TEXT


Prepared under the direction of

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,

by the

Eastern Europea\ Section, European Branch,

Intelligence Group,

Military Intelligence Service,,


f.


n)W


REGRADED
BY AUTHORITY OF
BY
ON

Table of Contents

Page

A.

Survey of Means Available
1

1. General Factors
1

a. National

1

(1) Political..

„.
1

(a) Introduction
1

(b) Density of Population
2

(c) Ethnic Groups
3

(1) General
3

(Z) Quantitative Ethnic Composition
3

(3) Languages
4

(? Religion
4

Ethnic Distribution of Peoples of the

"* U.S.S.R
4

Indo-Europeans
4

Finno-Ugr ians
5

Japhetides
...»
6

Turkic peoples
6

Mongol- Tungus-Manchu
6

(6) Ethnic Groups in the Caucasus
6

"""
Languages
7

Ethnic Distribution in the Caucasus 7

(d) Historical Growth of the U.S.S.R...*
8

(_1) From the Beginning to Rurik (4000

B.C.-860 A.D.)
9

(J2) Rurik to Genghis Khan (860-1237)
9

(3) Genghis Khan to Ivan the Great (1237­
~" 1462)
10

(4) Ivan the Great to Peter the Great

"" (1462-1689)
.o
10

(5) Peter the Great to the Crimean War

~
(1689-1853)
11

(6) Crimean War to the Russo-Japanese War

""" (1853-1904)
12

(7) The Decay of Czarism (1904-1917)
13

(7F) The Communist Experiment (1917-1927), 13

(9) Rise of Stalin and Soviet Nationalism

~
(1927-1942)
14

(e) Present Political Administration of the

U.S.S.R
18

(1) Actual Political Administration of the

"" U.S.S.R
18


Table of Contents (Contd.)

Page

General Organization
18

Stalin.

18

Political Administrations
19

The Franchise and Party Cell
20

Territorial Division
21

(2) Theoretical Political Administration

"
of the U.S.S.R...........
21

State Organization
22

All Union Commissariats
<>... 23

Party Organization
23

($) Administrative Divisions of the U".S*S.R* 23

(2 ) Economic Factors

25

(a) Availability of Strategical Materials
25

(b) Strategical and Critical Materials........ 27

(c) Production capacities.
39

Industrial production
.'
39

Industrial production by zones.....
39

Zone of combat...
39

Zone of communications
40

•Northern Region
40

Central Industrial Region....
41

Volga Region.
45

North Caucasus and Transcaucasia
46

Zone of the interior
55

Urals
58

West Siberia.
75

Central Asia
79

Prospects for increased industrial output 86

Agricultural Production and the Food

S ituation
88

Estimate^of the present situation—

general
88

Food and agricultural production by zones 93

Zone of Combat
93

Zone of Communications
93

Zone of the interior
100

(d) Maritime Shipping
103

Tonnage and Disposition.
...» 103

Types of ships
106

General operating conditions............ 106


Table of Contents (Contd.)

Page


2.

(3) Psychological Factors
107

(a) Morale
107

(b) Training
108

Training Organization
108

(c) Capacity for United Effort.
Ill

(d) Inventiveness.
Ill

(e) Versatility
Ill

(4) Information and Counter Information Facilities. 112

Factors directly applicable to the armed forces
114

j*.
Strength and Characteristics
,.
114

(1) Army.
.
114

(a) Strength.
114

(b) Organization
117

(o) Efficiency.
119

(2) Navy
120

(a) Strength....
.......... 120

(b) Organization.
122

(c) Efficiency.
122

(3) Air Forces.
123

(a) Strength
123

(b) Organization
123

(c) Aircraft production.
124

(d) Naval aviation
127

(e) Organization of Naval air forces...
128

(f) Sea plane production...
130

(4) Home Guard Troops
131

b.
Characteristics of Personnel
131

"""
(1) Basiq doctrines and command psychology of

military and naval leaders
131

(a) Basic doctrines
131

(b) Command psychology of military and naval

leaders
133

(2) Morale
135

(3) Stamina
»
135

c.
Characteristics of Materiel.
136

~"
(1) General.........
136

(2) The quality of design
136

(3) Armament (Ground Forces)........
137

(a) Infantry.
137

(b) Cavalry..
137

(o)
(d)

Artillery
Antiaircraft a r t i l l e r y

i n

jfj

138

138


Table of Contents (Contd.)

Page

(e) Coast artillery

138

(f) Engineer
138

(g) Chemical materiel
138

(h) Tanks

138

(4) Speed and radius of action (Ground Forces)
139

(5) Operating conditions (Ground Forces)
139

(6) Armament (Air Forces)...
.....
144

(7) Speed and radius of action (Air Forces)
144

(8) Operating conditions (Air Forces )...„
144

Facilities for logistical support......
..
147

(1) Facilities for logistical support - general..,. 147

(2) Logistical and strategic importance of the

Soviet and Persian Gulf ports
149

(a) Vital supply ports
149

(b) Ports for local supply.
151

(c) Naval and operational bases............... 151

(3) Port facilities: Soviet ports..
152

(4) Port facilities: Pahlevi and the Persian Gulf

ports
152

(5) Airfields.........................
152

(6) Railroads
159

(a) General......
159

(b) Supply of the western front...
161

(7) Roads
170

(8) Shipping available for support of forces
170

(9) Commercial trucking available
171

(10) Air transport available...
....
171

(11) Local supplies available...;
<>
1 7 2

(a) Zone of Combat.
*
172

(_l) Kola Peninsula
172

(2) Kandalaksha- Tikhvin.
172

("3) Tikhvin - Orel
172

(T) Orel - Rostov
172

(b) Zone of Communications
173

(12) Replacement of personnel.
174

(a) Military forces
..«.
174

(1) Numbers
174

(2) Training and mobilization procedures. 175

(b) industrial and agricultural mobilization.. 177

(13) Evacuation facilities.
178

(14) Communications
178


IV


Table of Contents (Contd.)

Page

B.

C.

(15) Vulnerable Objectives.
.... 179

Survey of the Characteristics of the Area
182

1.
Hydrography.
182

a.
General
182

_b. European Russia
183

Volga River
184

Kama River
184

Don River
.

186

c.
Transcaucasia
187

£.
Siberia
187

"e.
Soviet Central Asia
,
,. 189

2. "Topography.
200

a.
General
200

V.
European Russia
.
.
200

c.
The Caucasus
203

ji.
The Ural Mountains
205

e.
Siberia...
...
.
205

T.
Soviet Central Asia... e.........
206

jg. Border Passages and Ranges of Asiatic Russia..
209

h.
The Tadzhik and Kirgiz Highlands
211

T.
The Altai Mountain System.
214

3. Weather..
216

a.
Temperature
,
216

b". Frozen Subsoils.
». 218

~c.
Precipitation
218

£.
Winds
221

4.
Health factors
222

a.
General
222

b". Sanitation
222

"cT. Medical Facilities
223

"d. Medical Problems•
225

5. "Distance Table
227

6.
Vital Areas
227

7.
Fortifications
229

Conclusions as to Fighting Strength
234

1.
Strength Factors: To be considered in relation to

Weakness Factors
234

a.
Ethnic, historical and political
234

"F. Economic
235

"c". Psychological
235

"d". Intelligence and counter-intelligence
235


Table of Contents (Contd.)

Page


3.

e.
Strength and characteristics of armed forces
7.
Military doctrines, leadership, morale and stamina..
£.
Materiel...
h.
Logistics
T.
Geographic
Weakness Factors: To be considered in relation to

Strength Factors
a.
Ethnic, historical and political....
b.
Economic
£.
Psychological.
d.
Intelligence
»....
e.
Strength and characteristics of armed forces
T.
Military doctrines, leadership, morale and stamina..
j;.
Materiel
h.
Logistics
o
T.
Vulnerable objectives

Geographic
Conclus ions

VI


236

236

237

237

238

239

239

240

240

240

240

241

241

241

242

242

242


BLES

Title
A.

Page


Survey of Means Available
,
1. General Factors i
e.. 0.
Table I: Population totals
II: Chronology of Russian history
III: Critical materials
IV: Pipelines in the Caucasus
,
Vt Black Sea ports..

VI: Caspian Sea ports
VII: Mineral production in the zone of the interior.
VIII: Ural-Volga refineries
IX: Non-ferrous metals and minerals in the Urals...
X: Power stations in the Urals
XI: Industries in the Urals
XII: Industrial resources of West Siberia....
XIII: Industrial resources of Central Asia
XIV: Agriculture - Northern Region
XV: Agriculture - Central Region
XVI: Agriculture - Middle and Lower Volga Region....
XVII: Agriculture - North Caucasus and Transcaucasus.
XVIII; Agriculture - Ural Region
XIX: Agrioulture - Siberia (West of Lake Baikal)....
XX: Agriculture - Central Asia
2.
Factors Directly Applicable to the Armed Forces
Table I: Order of battle
II: Naval forces
....
III: Airplane numerical strength according to type:

ju March, 1941....
.....,...,
W March, 1942
IV: Infantry weapons
V: Anti-tank - anti-aircraft weapons
VI: Artillery
VII: Motorization - mechanization
VIII: Characteristics of airplanes
IX: Port facilities - Soviet ports.
X: Port facilities - Pahlcvi and the Persian

Gulf ports
XI: Daily supply requirements (maintenance only)

of large Soviet units..

Vll


1

1

3

15

29

49

54

55

56

64

66

69

72

76

81

.95

96

97

98

101

102

104

114

115

120

125

126

140

141

142

143

145

153

157

165


LIST OF TABLES (Contd.)

Title

XII:
XIII:
B.

Survey of the
Table I:
II:
III:

Page


Rail shipping weights and spaces, initial

equipment, of large Soviet units
<,
List of vulnerable objectives, Western Front,

U.S.S.R
Characteristics of the Area
Principal irrigated areas
Rivers and lakes at present exploited for

electric power
U.S.S.R. Coast and Port Defenses

1

'*, , i J

* ' 'l

I

i '


166

180

182

195

198

231


List of Maps (Volume II)

1. Density of Population in the U.S.S.R.

2. Ethnic Distribution in the U.S.S.R.

3. Ethnio Distribution in the Caucasus.

4. Historical Growth of the U.S.S.R.

5. Political Divisions of the U.S.S.R. as of April, 1941.

6. Industrial Centers of the U.S.S.R.

7. a. Agricultural Areas of European Russia.

"F. Agricultural Areas of Asiatic Russia.

8. Armed Forces U.S.S.R.

9. a. Northern Routes into Soviet Russia.

"F. Southern Routes into Soviet Russia.

10. a. Air Fields Supporting the Western Front,

"b. Sketch Map of Tenth Kilometer Airdrome.

Is. Sketch Map of Kego Island Airdrome.

d. Sketch Map of Yagonik Airdrome.

11. "Probable Railroad Supply Network, Western Front, May 1942.

12. Vital Areas and Vulnerable Objectives.

13. Physical Map of the Soviet Union.

14. Natural Regions of the Caucasus.

15. The Kirgiz-Tadzhik Highlands (T'ien Shan Range and Pamirs),

16. The Altai Mountains and Kuznetsk Basin.

17. Defenses of Murman Bay and Kola Inlet.

18. Defenses of Archangel Bay and the Mouth of the North Dvina,


IX


IV..,

if * * -•> m ' «


A.

Survey of Means Available.

1.

General Factors.

a.

National.

(1) Political.

(a) Introduction. The people of the U.S.S.R. in

their numbers and distribution, in their ethnic divisions, in their

historical development, and in their present political administration,

exhibit major strengths and some weaknesses.

The population of the U.S.S.R. in 1939 was

exceeded only by India and China; losses have reduced it by 30$. Two-

thirds of the remaining population live west of the Volga River.

The multiplicity of ethnic groups in the U.S.S.Rf

16 major nationalities (represented in constituent republics) and in­
numerable minorities--renders uniform government policy difficult.

Separatism is not, howevef, an
important problem. Great Russians

(58y£) and other Indo-Europeans comprise B0% of the population; Turkic

tribes, 14$; and the rest, 6%. The Russians are still largely Greek

Orthodox in religion; most of the Turkic peoples are Sunnite Moslems.

The Russians live largely in the cultivable areas of European Russia

and Western Siberia; scattered near rivers and railroads elsewhere.

The Finno-Ugrians live in the forests and tundras of Northern Russia

and Siberia west of the Yenisei River- The Turkic groups predominate

everywhere in Central Asia except the Ferghana Valley, which is Tadzhik

(Indo-European) territory. The Mongol-Tungus-Manchu are found primarily

in the Far East; west of Lake Baikal, the principal groups are the

Kalmyk along the Volga and near Biisk, the Buriat north of Irkutsk, and

the Tungus along the Yenisei River. The Japhetides are indigenous to

the Caucasus. In general, one-third of the population of that area is

Russian; the rest, including the Japhetides, are quite heterogeneous,

the result of the crossroads location of the Caucasus since time

immemorial.

Russian history is the record of centralized

authority--Czarist or Communist--uniting a confusion of peoples and

environments. Russia's strength has been proportional to the firmness

of its ruler. The government was strong during the successful repulses

of Charles XII and Napoleon; weak, before the Mongol conquest and the

defeat by the Central Powers in World War j. Russia's outstanding


^-J^wi'«^uV]iriiH!l


weakness has been its technological backwardness. Nevertheless, its

record of territorial expansion has only been equaled by the colonial

expansion of the British Empire.

Nine periods may be noted in the historical

development of Russia. An obscure early history from about 4000 B.C.

was climaxed by the formation of a Slavic state at Novgorod under Rurik,

about 860 A.D. However, Kiev was the dominant Russian principality

until the Mongol conquest in 1237. The Mongol period, with its strong

oriental influences, lasted for more than two centuries. Russia's

growing nationalism after the overthrow of the Mongols was influenced

by orientation to the west, with Polish, English and Dutch contacts.

Siberia was conquered at this time; but internal dissension was great.

From Peter the Great to the Crimean War, great territorial expansion

and westernization stabilized Russia externally, internally and

diplomatically as a European power. Between the Crimean and the Russo-

Japanese Wars, Russia was on the defensive in Europe, weakened by

internal corruption. Expansion in the Far East and Central Asia con­
tinued, however. The decay of Czarism progressed until Russian defeat

and revolution in 1917. The Communist Party assumed power and began

the formation of the U.S.S.R. After 1927, Stalin emerged as sole

leader of the U.S.S.R. Gradually, he orientated Russia toward nation­
alism. On June 22, 1941, Germany attacked Russia.

Theoretically, the Soviet Union is a socialist

state operating with minimal central control for the good of the

proletariat, whose will is expressed through a hierarchy of elective

Soviets.

The present government of the U.S.S.R. is

actually the dictatorship of Stalin, head of the Communist Party which

•shapes basic policies. This dictatorship is guaranteed by the police

activities of the N.K.V.D. Government leaders are prominent in ratio

to their Party status; the most important state offices are invariably

occupied by Party leaders. All phases of life in the U.S.S.R. are

centrally governed; franchise as such is farcical. All votes are

determined by party will; oppositionists are liquidated. Territorial

administrative divisions, based on nationality and economic efficiency,

are unimportant in themselves.

(b) Density of Population. (See Map 1 and Table I ) .

The U.S.S.R. in 1939 had a population of 170,000,000, exceeded only by

India and China; conquests the next year gained 20,000,000 more. Russia's

most densely populated areas, however, containing 30$ of the population,

were lost at the outset of tho war. Of the total remaining population,

over two-thirds is west of the Volga, including the Caucasus. The Ural


2 ­

industrial areas, Western Siberia south of the Vasyuganye (or Great

Siberian Marshland) and north of Kazakhstan, and the oases of Central

Asia contain most of the remainder. Other Siberian and Central Asian

regions are sparsely settled, mostly by nomadic tribes untutored in the

needs of modern warfare and industry necessary to support the Soviet

army. The high birth and death rates result in an unusually large

proportion of children. Fifty-two per cent of the population is female;

forty-eight per cent, male. Total manpower between 15 and 49 years is

40,000,000. Most of the U.S.S.R. is rural; Moscow (4,137,000) and

Leningrad (3,194,000) are the only cities with a population over one

million. Concentration of the population between the front line and the

Volga allows massive resistance and construction of dense fortifications

Loss of this area, however, would deplete Russia's manpower.

Table I.
Political Division.

Population Totals.

Population.

Density of Population.

(2.59 Sq. Kil. = 1 Sq. Mi

Sq. Kil
(Sq. Mi.)

6.7
170,000,000
( 2.6)
6.5
108,809,469
( 2.5)
66.0
(25.5)
31,850,307
3,209,727
37.2
(14.4)
(19.7)
3,542,289
50.9
1,281,599
42.7
(16.5)
1,253,985
2.8
( LI)
16.9
6,282,445
( 6.5)
10.3
1,485,091
( 4.0)
2.2
6,145,937
( .8)
7.4
1,459,301
( 2.9)
(c) Ethnic Groups.
(1) General. The multiplicity of ethnic groups

in the U.S.S.R. renders any uniform government policy difficult. The

Soviet government controls these numerous peoples by exercising strict

rule from Moscow administered through policing and espionage—the

N.K.V.D. and the Communist Party—and by creating territorial-administra­
tive divisions according to racial differences, thus fostering limited

local autonomy. Each of the 16 constituent republics represents a

national majority; political subdivisions, national minorities. The

long historical intermingling of these peoples has reduced separatism

somewhat. The melting-pot tradition illustrates great assimilative

powers and facilitates further expansion and absorption.

(2) Quantitative Ethnic Composition. Great

U.S.S.R.
R.S.F.S.R.
Ukrainian S.S.R.
Azerbaidzhan S.S.R.
Georgian S.S.R.
Armenian S.S.R.
Turkmen S.S.R.
Uzbek S.S.R.
Tadzhik S.S.R.
Kazakh S.S.R.
Kirghiz S.S.R.

VJW

h


'4 -J


Russians form 58% of the population, Ukrainians 17$, White Russians 3$,

Uzbeks 3$, Tatars 3$, Kazakhs 2$, Jews 2$, Azerbaidzhans 1$, Georgians

1$, and Armenians 1$. No other nationality listed in the 1939 census

numbers 1$. Russians and other Indo-Europeans comprise about 80$ of

the population, Turkic tribes 14$, and the rest 6$.

(Z) Languages. Each nationality speaks its

native tongue, but Russian~is the secondary language in all U.S.S.U.

republics. Russian is taught in all schools, and since the Soviets

simplified Czarist forms its use has become much more widespread.

The four general language groups in the

U.S.S.R. comprise the following percentages of the population*

Indo-Europeans, 80$; Russians 78$, Armenians

1%, Poles and Germans 1$.

Altaic peoples, 16$; Turkic branch 14$,

Manchu-Tungus-Mongol branch 1$.

Finno-Ugrians, 1$.

Japhetides, peoples living exclusively in

the Caucasus, 3%; Georgians 1%, Abkhaz-Cherkess group, Chechen, and

Lesghin tribes, 2$.

Semites, mainly Jews, 1$.

(4) Religion. Russians primarily are believers

of the Greek Orthodox faith, the official State religion of Czarist

Russia. There are some Roman Catholics and Protestants. Most of the

Turkic tribes are Sunnite Moslems. Mongols as a rule are Buddhists.

Russian political domination has had little influence on the native

religions of nationalities, except for the present younger generation of

Russians who have been versed in Communism and may be generally anti­
religious.

(5) Ethnic Distribution of Peoples in the

U.S.S.R. (See Map 2). Indo-Europeans, mainly Russians, live all over

the U.S.S.R., largely in cultivable areas of European Russia and Western

Siberia; scattered near rivers and railroads elsewhere. The portage

system had great influence on Russian expansion and settlement- Russians

are overwhelmingly Slav, but near ethnic boundaries show marked admixture

with neighboring nationalities. Great Russians, forming tho bulk of the

entire population, live mostly in the R.S.F.S.R. in European Russia

around Moscow. They were known as Muscovite Russians, having settled

around Moscow after the Mongol invasion forced them from Kiev. They were


4 ­

modified somewhat by association with Finno-Ugrians, mainly Finns and

Estonians. In Asiatic Russia, Great Russians have spread in a dense

belt along the cultivable prairie land lying between the 50th and 60th

parallels as far as the Yenisei River, along which a ribbon of Russian

penetration has reached the Arctic. Russian settlements are scattered

like islands in the Turkic republics. Ukrainians, known also as Little

Russians, live mostly in the Ukrainian "373TE. in "the heart of old Russia

around Kiev. They have been modified by their association with the

Germans, Austrians, Poles, and Jews. Since the war Poles and Germans,

formerly concentrated along the Volga in European Russia in R.S.F.S.R.,

Ukrainian S.S.R., and White Russian S.S.R., have been moved to Central

Asia and Siberia. Tadzhik, an Indo-European tribe of Turkestan, occupies

the Tadzhik S.S.R. The Tadzhik speak New Persian, but have been in­
fluenced greatly by Turkic culture. In the Tadzhik S.S.R. are numerous

Iranians, the original inhabitants of southern Turkestan who were either

driven out or physically modified by numerous invasions.*

Finno-Ugrians are located in the Kola

peninsula and in northern Russia east of "bhe 40th meridian between the

60th and 65th parallels in a belt lying north of Slavic preponderance

*
The following peoples of the U.S.S.R. live in territory now under

German occupation:

"White Russians are concentrated mostly in the White Russian S.S.R.,

in the regions occupied after the Mongolian invasion. Though their

association primarily with the Poles and Lithuanians has influenced

them somewhat, they have probably retained more distinctive character­
istics of their race than the Great Russians or Ukrainians.

Baltic peoples—Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians—are a mixture

of old Indo-European and Finno-Ugrian groups and live on the Baltic Sea

in their respective republics. Racial identity of the Lithuanians is

controversial; it is probably more closely related to the Slav than the

Finno-Ugrian, although there is some admixture of both. Their language

is Balto-Slavic. Latvians are a branch of Lithuanians, though the

Latvian S.S.R. is populated partly by Estonians. Livonians, former

inhabitants of the present Latvia and now practically extinct, were

more closely related linguistically to Estonians than Lithuanians.

Estonians are Finno-Ugrians, and havo the strongest ethnic distinctiveness

"of the Baltic peoples.


- 5­

and extending to the Yenisei, especially along the Ob River. The Finns

have intermingled with the incoming Slav population. Their culture is

most evident among the forests and marshes south of the tundra zone,

and along the central course of the Volga* Karelians inhabit the

Karelian-Finnish S.S.R.; Samoyeds, ancient inhabitants of Northern

Siberia, live in the tundras north of the 65th parallel to the north­
east of the Finns; and Mari (Chuvash) and Komi (Permians), the Ifoscow

and Molotov areas respectively. Other Finno-Ugrians, numerically small,

are scattered over northern Russia.

Japhetides.

(See (6)).


Turkic peoples, members of the Altaic

family and second in number to the Russians, live mostly in Turkestan

and among Russians in southern Siberia and Tungus in northern Siberia.

The Sarts, Iranian Turks, live in the Uzbek and Turkmen republics. The

Kazakh, known originally as Kirghiz-Kazakh, live in the Kazakh S.S.R.

and in the Bashkir Oblast of the R.S.F.S.R. The Kirghiz, a branch of

the Kirghiz known originally as Kara-Kirghiz, inhabit the Kirghiz S.S.R.

near the Tyan-Shan Mountains. The Uzbek, a conglomerate of Turkic

tribes, with a mixture of Mongolic and Iranian elements, and speaking

the Turkic language, occupy the Uzbek S.S.R. Uzbek is related to

Kirghiz, and together form the bulk of the population of Turkestan.

The Turkmen, a Turkic tribe closely related to the Kirghiz, particularly

the Uzbek, influenced more by the Iranians than by any other Turkestan

tribe, live in the Turkmen S,S,R. The Yakut live in northern Siberia

south of the Khatanga Gulf. The Kara-Kalpak live in the Uzbek S.S.R,

Lesser Turkic groups are scattered among the Russians in the Altaic Krai,

Mongol-Tungus-Manchu, members of the Altaic

family, are thinly scattered over most of the Eastern Siberian Krai.

The principal Mongols are the Kalmyk (Oirot), who live in the Kalmyk

A.S.S.R. near the Volga mouth and in the southern part of the Altaic

Krai near Biisk, and the Buriat, in the Krasnoyarsk Krai north of

Irkutsk near Lake Baikal. The Tungus live in the northern part of

Krasnoyarsk Krai, as well as over an enormous territory to the

east,

(6) Ethnic Groups in the Caucasus. The peoples

of the Caucasus are divided into three general groups. Russian conquer­
ors and other Indo-Europeans, including the Iranian Ossetes, comprise

about six of the ten millions; aborigines classified as Japhetides,

having no recognizable racial or linguistic connection with any people

outside the Caucasus, number less than a million; aborigines having

racial affilitations outside the Caucasus comprise the rest. The only

nationalities including mare than 1% of the population are: Russians

30$; Azerbaidzhans 15$, Armenians 13$, Georgians 11$, the Leaghian

tribes 5$, the Chechen 2$, and tho Abkhas-Cherkess group Z%.


-

.6

•*•


Languages* The languages of the Caucasus,

like the physical anthropology, are very mixed. Most of these peoples

use their native dialect for ordinary conversation and the ancient lan­
guage of their nationality for church and literary use. There are five

language groups in the Caucasus: Japhetides, 20$ — Georgians 11$,

Abkhaz 1$, Cherkess 1$, Chechen 2$, Lesghian tribes 5%; Japhetized

Indo-Europeans 3$ — Kurd 1$, Ossete 1$, Tate 1$; Indo-Europeans 46$ ~

Russians 30%, Armenians 13$, Greeks 1$, Germans 1$, others 1$; Semitic

peoples, Jews, 1$; Turkic peoples 18$ — Azerbaidzhan 15$, Kumyk ljTJ

Nogais 1$, Kirghiz 1$; Manchu-Tungus-Mongol, Kalmyk, 1$.


Ethnic Distribution in the Caucasus.

(See Map 3). The ethnic groups live mostly in the localities cited;

however, since many of them are nomads, small bands of various affilia­
tions may be scattered throughout the Caucasus. Georgians, Japhetides

of the southern Caucasus, live in the Georgian (Gruzian) S.S.R. Abkha­
zians, Japhetides of the west Caucasus, of the Abkhaz-Cherkess group,

inhabit the Abkhazian A.S.S.R. Cherkess, also called Adygei, Japhe­
tides of the Abkhaz-Cherkess group consisting of many differently

named tribes living in the west Caucasus, occupy the Cherkess Autono­
mous Oblast and the Adygei Autonomous Oblast. Kabardin, the chief

tribe of the Cherkess, live in the Kabardino-Balkarian A.S.S.R. The

Chechen group, Japhetides of the east Caucasus, dwell in the Checheno-

Ingushian A.S.S.R. The Lesghian group, also east Caucasian Japhetides,

are Dagestan tribes comprising the population of the Dagestan A.S.S.R.

and living' in the Agerbaidzhan S<S.R. Kurds, Japhetized Indo-Euro­
peans, are found in the Armenian S.S.R. Ossetes, Japhetized Indo-

Europeans, live in central Caucasus in the North and South Osetian

Autonomous Oblasts. Tates, Japhetized Indo-Europeans, live in the

Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. Russians comprise the majority of the population

in the north Caucasus, particularly in the Krasnodar Krai. Great

Russians live all over the Caucasus, evidently in regions sparsely

settled, and Little Russians live in Krasnodar Krai and Ukrainian

S.S.R. Armenians, Indo-Europeans, live in the Armenian S.S.R.

Greeks, Indo-Europeans, are located mostly in the region of the Sea

of Azov. Germans, Indo-Europeans, are located in the region of the

Sea of Azov, and in the North Caucasus in the Krasnodar Krai and

Ordzhonikidze Krai. Jews, the leading Semitic peoples in the Cauca­
sus, though there are some Aissor and Arabs, live in colonies in the

Dnepropetrovsk Oblast of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and on the southern

shores of the eastern arm of the Sea of Azov in the Krasnodar Krai.

Those dwelling generally in the region of the 42nd parallel are

mostly Georgian and Gorsky or Mountain Jews, and differ somewhat from

the Armenian Jews. The Jews are ancient dwellers of the country, hav­
ing mixed with the Caucasian population and adopted the speech and


- 7 ­

customs of those peoples with whom they came .in contact. Azerbaid­
zhani, belonging to the Turkic branch of the Altaic peoples occupy

the Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. and are found in the Dagestan A.S.S.R. They

are scattered through the Armenian S.S.R., especially in the Nakhi­
chevan A.S.S.R,, an Azerbaidzhan province in the southern part of the

Armenian S.S.R. Kumyk belong to the Turkic Branch of Altaic peoples

and live in northeastern part of Dagestan A.S.S.R. Nogais belong to

the Turkic Branch of the Altaic peoples and inhabit the Steppes

between the Kuma and Terek Rivers, in the Northern Dagestan A.S.S.R.

and eastern part of the Ordzhonikidze Krai on the Caspian Sea. The

Kirghiz of the Caucasus are a branch of the Kazakh (formerly called

Kirghiz-Kaisak) a Turkic tribe inhabiting the Kazakh S.S.R.

(d) Historical Growth of the U.S.S.R. (See Map

4 and Table II). Russian history is the record of a centralized

authority—Czarist or Communist—uniting a confusion of peoples and

environments. Russia has been strong if controlled by iron-clad

rule, weak otherwise. Itsfetoryis one of alternating influences

from the East and I/Vest thrusting modern progress onto a country

characteristically backward, yet constantly expanding and growing in

power. Its present outstanding weakness, technological dependence

on the West, was lessened by Stalin*s forced industrialization; in

the past, Peter's westernization and Genghis Khan's orientalization

similarly raised Russia's cultural level#

The people of Russia have been restless

pioneers. Peasant families and half-wild Cossacks, fighting and

mixing with native tribes, expanded Russia. Their stamina in

war and peace has been incredible. Ignorant yet avidly eager for

knowledge, stolid yet stubborn and undisciplined, compassionate

and callous, submissive and rebellious, the Russians have been

an enigmatic people.

Historically, Russia's strength has been pro­
portionate to that of its ruler. With stable government Russia has

resisted tremendous onslaughts as those by Charles XII and Napoleon;

with internal weakness it fell to the Mongols and collapsed in World

War I. Dictators, organizers,, realists desirous of personal aggran­
dizement and sovereign control have done most for Russia. Her innum­
erable factions have demanded a firm, even ruthless, rule. Fear and

terror have been determining factors; liberty and justice according to

western standards have been unknown. Rather, revolutionary tendencies,

always latent in Russia, have been used by strong rulers for the co­

ordinated development and expansion of the country,
and cultivated Siberia.


Exiles conquered


Loyal opposition to the government and demo­
cratic processes have never been a constructive influence in Russia.

Many leaders had liberalistic aspirations, but mild liberalism co­
existing with secret terrorism simply resulted in internal corruption

and finally disaster.

(1) From the Beginning to Rurik. (4000 B.C. ­
860 A.D.). Russia's history begins in Central Asia at Anau where

domesticated horses and camels were found about 4000 B.C. and in the

North Caucasus where a pastoral and metal-working civilization connected

with Mesopotamia existed about 3500 B.C. The political unit of Russia,

however, did not appear until the tenth century A.D. Slavic culture

appeared about 3000 B.C. Eastern Slavs were not in Russia until

400 A.D.; they settled in the Ukraine near the Pripet Marshes, a region

which became the melting pot for three groups of peoples; hunters and

fishermen from Scandinavia, probably Finno-Ugrians; peasant farmers

from the Ukraine and Balkans, probably Indo-Europeans; and nomads from

Central Asia and the North Caucasus, probably Altaic peoples, mainly

Turks, Huns, and Scyths.

The numerous cultures of these peoples

were leavened by influence from the West, primarily by Greek colonists

in the Crimea about the fifth century B.C., the Romans and Persians

following the Macedonian Wars by the second century B.C., and Teutons

and Huns migrating from the north and south respectively between the

fourth and sixth centuries A.D. Byzantine culture exerted the greatest

influence on Russia. Trade routes between Scandinavia and Constantinople

crossed Russia. Merchants, particularly from Byzantium, did not

attempt to conquer Russia, but their culture strongly influenced

Russian life, religion and art. Scandinavian Vikings called Varangians

or Rus penetrated northern Russia, and gradually established political

domination over the Slav communities. According to tradition the Scandi­
navian Rurik ruled in Novgorod, the largest and northernmost of the

Russian principalities, in the ninth century. He is recognized as the

founder of the Russian dynasty.

(860-1237).

(Z) From Rurik to Genghis Khan
Several Slavic states ruled by Grand Dukes developed. Having no

central ruler encouraged rivalry and internal warfare. Disunity made

Russia an easy prey to the invading Golden Horde. Kiev, the heart of

old Russia, was the most powerful and centrally located of the 12

Russian principalities of the Middle Ages. Trade with the Byzantine

Empire continued; its influence predominated during the reigns of


iUbh

Russia's first rulers of consequence, Vladimir and Yaroslav. Shifting

trade routes and internal dissension, together with the Mongol in­
vasion, caused the downfall of Kiev and, with" it, Russia.

(£) Genghis Khan to Ivan the Great. (1237 ­
1462.
The invasion of the Mongols and allied Turks or Tatars resulted

in a great physical movement of Eastern and Western peoples converging

on Russia. The Tatars settled particularly around Kazan, their capital;

introduced Oriental culture and Islam; and extended their influence to

the Arctic. Western influence resulted primarily from emissaries sent

from foreign courts to Genghis Khan, the most important being Friar

Rubruk, a Franciscan monk, whose medieval travels did much to westernize

Russians of that day.

Under the Mongols Russia was centralized

and unified. Superior to their conquerors, the Russians were never

absorbed by them, although the mingling of Oriental and Occidental

cultures was profoundly felt. Traces of Mongol culture are evident

in Russia today. Under the Tatars Russian leaders were responsible

to a higher authority; they united against the common foe, and built

a protective system based on conciliation and submission. Technical

advances resulted. The development of horsemanship bore particular

relation to the growth of Cossacks, free men who ran away from the crown

and colonized on Russian borders. Culturally, the Turks brought in a

strong sophisticating influence, particularly through luxuries and

literature, from Persia and eventually from India. Oriental governmental

methods emphasizing centralized authority weakened the western feu­
dalistic system then extant in Russia; and with the rising absolutism

of rulers, Grand Dukes and their Imperial Guards became supreme.

Oriental influence was gradually weakened

of a national center at Moscow and a national leader, Ivan

The political unit of Russia emerged, the Tatars were over­
Hanseatic League was broken, and Russian influence was

the Urals. Russia became a Western power.

(4) Ivan the Great to Peter the Great (1462­
1689.
Russia's growing naTionalism was influenced by orientation to

the west primarily through contact with the Poles in the Ukraine, and

English and Dutch traders in Northern Russia and Siberia. Polish

dominance in the Ukraine, responsible for present differences between

Great Russia and the Ukraine, Cossack territory at that time, increased

until Russia defeated Poland in battle. Trade with England and Holland

resulted from the opening of the Archangel route, spurred the develop­
ment of trading cities in Northern Russia, and stimulated Siberian ex­
ploration where fur trade attracted Russians and Europeans. Colonization

by the rise
the Great.
thrown, the
extended to

wai^J

t(%


in Siberia began, especially by Cossack pioneers under Yermak; Cossack

power increased. Internal government was strengthened somewhat by the

"Zemski sobor", a representative assembly created mainly to oppose the

boyars. The church became independent of Constantinople. Printing

was introduced.

After the death of Ivan the Terrible no

national sovereign until Peter the Great was able to control the con­
flicts between boyars and lower classes, principally Cossacks. A

period of utter confusion resulted, until the rise of the Romanov

dynasty gradually restored order.

(5) Peter the Great to the Crimean War
(1689­
1853). Great territorial expansion and westernization stabilized Russia

internally and diplomatically as a European power. Fear of her in­
creasing strength finally brought on the Crimean War- The search for

technological equality with the West was accompanied by industriali­
zation and revolutionary uprisings.

Russia's contact with the West increased

during the reign of Peter the Great; and her position as a European

power was established when Peter defeated Charles XII of Sweden at

Poltava, thereby gaining an outlet to the Baltic Sea. Peter stimulated

scientific exploration in Russia, founded the Russian Academy of Sciences

after the model of the London Royal Society, and introduced many other

ideas to Russia after his tour of Europe. In addition he founded the

city of St. Petersburg as Russia's first industrial and shipping center,

the capital and gateway to the west.

Russia under Catherine the Great continued

to expand mainly in Poland—annexed after three partitions—the Caucasus,

and the Balkans. A Pan-Slavic movement was started. Internally,

Catherine was responsible for building up Cossack and German influence.

She integrated the Cossacks into the Russian imperial system by giving

them a recognized political status and by transplanting their leaders

on various estates. She fostered the settlement of the Volga Germans

whose later influence became tremendous. Many reforms initiated by

Peter matured during her time.

Territorial expansion continued under

Alexander I. By 1812 the Russians reached California, after exploring

and claiming Alaska. Russia proved her strength against Napoleon, and

Alexander became known as the "Savior" of Europe. England and Franco

began to fear Russia's increasing strength; finally, they joined Turkey

in the Crimean War against Russia.


-11 ­

Russia's defeat was probably due to a

weakened internal condition which had been developing since the Congress

of Vienna. An intellectual class arose in 1830 which threatened the

stability of the crown. Revolutionary ideas, entering Russia first

through soldiers who had come in contact with the West as they drove

Napoleon to Paris, were fostered by the nobility—intellectuals who

were to become the backbone of revolution in Russia. A minor uprising

in December 1825, though unimportant in itself, indicated the coming

democratic movement. Industrialization entered Russia. Railroads began

in 1838, and the increasing influx of Western capital led to various

concessions to foreigners, and to the formation of industrial cities,

capitalists and proletariat. Labor troubles arose. An intense Russi­
fication of Poland followed revolution there.

After the Crimean War, Russia was forced

back within her boundaries, and excluded from European power politics.

The crown came face to face with internal dissension formerly avertible

by external activity.

(6) Crimean War to the Russo-Japanese War

(1853-1904). This period, during which Russia was on the defensive in

Europe is marked by internal corruption which weakened the state and

encouraged the growth of disruptive elements within it. In the central

government, the crown, unable to control its subjects, enforced its

rule by terror and espionage. Court corruption was heightened by

foreign financial entanglements which increased constantly. Within

the government two opposition factors, liberals and reactionaries,

gained strength. The leading revolutionaries, mainly intellectuals,

men like Tolstoy, Prince Kropotkin, and Lenin (Ulianov), were members

of the upper class; reactionaries were mostly members of jingoistic

groups activating war primarily with Japan, and later with Germany.

Corruption existed in the church. Territorial expansion continued,

mainly in the North Caucasus and Turkistan, principally under the

leadership of Von Kaufmann. Przywalski led military-scientific

expeditions into Central Asia which aroused great English anxiety.

Muraviev consolidated the Par East and began Russian expansion into

Manchuria. The Trans-Siberian Railroad, a major construction project,

was startedo

Industrialization continued. The pro­
letariat became a major revolutionary force„ Liberation of the serfs

only disturbed an already precarious internal situation. Agricultural

conditions grew steadily worse, and resulted in a great famine toward

the turn of the century. Growing conflicts between the aristocracy

and intelligentsia increased internal dissension. Revolutionary


- 12 ­

societies became powerful forces; the principal ones were the Social

Democrats, industrial workers (the Bolsheviks led by Lenin were the

extreme left wing of this group); Social Revolutionaries, jingoists

and terroists inspired by earlier Populist movements; and Liberal

Unionists, intelligentsia, desiring a liberal constitution (the most

important group at the time).

{]) The Decay of Czar ism
(190.4-1917).

Russia's foreign policy and internal corruption caused the decay and

final collapse of Czarism. Her Far Eastern policy provoked the war in

which Japan at last defeated Russia overwhelmingly. Internally the

crown was wracked by graft and corruption. It sought to quell internal

disturbances on the one hand by increasing terrorism--the Black Hundreds

were created to augment the Okhrana--and on the other by attempting to

reform autocratic methods, but efforts were insufficient. A constitution,

granted after strikes by industrial workers in 1905, failed to solve

ever increasing problems.

Germany's strengthening position was a

constant threat to Russia, and resulted in a series of pacts with

England and France prior to Germany's attack on Russia in August 1914.

During the war Russian troops suffered devastating defeats. Corruption

was revealed within the army as well as in the court. General

Sukhomlinov was proved traitorous. The aristocracy's corruption was

particularly evident in the Czarina's involvements with Rasputin and

other powerful groups of mystics and magic healers. Dissatisfaction

increased in other circles; the condition of industrial workers and

peasants continually grew worse. Elements of revolution reached the

boiling point after continupd defeats on the battle front and at home.

In March 1917 the aristocracy revolted.

The Duma refused to obey imperial orders and set up its own Provisional

Government headed by Alexander Kerensky, a Socialist and Minister of

Justice. This band of intellectuals failed, too, because they refused

to be realistic in their dealings with the fundamental revolutionaries-­
workers and peasants--whose strength was increased by the continual

defeats of their enemies at home and abroad, and who finally seized the

government by force in November. They were Bolsheviks headed by Lenin

and Trotsky, who had been sent from Switzerland via Germany in a sealed

car to foment revolt. They made peace with Germany in March 1918.

Much territory was lost including Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Baltic

provinces, Finland and Transcaucasia. German occupation attempts, how­
ever, renewed bitter resistance particularly in the Ukraine.

(8) The Communist Experiment
(1917-1927).

This period is marked by the assumption of power by the Communist Party


and subsequent formation of the U.S.S.R.; the intervention and growth'

of the Party as the nucleus of Russian nationalism; the foundation of

the Third International and spread of Communism abroad; and reconquest

of former Russian territory. After Brest-Litovsk, Russia was the scene

of allied intervention, under the guise of quelling the revolution.

Civil war between the White and Red Armies resulted in even greater

turmoil than existed before, and demanded over-all control to restore

order. The German occupation of the Ukraine and the famine of 1921 added

to need for a change in policy.

The Communist Party of Bolsheviks,

victorious in the Civil War, seized control and with the Red Army,

the only nationalistic movement in Russia at that time, became the

strongest force in the country. It took the name of Council of People's

Commissars and drew up a constitution. Lenin became dictator of the

party; Trotsky, Commissar of Foreign Affairs; and Stalin, Commissar of

National Minorities. To protect itself and crush opposition, the

Communist Party organized the Cheka, later the N.K.V.D., which served

the same purpose as the Czarist Okhrana. The strength of the Party

continued to grow, and the Third International (Communist organization

founded in 1919 for world revolution) dominated Soviet Russian politics.

Through the Party Russian nationalism found expression. Economic

failure resulted in formation of the New Economic Policy, a drastic

economic revision resulting from economic failure, due primarily to

Allied blockade and continual uprisings. The U.S.S.R. sought economic

cooperation with other countries, especially Germany. Communism was

felt abroad. Revolutions in border countries were fostered, especially

in Hungary and Poland until stopped by the French; and in China and

Mongolia until stopped by Japanese pressure on China and by Sun Yat Sen's

anti-Communistic successor, Chiang-Kai-Shek. Russian territorial ex­
pansion revived under Communism or Bolshevik imperialism. The recon­
quest of Russian territory proceeded, particularly in the Caucasus and

Turkistan.

(9) Rise of Stalin and Soviet Nationalism

(1927-1942). Stalin entrenched himself as dictator of the U.S.S.R. He

stabilized Russia internally by eliminating all Party irrelevancies and

strengthening economic and scientific development; externally, by re­
establishing world recognition. He inculcated in the people the spirit

of nationalism. In June 1941 Russia was a stronger nation than she had

been before.

By 1937 Stalin was the unchallenged leader

of the U.S.S.R. Appointed Secretary-General of the Communist Party by

Lenin in 1921, he gradually rose to power through Lenin's death and

Trotsky's defeat. Trotsky maintained, according to Lenin, that Communism


- 14 ­

in one country was anomalous. Stalin, formulating his policy afterward,

accused Trotsky of deviating from the Party line, and had him expelled

from the Union. Bukharin and other "Rightists" were also expelled, and

from 1936 a series of purges liquidated other oppositionists. Stalin

strengthened the economic policy of the country by a series of five-

year plans to collectivize and socialize industry and agriculture, and

to equalize the U.S.S.R. technologically with other world powers.

Scientific development and efforts to raise literacy were promoted; the

continual Russian search for knowledge was turned into military and

national channels. The University of Tashkent was founded five years

after Turkistan was conquered; the double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian

Railroad was completed. The Urals became an industrial center. Stalin

established the U.S.S.R. in world politics. Nonaggression pacts with

bordering countries, recognition from leading world powers, and member­
ship in the League of Nations followed. A Democratic Constitution in­
corporated all Soviet possessions into one state. The U.S.S.R. was

established as a nationalistic and imperialistic power.

Prior to 1937, Soviet imperialism had been

idealistic, accomplished mainly by revolution; after 1937, realistic,

accomplished by military growth and territorial exploitation. The U.S.S.R,

proved its military ability against Japan in 1938, and further secured

its internal position by territorial conquest, always dormant in Russian

policy, and protection against foreign attack, particularly against

Germany whose power was steadily increasing. In September 1939, the

U.S.S.R. occupied part of Poland, attacked Finland two months later, and

occupied the Baltic States and Moldavia in June 1940. In April 1941,

the U.S.S.R. and Japan signed a nonaggression pact. The increasing

strength of Germany and Russia was mutually insurmountable. The non­
aggression pact of August 1939 which had witfi&dA actual conflict for two

years was abrogated by Germany's attack, on the U.S.S.R., June 22, 1941.

Table II: Chronology of Russian History.

1.

From the Beginning to Rurik.
4000 B.C.
400-700 A.D.

2.

First signs of ancient Slavic culture.

Eastern Slavs settled in Russia.


From Rurik to Genghis Khan.
860 A.D.
978-1015

(4Q00 B.C.-860 A.D.)


(860 A.D.-1237)


First recorded appearance of Russians at Constanti­
nople. Rurik in Novgorod.

Vladimir the Saint. Russians converted to Christi­
anity.


:

, Hi .


Table II; Chronology of Russian History.
1019-1054
3.

(1237-1462).


Mongol conquest.

Friar Rubruk, Franciscan monk, emissary to Genghis

Khan.


Ivan the Great to Peter the Great
1462-1505
1533-1584
1555
1589
1598-1613
1613-1645

5.

Greatest Russian ruler of Kievan period,


Genghis Khan to Ivan the Great
1237-1240
1250

4.

Yaroslav.

(Contd.)


(1462-1689).


Ivan the Great. First sovereign of Russia.

Ivan IV, the Terrible. Assumed title of Czar.

Trade with England opened.

Russian church independent of Constantinople.

Boris Godunov. Time of Troubles.

Michael Romanov elected Czar.


Peter the Great to the Crimean War

(1689-1853).


1689-1725
1709, July 8
1728
1762-1796
1768-1792
1772-1795
1798

Peter I, the Great.

Battle of Poltava: Peter against Charles XII.

Bering began Russian exploration of Alaska.

Catherine II (The Great).

Turkish wars.

Partitions of Poland.

Great Britain and Russian alliance, Second Coalition

against France.

1801-25
Alexander I. Defeat of Napoleon- - 1814.

1825, Dec. 26 Decembrist Uprising.

1827
Erivan captured from Persia.

1830-31
Polish Revolution.

1847
Nicholas Muraviev became Governor General of Siberia,

6.

Crimean War to the Russo-Japanese War
1853-1856
Crimean War.

1855-1881
Alexander II.

1860
Vladivostok founded.

1861, March 3 Emancipation Edict.

1863-1864
Second Polish Revolution.

1867, March 30 Cession of Alaska to U.S.

1877-78
Turkish War.

1881-94
Alexander III.


(1853-1904).


Table II: Chronology of Russian History.
1885
1891 92
1894-1917
7.

8.

Merv taken.

Great famine.

Nicholas II.


The Decay of Czarism
1904-05
1913
1914, Aug. 1

(Contd.)


(1904-1917).


Russian-Japanese War.

China recognized autonomy of Outer Mongolia.

Germany declared war on Russia.


The Communist Experiment

(1917-1927).


1917, Feb. 27
Revolution began.

Provisional Government formed.

1917, March

Bolshevik Revolution.

1917, Nov. 6

(Oct. 24)

Gregorian calendar introduced.

1918

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Peace with Central Powers.

1918, Mar. 3

1918-20

Civil War.

1918, July 10
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic formed.

1918, Dec. 30
Ukraine became part of Soviet Russia.

1919, March 2
Foundation of III International.

Hungarian Revolution.

1919

1919, Dec. 11
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic formed.

1920, April 28
Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. formed.

Polish War.

1920

1920, Aug. 11
White Russian S.S.R. formed.

Armenian S.S.R. formed.

1920, Dec. 2

1921, Feb. 25
Georgian S.S.R. formed.

1921, March 17
New Economic Policy adopted.

1922, Apr. 16
Russian-German Treaty of Rapallo. (Economic Agreement)

Stalin appointed Secretary General of Communist Party.

1922

U.S.S.R.
organized. Russia, YiThite Russia, Ukraine,

1922, Dec. 30

Transcaucasia incorporated into U.S.S.R,

Russia supported revolution in China.

1924-26

1924, Jan. 21
Lenin's death.

1925, May 12
Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzhik, Kazakh, and Kirghiz S.S.R.!s

formed.

9.

Rise of Stalin and Soviet Nationalism,
1928-32
1932-33

(1927-1942).


First Five-Year Plan.

Famine.


»

•••?
; ; , . '

.7 ­

"jr.1 Wi
• ' / " '

I!

Table II; Chronology of Russian History.
1933-37
1934
1934, Dec. 18
1936, Nov. 26
1936, Dec. 5
1938, July-Aug,
1938-42

1939, Aug. 23
1939, Sept. 22
1939, Nov. 30Mar. 31

1940, Mar. 31
1940, June 27
1940, July 21
1940, Aug. 2
1940, Aug. 3
1940, Aug. 5
1940, Aug. 6
1941, Apr. 13
1941, May 6
1941, June 20
1941, June 22

(Contd.)


Second Five-Year Plan.

Assassination of Kirov.

U.S.S.R. joined League of Nations.

German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact.

Adoption of New "Democratic" Constitution.

Japanese-Russian incidents.

Third Five-Year Plan.

Russo-German nonaggression pact.

Partition of Poland.

Russian-Finnish War.

Karelo-Finnish S.S.R. formed.

Rumania ceded Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.

Baltic States into Union.

Moldavian S.S.R. formed.

Lithuanian S.S.R. formed.

Latvian S.S.R. formed.

Estonian. S.S.R. formed.

Russian-Japanese nonaggression pact.

Stalin became Premier.

Stalin became Commissar of Defense.

Germany attacked Russia.


(e) Present Political Administration of the U.S.S.R.

(1) The Actual Political Administration of the

U.S.S.R. General Organization. Government in the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics is a dictatorship of Stalin, the leader of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the only political party in the

U.S.S.R., which shapes basic policies. The N.K.V.D. enforces Party

policies, checks all attempts at revolt and is the government's most

powerful weapon. Government leaders are the most outstanding members

of the Communist Party, and their prominence in State affairs is pro­
portionate to their Party status. Communist Party Secretaries are the

real rulers of the Soviet Union. Every territorial subdivision in the

U.S.S.R. has Party and N.K.V.D. organizations which actually control all

activities in that particular political unit.

Stalin. Stalin has been dictator of the

Soviet Union since Lenin's death, and a Party and State leader since the

Bolsheviks came into power. The only official title Stalin held until

shortly before the German invasion was Secretary-General of the Communist


Party; he now has official titles in all key positions. He is Premier

of the Soviet Union; Commissar for Defense; Chairman of the two major

bureaus of the Party's Central Committee which formulates all govern­
ment policy. (The Politburo is the smaller and more powerful of the

two, the governing board of the Central Committee and composed of the

self-perpetuating inner group which rules the Party. The Orgburo is

the organizing board composed of candidates to the Politburo.) He is

Chairman of both the Party Secretariat and Revision Commission, and a

member of both the Supreme Military Council and the Presidium of the

Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

Political Administrations. All government

administrations, controlled primarily by the Party and secondarily by

the State, are centralized under Stalin. In the U.S.S.R., every phase

of life is socialized. The central organizations are commissariats,

councils, and commissions; they control national economy, politics,

society, and culture. Government administration stems from the Central

Committee of the Communist Party and its state equivalent, the Council

of Peoples' Commissars (Sovnarkom). State administrators are responsible

to their respective Party superiors. Usually, the top administrator is

a Party leader; if he is not, the Party leader is the higher authority.

The government controls all organizations

in the U.S.S.R. through Party and State agencies. Two primary ideals

inculcated in the mind of every child in the Soviet Union are the spirit

of Communism and the need for defending it—major principles of all

U.S.S.R. organizations. Functioning primarily for the protection and

maintenance of the Soviet Union, these organizations provide a reserve

of trained personnel for the military forces. The Party's first pro­
tection is military organizations, therefore, not essentially part of

the Red Army, are of primary importance. Organizations exist for every­
one; their programs cover every conceivable subject supplementing

regular school curricula. Participation in some, however, is permissible

only to members of the Communist Party and their families. Like all

U.S.S.R. systems, these organizations are patterned after the Communist

Party, and are highly centralized. Every person in the U.S.S.R., if he

expects to receive any individual recognition, belongs to one or more

of these organizations; his personal security and well-being are pro­
portionate to his Party affiliation.

The Central government manages all phases

of life in the U.S.S.R. Minor authorities have power just so long as

they comply with orders from above. Subordinate officers often are not

local citizens, but sent from Moscow; when local authorities qualify for

leadership, however, they are appointed to office or allowed to be


elected.

National administration is the model for political subdivisions.


Principal political administrations aree

N.K.V.D. (Commissariat of Internal Affairs), the all-powerful, ubiquitous,

and omnipresent police system responsible only to the highest authorities;

Osoviakhim, "leisure time" military organization; Komsomols, Pioneers,

Ootobrists, youth organizations, primarily for civilian defense training;

Trade Unions and the Chief Administration of Labor Reserves, organization,'

to supply and control labor; and Gosplan, planning commission for

government economy.

The Franchise and the Party Cell. Indi­
viduals at the head of Party and government organizations are selected

by the district party leaders, through party cells.* Cells carry out

party policies and decisions, recruit and educate new members, assist

local party committees in propaganda work, and participate actively in

the political and economic life of the community. The elections, when

they are held, are farcical and their results negligible. Military,

naval, and even athletic heroes are frequently delegates. Election pro­
cedure as it is managed by the Party is arranged so that the percentage

of Communists increases in the higher Soviets. The Supreme Soviet is

composed entirely of Party leaders.

Candidates are usually selected from Party

leaders prominent in the local organizations. In elections, the pro­
letariat has distinct advantage over other "voters." Suffrage is on on

occupational, not territorial, basis. Delegates of workers are pro­
portionate to the number of voters, not population; workers elect five

delegates to every one for peasants. Town and factory Soviets are

directly represented in Ail-Union Congress, whereas village Soviets

have only indirect representation.

All Party oppositionists are disfranchised,

entailing deprivation of civil rights, social ostracism, and gradual

class extinction. Political prisoners, mostly Poles, at present, consti­
tute the principal disfranchised group; before the war, most dis­
franchised were former "exploiters"; i.e., bourgeoisie, private traders,

•Party cells are found in all units where there are enough people to be

of any importance. They are found in towns, villages, Soviet farms,

tractor stations, collective farms, factories, plants, schools, offices,

army units, navy units, N.K.V.D. units, and railroad units. Delegates

from these cells are appointed to district Party committees in all the

city raions, cities, districts, areas, territories, regions, republican

Party Congress, and, finally, All-Union Party Congress,


priests, and kulaks. Prisoners (usually kept in concentration camps in

Siberia) are classified as either political, criminal, or civil.

Territorial Division. Territorial-adminis­
trative divisions in the U.S.S.R. are unimportant. All power comes from

the central government; the medium is of small consequence. Continual

changing of internal boundaries in compliance with economic demands,

necessitates fluidity of state administration. Since the Soviets are

continually experimenting with their boundaries, economic statistics

are obscure and inexact.

In Czarist Russia, fiscal and military

needs determined administrative units. The Soviets, however, re-

regionalized the country on the basis of economic geography with the

"raion" as the keystone. National boundaries, regional limitations,

and new industrial techniques resulted in territorial-administrative

divisions based on nationality and economic geography.

The classifications of national units,

depending on the individual degree of autonomy, beginning with the

highest unit, are: constituent republic (theoretically able to secede

from the Union), autonomous soviet socialist republic, the autonomous

oblast, and the nationaiT'okrugT As autonomy increases, the political

unit is promoted to the next higher level. National boundaries based

on population are changed less frequently than non-national.

The classifications based on economic

efficiency, also ranging from highest to lowest, are: krais and oblasts,

large units roughly corresponding to our states (they are coordinate

terms, the krai having a larger area and a more heterogeneous popu­
lation) and raion, the fundamental economic planning unit, a region

within the radius of some industrial or agricultural center with no

particular administrative boundaries. Smaller units are rarely divided

or changed. The city raion is in some large cities, where subordinate

units are wards. In larger krais and oblasts where an intermediate

link between them and the raions seems advisable, the okrug is used*

It is composed of raions with unimportant racial minorities. (The

economic okrug should not be confused with the lowest grade in the

national classification.)

(2) The Theoretical Political Administration

of the U.S.S.R. Theoretically, the government of the U.S.S.R. is a

dictatorship of the proletariat with minimal state control, existing

for the benefit of the individual factory worker and farm laborer. A

hierarchy of soviets--councils of workers' elected representatives—


combining executive, legislative, and judicial powers, operates govern­
ment administration. The soviet with authority vested in the individual

worker is the basis of U.S.S.R. administration, all of which is

pyramidally organized.

State Organization. Government leaders

are elected; any citizen of the U.S.S.R. is eligible. Suffrage is

universal and unrestricted for every citizen of the U.S.S»R., 18 years

of age and over, engaged either in "productive work useful to society"

or enlisted in the Soviet army. The primary electoral unit is the cell,

composed of at least three members who are represented in the village,

town, and factory Soviets; then in raion Soviets. Delegates to krai

and oblast Soviets, elected directly by village, town, and factory

Soviets as well as through raion Soviets, elect delegates both to the

constituent republic in which they are situated and to the All-Union

Congress of Soviets to which delegates also come directly from village,

town, and factory Soviets. Subordinate administrative units within the

U.S.S.R. usually have theuhicameral system of-representation with supreme

local authority vested in the Executive Committees of their Supreme

Councils of Peoples1 Commissars or Deputies.

The highest representative council in the

U.S.S.R. is the Supreme Soviet, composed of five main departments which

handle state administrationT~~Of these departments,two--Soviet of the

Union and Soviet of Nationalities,--comprise the Council of Peoples'

Commissars (Sovnarkom). The system of representation is bicameral.

The five main departments of the Supreme Soviet are: Soviet of the Union

(representation according to population, with one for every 300,000

persons in the U.S.S.R.); Soviet of Nationalities (representation accord­
ing to subordinate administrative units on the following basis: 25

representatives from each constituent republic, 11 from each autonomous

republic, five from each constituent oblast, and one from each national

region); Supreme Court (elected by the Supreme Soviet); Prosecutor

(elected by the Supreme Soviet); Presidium, of the Supreme Soviet (the

governing board of the Supreme Soviet, composed of one President, 16

Vice-Presidents, one from each constituent republic, one Secretary, and

24 members),

The U.S.S.R. is a federation of 16 consti­
tuent republics. The Supreme Soviet delegates legislative power to a

Central Executive Committee (elected by Supreme Soviet) and executive

power to the Council of Peoples' Commissars, whose members arc appointed

by the Central Executive Committee. The Sovnarkom is composed of a

President, 14 Vice"Presidents, 41 Peoples' Commissars, and many Chairmen

of important government commissions. Commissars are directors of the


25 All-Union Commissariats and the 16, Union-Republic Commissariats ­
Ail-Union Commissariats (primarily

national administrations) direct activities such as defense, foreign

affairs, foreign trade, industrial projects (Five Year Plans), and

communications. Administration in these commissariats is controlled

directly from the central government of the U.S.S.R. through inter­
mediate political units. Union-Republican Commissariats (primarily

local administrations with national control) direct activities such as

internal affairs, internal trade, and local industrial projects. Local

authorities direct activities according to the central government's

orders.

Party Organization. The only difference

between Party and state organizations is that the former is more

thorough, larger and stronger in every respect. The supreme organ of

the Communist Party, the All-Union Party Congress, is supposed to meet

every three years and elect a Revision Commission, Auditing Commission,

and Central Committee. The Central Committee forms the Party policies,

convenes the Ail-Union Party Conference annually and is organized as

follows: Secretariat (four members; Stalin, Secretary-General);

Politburo (nine members, most powerful men in the U.S.S.R.) and Qrgburo

(alternates and candidates to Politburo); Commission of Party Control;

Administrations (Cadres, Propaganda, and Agitation); Departments

(Mili'bary, N.K.V.D., Navy, Railroad Commissariat, Agriculture, Schools,

Organization, and Instruction).

(3) Administrative Divisions of the U.S.S.R.

(See Map 5 ) . In April 1941 the only consequential political subdivisions

in addition to the 16 constituent republics were those within the-

R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., and White Russian S.S.R. They are

listed as follows, with parentheses indicating capitals, and asterisks

indicating German-occupied territory within political boundaries (see

Map 1 for front line as of May 1942):

R.S.F.S.R. (Moscow)*—Kraist Altai

(Barnaul), Krasnoyarsk (Krasnoyarsk), Krasnodar (Krasnodar), Ordzhonikidze

(Voroshilovsk), Primorski (Vladivostok), Khabarovsk (Kharbarovsk);

Oblasts: Arkhangelsk (Arkhangelsk), Vologda (Vologda), Gorki (Gorki),

Ivanovo (Ivanovo), Irkutsk (Irkutsk), Kalinin (Kalinin), Kirov (Kirov),

Kuibyshev (Kuibyshev), Kursk (Kursk), Leningrad (Leningrad), Molotov

(Molotov), Moscow (Moscow), Murmansk (Murmansk), Novosibirsk (Novosibirsk),

Omsk (Omsk), Orel (Orel), Penza (Penza), Rostov (Rostov-on-Don), Voronezh

(Voronezh), Ryazan (Ryazan), Saratov (Saratov), Sverdlovsk (Sverdlovsk),

Smolensk (Smolensk), Stalingrad (Stalingrad), Tambov (Tambov), Tula


(Tula), Chelyabinsk (Chelyabinsk), Chita (Chita), Chkalov (Chkalov),

Yaroslavl (Yaroslavl); A.S.S.R's; Bashkir (Ufa), Buryat-Mongolian (Ulan-

Ude), Dagestan (Makhach-KalaJ, Kabardino-Balkar (Nalchik), Kalmyk

(Elista), Komi (Syktyvkar), Crimean (Simferopol), Mari (Ioshkar-Ola),

Mordvin (Saransk), German Volga (Engels), North-Osetian (Ordzhonikidze),

Tatar (Kazan), Udmurt (Izhevsk), Checheno-Ingush (Grozny), Chuvash

(Cheboksary), Yakut (Yakutsk).

Ukrainian S.S.R. (Kiev)*—Qblasts; Vinnitsa

(Vinnitsa), Voroshilovgrad (Voroshilovgrad), Dnepropetrovsk (Dneprope­
trovsk), Zhitomir (Zhitomir), Kamenets-Podolsk (Kamenets-Podolsk), Kiev

(Kiev), Nikolayev (Nikolayev), Odessa (Odessa), Poltava (Poltava), Stalino

(Stalino), Kharkov (Kharkov), Chernigov (Chernigov), Volynian (Lutsk),

Drogobych (Drogobych), Lvov (Lvov), Rovno (Rovno), Stanislav (Stanislav),

Tarnopol (Tarnopol), Chernovitsy (Chernovitsy); A.S.S.R.: Moldavian

(Tiraspol).

White Russian S.S.R. (Minsk)*--Oblasts:

Vitebsk (Vitebsk), Gomel (Gomel), Minsk (Minsk), Mogilev (Mogilev),

Polesian (Mozyr), Brest (Brest), Belostok (Belostok), Baranovichi

(Baranovichi), Vileika (Vileika), Pinsk (Pinsk).

Other constituent republics of the U.S.S.R.

(Moscow)—Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. (Baku), Georgian S.S.R. (Tiflis), Armenian

S..S.R. (Erevan), Turkmen S.S.R. (Askhkabad), Uzbek S.S.R, (Tashkent),

Tadzhik S.S.R. (Stalinabad), Kazakh S.S.R. (Alma~Ata), Kirghiz S.S.R.

(Frunze), Karelian-Finnish S.S.R. (Petrozavodsk)*, Estonian S.S.R.

(Tallinn)*, Latvian S.S.R. (Riga)*, Lithuanian S.S.R. (Kaunas)*,

Moldavian S.S.R. (Kishinev)*.


(2) Economic Factors.

Ta) Availability of Strategical Materials. The

following "basic materials are strategic for the Soviet Union, i.e.,

those of which it has sufficient resources within its own "boundaries:

Coal
Iron ore
Crude petroleum
Manganese
Chromite
Magnesite
Cotton
Timber
Platinum


Mica

As"bestos

Potash

Boron

Phosphates

Salt'

Sulfur

Pyrites


The following are the most important critical

materials, i.e., those which must "be wholly or partially supplied from

outside sources:

Aluminum
Mercury
Nickel
Tungsten
Tin
Molybdenum
Antimony
Copper
Lead
Zinc
Ferroalloys
Rubber
Aviation gas;
lubricating oil

Machine tools; machin-

ery

Wheat

Sugar

Hides and leather

Scientific and

professional

instruments

Fats and oils

Electrodes and

abrasives.

Wool and woolen goods

Chemicals,, medicines

and dr*Ugs


To date the most important shipments from

Great Britain, Canada, and the United States have consisted of air­
craft and arms. During recent months shipments of food, metals, and

chemicals in particular have increased substantially. Food shipments

are of vital importance duo to the present severe shortage in the Soviet

Union, and even if a good harvest is obtained, food will have to "be in­
cluded in estimates of aid given to Russia during the coming year.

Although Russian industrial and agricultural

losses have "been severe, particularly in the Ukraine, the "bulk of the

country's productive capacity is still intact. Approximately 65-75^

of the country's industrial capacity remains in the hands of the


M.-irf"' nl'r ?


fltfl-.JJ..

.

"jj.. •'.

n

" A "J f'

5t" r<


Russians, and potential grain production not counting increased

plantings is "between 60-70$ of normal.

Efforts are "being made to increase the output

of food and manufactured goods in various ways, and these methods are

discussed "below under the appropriate headings. Most important are the

increase in the acreage sown to grain and other crops in the unoccupied

regions, and the maintenance of the production of strictly military

supplies which, if Lend-lease aid is included, may "be estimated at

approximately equal to pre-war output. In addition, the country is now

producing large quantities of gasoline of a"bout 85 octane at its Cauca­
sian refineries, and small increases have "been made in the output of

coal, ferrous metals, electrical equipment and some other goods in the

factories of the unoccupied areas.

It is impossible to predict whether the coun­
try can continue effective production indefinitely, since a number of

factors seriously limit both industrial and agricultural output.* In

addition, there are four situations whose aggravation or potential exist­
ence would gravely threaten the country's present agricultural and

industrial capacities. These situations are discussed below:

Possible loss of the Caucasus. Loss of the

Caucasus would mean the loss of 70-80$ of Russia's oil resources and

most of its refineries. The North Caucasus also produces a food sur­
plus even taking into account food shipments to Transcaucasia. In

addition, the Caucasus contains most of the country's remaining man­
ganese deposits, large power resources, deposits of lead, zinc, copper,

and some other metals. Moreover, it manufactures textiles, synthetic

rubber, and most of the country's cement, and contains a large number

of fish canneries.

Breakdown of the railroad system. Transporta­
tion in the Soviet Union is primarily geared to its railroads although

some goods are moved over the inland waterways during, the ice-free

season, and some overland transportation is possible in spite of the

lack of roads. At present the Russian railroads must supply the armed

forces and move troops, transport Lend-Lease goods from Murmansk,

Archangel, and Iran, and haul raw materials, finished goods, and

grain over the country's enormous distances. Railroad transportation

is very inefficient at the present time, and a complete breakdown of

the rail system would cause the collapse of the country's war effort.

*See pages 88 and 92


Possible drought. The Volga region, the east

part of the North Caucasus, the Urals, and Kazakhstan are arid regions

subject to drought. In case of severe and widespread drought in these

areas on which the Soviet Union depends for much of its grain, famine

would result. Up to now, weather conditions have been generally favor­
able but it is impossible to draw definite conclusions as yet about

this year's crops.

Labor shortage. A labor shortage exists at .

the present time, especially in the field of skilled labor. This situ­
ation will seriously reduce the country's productive capacities partic­
ularly in the highly important fields of machinery, and machine tool

building, arms, chemicals, etc.

The Russian merchant marine contains at the

present time an estimated 3^2 ships of 1,103,6jk gross tons. Of these

only 2k are in the Atlantic Convoy Route and 49 in the Siberia-United

States West Coast Route, plus about 20 additional ships in other trans­
oceanic routes. The procurement of outside supplies, therefore, depends

primarily on the shipping facilities of Great Britain and the United

States. Within the Soviet Union communications must, of course, be

maintained between Murmansk, Archangel, and Caspian ports and the inte­
rior of the country; emphasizing again the vital importance of the rail­
road system.

(b) Strategical and Critical Materials. For the

purposes of this Study, strategic materials are defined as those essen­
tial materials of which the Soviet Union has sufficient or nearly

sufficient resources. Critical materials are those essential items

which are wholly or partially lacking, and which must be supplied from

outside sources, mainly the United States, Great Britain and Canada.*

*The above definitions differ from those used by the Commodities

Division of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. The definitions of the

Army and Navy Munitions Board for strategic, critical and essential

materials as applying to the United States are as follows:

Strategical materials are those materials essential to the national

defense for the supply of which in war dependence muBt be placed in

whole, or in part, on sources outside the continental limits of the

United States and for which strict conservation and distribution control

measures will be necessary.

Critical materials are those materials essential to the national

defense, the procurement problems of which in war, while difficult, are


The materials classified as strategic and

critical are listed in the introduction.

Strategical materials. Coal -- In spite of

the loss of the Don Basin, the Soviet Union still has large coal re­
sources located in the Moscow area, the Urals, the Kuznetsk, Cheremkhovo

and Chernogorsk mines in Siberia, and the Karaganda mines in Central

Asia.

Iron ore. The chief remaining iron ore de­
posits are those of the Urals, and the Gornaya Shoriya mines in Siberia,

near Stalinsk. Certain ferroalloys and iron and steel manu£p.ctures

are, however, critical.

Crude Petroleum. From 70 to
of Soviet

crude petroleum comes from the Caucasus and most of the remainder from

the Emba fields in Central Asia, and -y^e Urals - Volga fields. The

Soviet Union is the world's third largest producer of crude petroleum,

ranking after the United States and Venezuela.

Manganese. The Soviet Union possesses a

large deposit of high grade manganese at the Chiatura mines in Georgia,

Trans Caucasus. There are also small deposits of manganese in the Urals

and Siberia.*

Phosphates. The "bulk of Russian phosphates

come from the huge nepheline deposits on the Kola Peninsula. Large

stockpiles are also reported to exist at the present time.


*The country's other large manganese deposits at Nikopol in the

Ukraine are in possession of the Germans.

(Footnote continued from preceding page:)

less serious than those of strategic materials because they can be

either domestically produced or obtained in more adequate quantities

or have a lesser degree of essentiality, and for which some degree of

conservation and distribution control will be necessary.

Essential materials neither strategic nor critical - In this classi­
fication are included those materials., essential to the national

defense for which no procurement problems in war are anticipated, but

whose status is such as to require constant surveillance because future

developments may necessitate reclassification as strategic or critical.


MATERIAL

Copper

I


Lead

TABLE III

CRITICAL MATERIALS

PRODUCTION
REASON FOR
CLASSIFICATION
NORMAL
ESTIMATED
PRESENT OUTPUT
AS CRITICAL
100,000 tons
Possibly
Insufficient pro1936 includ150,000 tons.
duction for waring copper
time needs*
extracted
both from ore
and reclaimed

metal.


SOURCE OF

OUTSIDE SUPPLY

REMARKS

i


United States
South America

27,000 tons of]

copper reques-!

ted from the j

Harriman

Mission,


58,000 tons
in 1936

Probably about
the same or
slightly higher

Insufficient production

United States
Australia (?)
United Kingdom

84,000 tons ofj

lead requested!

from the

Harriman

Mission,


63,000 tons
in 1936

Probably about
the s ame

Insufficient production partly due
to loss of a zinc
distillation plant
in the Ukraine,

United States

72,000 tons ofj

zinc requested

from the

Harriman Mis­
sion.


Insufficient production of rare

metals ­

United States


i


Zinc

Ferro! alloys
i (Vanai dium,

: tungsten,

etc.)


?

9

TABLE I I I

MATERIAL


Electrodes

and Abra­
sives


CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont.)

PRODUCTION
REASON FOR
SOURCE OF

CLASSIFICATION
OUTSIDE SUPPLY

NORMAL
ESTIMATED
PRESENT OUTPUT
AS CRITICAL
?

?

REMARKS


Insufficient
domestic
production

United States


U.S. exports

(1941)

Electrodes ­
568,000 lbs.

Abrasives ­
660,000 lbs.


Aluminum


55,000 tons
(1940 est.)

10,000 tons;
possibly
20-30,000
tons depending
on functioning
of Urals plant
and extent
Zaporozhe plant
was evacuated.

Conquest of main
production facili­
ties.

United States

Canada


114,000 tons

of aluminum

requested

from the

Harriman

Mission.


(Mercury


300-500
tons

Nil

Conquest of
Nikitovka mines,
Ukraine

Mexico via

United States


Reported

deposit

at Khai­
darkan,

Kirghiz

SSR produc­
tion, if

any, un­
known.


i





-&'••

"

'



"

-

-

"


±~ • "~'V

*=-

- ~


1-;
"

.

>^Siv

-<••

'.->


TABLE I I I

CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont. )

mTERIAL

PRODUCTION
NORMAL
ESTIMATED
PRESENT OUTPUT

REASON FOR
CLASSIFICATION
AS CRITICAL


SOURCE OF

OUTSIDE SUPPLY


Nickel

2,500-3,000
tons
(1939 est.)


About the same

Insufficient
resources

Canada

New Caledonia


Tungsten

Negligible

Negligible

Insufficient
resources

India

China


Tin

12,000 tons
(1937 est.)

About the s ame

Insuf f ic ient
resources

Bolivia via

the United

States


Molybdenum

Negligible

Negligible

Insufficient
resources


United States


I!


i

REMARKS


9,600 tons of

nickel reques­
ted from the

Harriman

Mission;

Canada is fur­
nishing 900

tons monthly;

yearly re­
quirements

estimated at

15-20,000 tons


48,000 tons of

tin requested

from the

Harriman Mis­
sion. Imports

from China via

Sinkiang.

1941 exports

of ore and

concentrates

(gross weight)

2,312 short

tons.


»r.^--2&

r^i

MATERIAL


TABLE III

CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont. )

PRODUCTION

REASON FOR

SOURCE OF

NORMAL
ESTIMATED

OUTSIDE SUPPLY

CLASSIFI CATION

AS CRITICAL

PRESENT OUTPUT


Antimony


Exact data not available:

up to 1940 production was

only about .01 - .05 of

domestic demand.


Insufficient

resources


Mexico

Bolivia


Ammuni­
tion and

Materiel


9,000 guns
6,000 tanks

Insufficient pro­
duction due to

loss of factories.


United States

Britain

Canada


1

^
^
'


Reduced by at
least 35^, i.e.,
present output
would equal
5850 guns and
3900 tanks. See
"Remarks."

REMARKS


Includes

tanks, Bren

carriers guns,

ammunition,

jeups, trucks,

parts and re­
placements.

(About 1,000

British

tanks have

been shipped.)

It is esti­
mated that

with Lend-

Lease aid

pre-war

Russian pro­
duction of

purely mili­
tary supplies

has been

maintained.


i
*•,-:.

MATERIAL

Aircraft

Cfll

TABLE I I I
CRITICAL T^TERIALS (Cont.)
PRODUCTION
REASON FOR
NORL1AL
ESTIMATED
CLASSIFICATION
PRESENT OUTPUT
AS CRITICAL
372 planes
About 175 per
See above5 also
per month
month; 78$ of
chronic lack of
(first half
factories still
efficiency.
1941)
in Russian hands
but 15% of these
are within bombing range of the
Germans.

Machine
Machine tools 3 Present capacity
tools
53j900 units
reduced because
machinery
in 1938.
of loss of big
semi-manu­
industrial
factures
centers in
of iron,
the Ukraine
steel
such as
and other
Kharkov.
metals.
270,000 units
planned for
period
1938­
1942.

Insufficient production and loss
of at least a
half-dozen
important
machine tool
plants•

SOURCE OF
OUTSIDE SUPPLY

REIIARKS

United States Pursuit and
Britain
bomber planes.
Lend-Lease
Canada
shipments
(U.S. and
Britain) more
than 2,000.

United States

From Oct. 1,
1941-May 31,
1942, export
arrivals of
machine tools
totaled 1,412
pieces, valued
at about
$7,400,000.

TABLE I I I

CRITICAL
PRODUCTION
NORMAL
ESTIMATED
PRESENT OUTPUT
Aviation

12,000 tons

Estimated

gas and

of high

possible capac­
octane gas

ity of high

lubricat­
ing oil,

(1940)

octane plants;

tetra ethyl,
1,275,000

40-50,000 tons

etc.

tons of

per year.

lubricating
Lubricating

oil (1937)

oil produc­
tion probably

not greatly

increased over

1937.


MATERIAL

Rubber

(Natural)


— _~—

_

!

:





-

-

­

50,000 tons

(approx.) of

synthetic

rubber

annually


About the same,

as the largest

Russian rubber

factories have

not been cap­
tured.


MATERIALS (Cont.)
REASON FOR
CLASSIFICATION
AS CRITICAL

SOURCE OF
OUTSIDE SUPPLYr

REMARKS

Backward refining

industry


United States
Large amounts

of high oc­
Dutch West

Indies

tane gas and

high grade

petroleum

products

shipped since

June 22, 1941.


Lack of natural

rubber and in­
sufficient syn­
thetic produc­
tion; loss of

factories in

occupied terri­
tory.


United States
72,000 tons

of rubber re­
Ceylon

quested from

the Harriman

Mission; 1942

requirements

estimated

by the Brit­
ish at

20,000 tons.


TABLE III

CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont.)

MATERIAL

PRODUCTION
NORMAL
ESTIMATED
PRESENT OUTPUT

REASON FOR
CLASSIFICATION
AS CRITICAL

Wheat and

1940 barn
production
of wheat
estimated at
30,000,000^
skeo^t tons.

Loss of the
United States Size of grain
Ukraine and Cenreserves un­
t r a l Russian a g r i c u l known. Ext u r a l area.
port a r r i ­

other
cereal
grains

Sugar

2,360,000
short tons of
granulated
sugar in 1938

An estimated*
5 million additional acres
have been sown
to grains, but
even with good
yields, the harvest will probably not be
sufficient to feed
adequately the
population of un­
occupied Russia,
(?)

SOURCE OF
OUTSIDE SUPPLYr

REMARKS

vals Oct. 1,
1941-May 31,
1942:
wheat ­
26,®D0 tons
wheat flour
-33,900 tons.
70-80$ of the
country's output
has been l o s t
through conquest.

United States Export a r r i - ti

vals Oct. 1, 1
1941-May 31, 1
1942 amounted!
to about
1
35,000 tons. I

TABLE III
CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont.)
MATERIAL

Fats and
oils

Vegetable
oil (1938)
570,000
metric tons.

Hides and.
leather

Footwear
1939
US,300,000
pairs.

''/.> ^« ­
*"""*^' i . r t

PRODUCTION
NORMAL
ESTIMATED
PRESENT OUTPUT
?

Footwear production reduced 35-45$
by war
losses.

REASON FOR
CLASSIFICATION
AS CRITICAL
Insufficient production of edible
fats and lacking
resources of
tropical oils.

Insufficient
domestic
production*

SOURCE OF

OUTSIDE SUPPLY

West Coast

Africa (palm

oil)

United States

(lard and

coconut oil)


REMARKS


U. S. Exports

(1941): Coco­
nut oil-12,500

short tons;

Shipments of

lard and butter

Oct. 1, 1941­
May 31, 1942

equaled 29,000

tons*


United States
Export arrivals

Mongolia

Oct. 1, 1941­
South America
May 31, 1942:

Sole leather;

3,766 metric

tons; Army

boots:

846,000 pairs;

British ship­
ments very

large.


TABLE III

CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont*)

MATERIAL


Wool and

woolen

goods


t>

. . . ^


Scientific

and pro­
fessional

instru­
ments.


PRODUCTION

NORMAL
ESTIMATED
PRESENT OUTPUT
1938-1939
wool output
-300 million
pounds; 1939
woolen cloth
-110,000,000
yards.

Wool at approxi­
mately the 1938­
39 level; all

textile pro-

duction re­
duced 35-40$

by losses.


REMARKS


REASON FOR

CLASSIFICATION

AS CRITICAL


SOURCE OF

OUTSIDE SUPPLY


Insufficient

domestic pro­
duction*


United States

Mongolia

South America


Large amounts .

of wool and

hair requested

from the

Harriman Mis­
sion; U.S.

export

arrivals of

army cloth

for Oct., 1,

1941-May 31,

1942 amounted

to 993,000

yards.


Insufficient

domestic

production


United States


U.Sw exports

(1941)

valued at

$1,659,000.


MATERIAL


Chemicals,

medicines,

and drugs

(opium,

quinine,

serums,

etc.)


TABLE I I I
CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont. )

REASON FOR

PRODUCTION

SOURCE OF

NORMAL
ESTIMATED
OUTSIDE SUPPLY

CLASSIFICATION

AS CRITICAL

PRESENT OUTPUT
?

?

Insuf£Lcient

domestic

production for

wartime needs


United States

(quinine,

serums, etc.)

Turkey

(opium)

United States

Toluol,

Phenol, etc.


REMARKS


Export arrivals

of medical

items, Oct. 1,

1941-May 31,

1942 valued at

$1,750,000;

large amounts

of chemicals,

blending

agents, ex­
plosives ,

etc•, also

shipped

during same

period.



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