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Diario Franz Halder 6 .pdf

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Chief of the General Staff

of the

Supreme Command of the German Army (OKH)

14 August 1939 to 24 September







Prefatory Note
Editor's Foreword


Frequent German Abbreviations and Terms
Military Districts

The Polish Campaign.

The Polish Campaign.


Part 1 : 14 August -10 September 1939
Part II: 11 September


- 9 May 1940
The Campaign in France. 10 May 1940 30 October 1940
The Second Winter. 31 October 1940 20 February 1941








The Campaign in the Balkans and Russia.
Part I: 21 February 1941 31 July 1941


- 6 December

The First Winter. 7 December 1939


VII The Campaign in Russia.

Volume VIII





Part II: 1 August 1941 -24 Sept. 1942

The Chief of the


General Staff*

First entry;


Februar3r 1941

Last entry


August 1941


•fc \u25a0& -X-


4f 7^­

21 February 1941
Things in Libya are proceeding
Morning Conference; No special news.
satisfactorily * In the Eastern Mediterranean no clues to Bri^­



Admiral Canaris? . Points, discussed;

a) The general

situation*, All briefing of the Wehrmacht (also
on naval and air matters) must be centralized in our hands,

b) British capabilities

at the outset of the operation in the

c) Preparatory measures in the Ukraine and the Baltic


d) Safeguarding of security > top secret matters*
c) Personnel matters (Change* of Section Chiefs).
Lt« Col t Radices

a) Soldiers' Memorial.. Day: Decoration of
celebrations in- Berlin and in units.


b) Army Art Exhibition opening on 16 March.
c) Organization of Propaganda


Conference with ObdHt (Heusinger present)

i Reports from the Army
Operational objectives for Barbarossa* Full agree­
ment Is reached or all proposals*,

oru0 ru IV: Current matters,.



British Air Strength, 15 February


Bomber and




Close Reconnaissance &
purpo se


Total S&uffcln.


00 incl
uding 300 Land
50 Class I
55 X
ti v
(150 h Transport and 70 Sea



180 to
192 \u25a0\u25a0







Jgypt, Libya,







Malta, Gibral­











Irak, Palestine A 535

A 55









India, Far East 60






Aden, Kenya

In the Eastern Mediterranean 20 % Second-GLass.

In East Africa, Irak, India, Far East: 60 % Second-Class.

To these mast be added the South African and Australian Air

cress in Egypt, Eastern Mediterranean, Kenya and Far East



100 South African aircraft (6 Staffeln) in Kenya (6£ % Second Class)
50 Australian aircraft (4 Staffeln) in Eg^rpt and Eastern Mediterran^.
5© Australian aircraft (4 Stafflen) in the Far East (Singapore),
Naval Aircraft
Shipborne (not including aircraft
On aircraft carriers




©n land, for new aircraft carriers, etc*
On land, for other purposes

) Of these about
) 200 are in the


22 February 19 Al.
Morning Conference?

Russian Air Force

No important new developments.


a) Air Force is
(Or g:inlkp. ti
on ) .-.


. -j.r^d)
an independent


part of the armed forces


b) Ground facilities and strength;
1100 airfields, 200 serviceable.
Estimated, strength 4,000


Equipment inferior to
5,000 bomber and fighter

aircraft. Horth of Pripet:

Reconnaissance and "bombers 1530, fighters 2200

South of Pripet:

Reconnaissance and bombers 675,
Main concentration
north of
Our Air Force considers this the final Russian disposition .«

for their concentration in the Vest. (Hew Russia pamphlet) .-rTransport aircraft and parachutists: "based on Kiev.
By next summer, it is estimated, 60$ of the above strength
will"be ready for commitment.

c) Types?.. Reconnaissance craft obsolete, range around 300 km
(a few new ones haYs- range up to 640 km); speed 150 to 250 km
Clpse- support,

Majority old types; cooperate with
Between 100 and 200 are modern (speed: 380
km, range up to 700 km) „ Armament:, only machine guns
(4 fixed forwardf iring MG)

Armd, troops.


fighters: Rata -J 16 is good; 4 machine guns, or 2 machine
guns and 2 cannon.
Inferior to the G-erman fighter (Spain);'
is slightly slower. Craft, now under construction probably
not ready for 1941.

Two-thirds good? SB 1- 3 and 1© 3, make up twc~

thirds of total. SB 1 -3, range 600 km, night and bad-,

weather craft.

(TB 3. Range 1,000 km (bomb load 2,000 kg),

Fair game
for German (BB 3. Range 1,500 km (bomb load
800 kg),




Transport craft:


Hot much is expected*


<3.) "-Traliiing, leadership and tactics:,
Fighters and bombers good while in formation; depend heavily
on lead pilot. Blind and bad-weather flying deficient.
Fighters are especially trained for action against ground
targets, but their foremost mission is to fight enemy air
force in the air and. on the ground. Between Fighter and .
bomber teamwork poor.
Leadership: Hard and "brutal, tut without training in modern
tactics; mechanical, lacking adaptability.

) .Ground

organization. Air Force Signal troops: Air force
signal troops, as we know them, are non-existent.
Only radio
Transmit- in clear in
organization scanty.
Large parts attached to flying organiza­
tions. Supply stocks apparently low.

f) Probable dispositions: See b).
Deployment will take considerable time; is being watched*.
Fighters work in close sup-port of their own and against enemy


ground troops. Close-support craft against enemy armor.
Bombers have targets in the enemy rear area. Clear nights
essential c Targets: East Prussian supply base, Silesian
industries, Romanian oil fields, Baltic ports, Berlin.



g) Ovn air strength: Our Air Force expects. Russians to have
4,00© (probably. more) plus 60§ new craft..





) Ratio .1:2
\(m bombers

If vie assume



vgn Treskow


. 1,ICO to 1,73©





AQp North

Own total:


6® % operational

Russia^, AM:


s:~d Z It



(sic) bombers

2,650 to 4^os®

Planned strength.

3^o medium, 200. light and AA MG batteries.
798 medium) AA
A a batteries.

(la ASp S) :

Discussion of our broad viewpoints regarding conduct of operation
Barbarossa in theater of. Army Group:

1») No battle at Bialystok, but at Minsk,
2.) Watch against gap between his Armj Group and Leebl
3,) Press with all means available behind southern wing so as
to obviate threat frcf flank, Technical details of build-up.


Gen* Jacob

ne ports o££ on leave.

Current matters*. •— Transmissions
attack .on Turkey,

to List of our study on

ObdH (on phone):

1.) SOBS O 8 cm AA guns to be used as "concrete crackers" for Barbaros
they needed against Russian fortifications? .
b) Can we count on having Ground Forces *A available for
ground combat?
c) Can
1© cm guns- so as to have them on hand in


. oime as




11 ?

2*) Ground forces AA units must be activated: are to fee committed
on motor highway*
have to train there ? not in 2«I»
3«) 11© Renault
Col.- Mlerainsky

* on hand:

%ough for three mobile Siege Gun Bns.,

(Foreign /irmies East): Jviission to collect most complet
fortifications A

data on enemy (Russian)


23 February 1941

Sunday^ Berlin^


y^ork on draft of Tactical Manual for Motorised Battalion*
with f|bc--Crown Pr-inceJ'" George of Saxony*,
Lecher family. l^*





(Liaison Officer to Abetz) : Situation report* Confidence
in Vichy apparently is on the rise since the Cabinet reshuffle
and' there is a desire to win our Government over to a policy of


trusting collaboration*

Yogi .

(.Armistice Commission):
a) 13^000 trucks from Occupied Zone on the way a
in moving them out.


b) Beginning March we join in control of Marocco and Algiers c
Concurrence of Rome not yet received. 1 emphasize our
interest in Algiers©



reports before leaving for Africa*

Gerio Tiemann and Lemelsen

(CG XXXXVIICorps) report.

HeuBlngerg Aerial and naval operations:


a) Dardanelles cannot be blocked with aerial mines,
We have no naval force there. Airborne landing!
In peacetime
some shipping available on Thracian coast a Can be chartered,
Importance of the Greek Aegean coast. Nothing can be expected
of Italian Navy*
Rumanian oil for Italian Navy,

tion of coastal



to Odessao

b) Operations in the Baltics Navy sees no possibilities for
active support* No protection for our coastal supply route,:
c) Hangoe: -Navy does not consider it a practical base for the
Russian fleet* Aalands Islands afford no naval bases*

a) Ready for Fifteenth i\rmd* Div., :
20 March s 1 Rifle Bn» and 1 AT Bn c
1 April t 1 Rifle Regt* and light Fd» How, Bn0
15 iLpril: Remainder,,

b) Tank complements 5 1 Mays in Hi general complete (inter-?
change of Tank 111, IV, and IIand I
Between 1 May and 15 about 3-4 Divs. come off the line,
i»e* about 5 % of the entire tank forces in the East*
15 May to 15 June one Div» comes off the line., iia c* re- .
placements would drop out for four weeks* I
suggest that
the pro tern Armd* Divs, be not activated before 1 June and
meanwhile see to it that the Armd %vs o get their tank


c) French tanks not much good in Norway •> Try to use old
Czech tanks instead c
d) 15 Brigs* (mixed Brigs*) as of 1 June (7 for East!).


25 February 1941*
Morning Conference ? Nothing of importance o Uncertainty persists as

to British intenbiciT^in the Mediterranean, ,bo'bh
in the Malta
area and in the .S.ibborn Mediterranean*


with Ob&H;

a) Personnels. la , Rommel j Rrfurth for Bulgaria*
for Fhmania. X:/lander?



b) Operation against Afghanistan,

c) Items for discussion with, Navy and Air Force.

d) Charge of duties for Konrad*

c) Tactical training for Russian campaigns

f) Tank replacements

; Whatever becomes available before start
to the front* What comes after _, will be
held for new units Location: Warsaw,

g) Supply

trains for -Libya. Combine Italian and German supply
trains* Take, trucks from Italian Divs.t

h) Preparation for continuation of iifrican operation^ Production
for itmust be under way by summer «
Heusinger ;

a) Barbarossa:

Briefing of the Divs v arriving at the front in
the last transport waves (also discussed with Training Sec.,).

te) Afghanistan
c) Gibraltar

— Persia*

- i'-alta - North

Africa (here attack on Egypt with

two Armd, Corps besides Italian units)*

d) For event that the British land in Thrace _, something must be
done to forestall them] List must be prepared for that,
c) Various

o chsner

inquiries from

List on the execution of Operation

: Current matters of Chemical Warfare and Decontamination

Thomas Current


problems of motorization of Army* Replacement of
NCO's* Training manual for Rifle Regts«> and Rifle

Bns« In Armd* Divs,





War Academy?


Visit to courses conducted 1, by Ifeyeraben.JU Bluimke, Siaedke. Impression
on the whole good* Afterwards, address to the participants and
conference with the instructors



— 1830

hrs 6 Conference with Adm<» Schniewind on common problem^
°£ Operation 3arba:rossa P
(Baltics Coastal protection and Finland,,
Difficulties of
organizing coastal shipping for supply purposes along the
Baltic coast*
Aaiand, Hangoe, BljS&kSea* Questions of Russian naval forces and
possibility of supply routes along the coasto)



Lemnos. Th^ir Ideas jibe with ours,
Shipment of oil to Italy (through Canal of Corinth).



Gibraltar, coastal shippings Africa,, Malta*

A unified Coastal Defense,

Current matters*





Liaison Officers,


Morning Conference.; Possibilities for speeding up shipment of troop f.
to Libya. Withdrawal of study on Italian Generals by Foreign
Armies West,


a) Questions regarding Air Support Hq Staff* and signal communi
cOifetasu^ settled to conform to our wishes. Air Staff somewhat


b) Liaison between AGps and Air Force willbe handled by Suppoi
c) Allocation of airfields for reconnaissance


d) AA: AA Corps are to stay,, also ground missions (Fuehrer crd
It would be out of the question to leave them with the. Air
Fleets and use them as reserves.

Ground Forces MA?


Thirty batteries i.c» 10 battalions^ are supposed to be/c
hand for us on 1 May w
Beginning May. additional 30 batteries, i.e fc 1® Bns Ci will
;\u25a0;. .
added as organic AA of the Ground Forces.
We have specified: 50 Bns» } including 30 mixed; (mixed I-jns
make up 60 to SO % of total recuested) plus 11 light Bns a
!'; ;
quested: 22-24 i.e., 50 \u25a0$).**



Air Defense Commanders for rear area (24 Reserve Bns.)«
East of the Reich frontier*

Heusinger: Current matters.
One additional Corps
or third wave
Boehrn in
of J%rita
Holland to be released.
of the Reinforced Brigs*
(15) which will be ready in the Z~ beginning middle of March*
Liaison Officers for Bulgaria*

Jodl inquires officially, "whether we have any reason for wishing to
have approach inarch in Bulgaria stopped iwhich would still be
feasible today,, Tb 3 answer is in the negative.
Radke: Friction between the Deputy of the Fuehrer and ObdH (regarding
Mieth, Week- and. other incidents),


Buhle: Ground Forces AM: Materiel; So far nothing has been delivered
by the Air Force* Promise to send bulk of equipment second half
of April, so that everything would be on hand 1 May* Provisional
fire control instruments for Batteries, Hope to get fire control
instruments also for Bns»
Training; Courses in progress.
Specialists ready 1 May. After­
wards unit trainingo Personnel apparently not bad. Battery
training a minimum of three weeks. Cannot be in action before :
1 June,
Traction equipment lacking: Tests now in progress to determine
serviceability of French traction equipment* Only limited
mobility* Will have supply vehicle s., but tactical mobility
Two batteries
cannot be achieved* (No ammunition columns).
tank destroy­
mounts, ' to serve as


"Traction Bns», motorized" could be formed, but chain of command
and control would be very difficult in practice*
Fellgiebel :

Finland « Senior Sig. Corps Officer to Finland for operational
communications (through Sweden postal network)*
Marita : Three river cables; tele-communications via Belgrade,
-Bach Armd« Group 2 dem lines* Three large direct
transversal decimeter lines* Supply service network East:
Gc-r: r —"t -General^ trunk lines to the advancing armies »





Monitoring of cryptograph traffic; Seehausdienst


Conference with Gen c

Jeschonrie^ r (present

- Aall--4 : no

North: Reconnaissance


Major Christ, Col,



off Murmansk (based on central Norway).

Barbarossa:. Fighters 6:1 (3:l); training and material said to be
considerably inferior*
Bombers 2:1 (l:l)o TBaining inferior^
Fighters: -Only AOO- modern, total 3^000; for close-support effort*
Bombers 1,600 to 2_,oCo^ mostly older types*
Air Force expects concentrated attacks against our .spearheads,
thinks they will collapse owing to out superior technique and t;|:
experience* Targets for long-range fighters©


Russian ground organizations, "being organic to operational
flying units, arc clumsy and, once disrupted, cannot be readily
Distribution of forces? 1 Air fleet for each AGp. ;
Further details later.

M§4iiJ;fe.£Q§^_ I'-'iiiiiOt; possible, but pu^po-Je mus b be clearly
defined. Malt7i/-Ch: et3 in preparation (airborne landing) c I

call attention to possibilities for airborne operations
Tangier and Cerr'-a,., Corsica sfaill "being studied",,'


Franc a RclaL . vo"\.y fighter and long-range fighter
forces under Spe-.r6.0-.In Holland, Belgium and Northern France,
excluding Brittany.,
Figiro fighters. Fight for control of •;
air for reconnaissance
over the sea* XI airborne Corps probab­
ly to go to France (deception)
Attila still on active list. :'
AAA ample.




Fighters and night fighters in the Ruhr and ;
ZI: Woise.
Northwest Germany, AA defense will "be slightly weakened (20$)
in favor of Barbarossa.

XI Corps. Either use right off the start
or not at all. Discussion of possible airborne operations in
the Mediterranean and in Barbarossa.


AAA: Fuehrer wants no serviceable piece to remain inactive.
Personnel for 30 Batteries. AA Corps, of 6 Bns,, for Sixth
Army (Armd.G-roup l) and for Armd. Group 2.


Liaison Air Force


under Stunmff.

- Ground



Tanks for JMorway.
800 th Regt. as "fire brigade" against
uprisings'. Use of tanks in Barbarossa.
Roechling projectile
for Armor in X'ibya.

Ziohrberg:; Current personnel matters
nel assignments on the Balkans),

28 Fob rnary 1941

Twelfth Army has started building
fighters and AA has crossed
Morning conference.*
Hp special reports.


Konrad' s



Gonf Grenco with

(Liaison Officers, person­


of bridges „ Covering force of
into Bulgaria.

Still no clear picture of British inten­

— (With Bulile

Current Gen. Staff personnel matters, *
Peacetime organization of OKH.

a) ITavy1 s evaluation of the situation.

Situation and intentions
of Air Force agree with information in yesterday's conference;
with Jeschonneck.


b) Norway; Disposition of forces and operational staffs for
c) Hangoe,

Only Luftwaffe can do


d) Briefing of the CGs of Armd, Groups and Corps on technical
innovations by the Ordnance Office*
c) nSuedwind%* Comments on Hilpert's study*
f) Exchange of views on operation in Libya, We must beware of
unduly interfering there,

Brig* Gen o Dr. Grosse (Mcd, Corps) and Brig. Gen« Dr« Binder (Med*Ct>'rp

Gen* Paulus:
a) Report on trip to Guderian's map maneuvers Very satisfactory*
The leaders arrived at conclusion that the Pripet line would
be reached in Eleven days»

h) Result

of consultations with AGp, B on the conduct of operation
General agreement of views!

Gen* Bogatscht Result of conference with Jeschonmeck*



AA problems*

Col, Matzkyg

1*) Foreign Office sent cabled instructions to Ambassador Ott
to see to it that Japan should rush attack of Singapore.
suppose that it is not as simple
as all that for Japan. A coordinated war is probably
naeded as a basis.
2.) Turkey; .Leading Turks are reported to have expressed
misgivings to Papen to the effect tha;fc Germany's Balkan
policy is moving to a point where Turkey would be forced
to go to war against her* Papen has been instructed to
make the following statement to the Turkish government.}
Germany is fighting England only, but otherwise wants
only peace and order on the Balkans* But if the Turks
were trying to find faulty 'he would be ready at any time
to pack his trunks.
3») Russia?

Isolated reports on Russians unfriendly attitude
towards us received lately, are of no importance,
has made no protest against our measures, nor against Bul­
garia 1 s attitude*

km) 1 March 1941, is

the date when Bulgaria will sign the Tripar­
tite. Pact by Bulgaria* Russia, Turkey and Yugoslavia are
feeing informed of our march into Bulgaria*

fivening* Message is received

that two of the three Danube bridges are
? bottomless

finished,* Bad weather


March 1941.
"bridges on; the Danube makes
Tested for

Mora-inff Conference: *Construction
(last "bridge

good progress
loads fcjf 26 tons)


finished' lOO6 nrs.

Conference wiiliffaulus and Misingerf
ll) SituMph in Libya* Rommel's irejbafatibns


"Suk&lnd": Expression


for forthcoming
. ;


stalling action,


of b|)inibn^




3.) Norway: Organization of Command agencies for Operaiioii
OQn IV (with Liss); Situation in England (homeland): How 4-0 Divs.,
including one new Armd.Biv.
ScLuabble between Hq.. Second Army and Ninth Armd.Div. ae to
who is to have credit for capturing the French war archives..

Current business

of Operational


Ehlert.,:, ( la, Africa Corps)

reports in; Is briefed on our ideas
concerning coming offensive operations.







; Liaison instructions for Konrad.
mv annoyance at X,'s working methods.

make quite

(G-en Q,u) i

a) Eesult of conference

in Paris. Bather unsatisfactory.
The personalities involved willnot be able to avoid
friction for long,


b) Provisioning of forces in France from local sources
"be feasible


c) There will be difficulties in obtaining enough, trucks for
motorization of troor>s in France. Wood generator gas etc.
d) Feeding of industrial workers is getting difficult. Belg­
ium, e.g. wants emergency train Bayern with one million :
rations. Industrial canteens.
c) Barbarossa:

GP of Gen Q,u


Administrative orders on SO March.

as of 10 April

f) Libya: Shipping space.

.3 March 1941.

Twelfth Army (List) marches into Bulgaria.





Crossing was effected at 0600 hrs, a* per schedule, on the'
two eastern "bridges; 1000 fcrs on the western bridge. Belay
was due to "bridge damage $ugtfeigf®& when opening for passage
of oil "barge train.

Reports from Eintelen on alleged Italian plans for offensive in
Albania, Attack is to start within a few days on the supposi­
tion that the Greeks will withdraw trcops from the Albanian
front in reaction

to our advance

into Bulgaria,

The mere fact that Italy believes to be able to launch such
a drive on a few days notice shows that no more than local
attacks are to be expected, They do not in any way affect
our plans.
Iveiiing in BerXia*

S. I%rch 194:

G-erekftt 1,.)- AssQinTDiy.

of trdops is. proceeding according to plazi.
&overnment~G'eneral now falls in iihs*.. .W© shall be
ready on time*

2.) Water


problems viewed in the light of future


3.) Railway Construction Troops needed for additional lines
serving not only current requirements but also stock- ;
In contrast to the West, also
piling of new base..
station installations will have to be moved forward and
operation must be organized on military lines* Construction Troops must advance right behind the Armor."
Yfhere&s 'in -Fi^ice h&\<s.:rt*\ridg-:frcm&ire"^ t.;
which the- railroads were pushed forward, the base line
of departure in the East will be narrow. One Railroad
3n. changes tracks from Russian to German gaugo at
rate of 20 km a day.

... .


4#). distribution of Railway Troops, .In the West four Cos,
in lorway three (including two operating units ) i two
in Bulgaria* All others set aside for Operation Bar~
6.) Boad construction to follow behind advancing troops
Main supply routes.


6 ,) Railway accidents *

Conference with .CbdH;,

1.) Military-political situation on the Balkans.
with political leadership' again very tenuous.


2.) Operational possibilities in Libya new and later, when
additional troops could be 'released from Barbarossa.



3.) Continuous intrigues "by various non^military' agencies
against us, to undermine the position of the military.


is too
Jodl ,QECW (op. phone): Liaisoa with political canr.ajrf.
loose. We must have a clear knowledge of what is going on.

a) Is the political :.xrcnaEjasj&" interested in having German
advance elements appear at the Greek frontier to impress
on the Greeks that we are faster than Mr. Bden r s troops *
who is just now in Athens l
b). What are Turkey's reactions:.

Must we expect interference

from that quarter?

q) Are the Italians, "being made to understand that piecemeal
attacks in Albania are only disrupting t)lana?

Concerning a) : , GKW welcomes everything calculated to further

an early appearance of German troops on the Greek frontier.

However, the question is still Toeing discussed with the Fueh­
rer. Definite instructions soon*
Concerning Id); 'Turkish question If settled",.
Concerning c)i Wholly in agreement with OKH.

a) Effect of note informing the Russian Government of our
march into Bulgaria. General reaction: Obvious concern*
Molotov replied to the German Ambassador in writing, as
1.) Events have not developed on the line recommended "by
Russia, It is a matter of regret that contrary to the
Russian proposal of 25 November, the German Government
has deemed it desirable to take a course infringing on
Russian security interests.
The march into Bulgaria
is in opposition to the Russian conception of security
zones, which include that country*

2.) The Heich Government, cannot exoect Russia to give any
support of its action in Bulgaria. (This probably
refers to diplomatic support)


b) Effect of the information on the Turkish Government;
Friendly in tone, no direct reference to the matter.- Eden
had shown understanding for 'Turkey 1 s situation. Nothing
tangible has come out of Sden 1 s visit. Turkey has not
been maneuvered into any new commitments, because Turkey
is not yet sufficiently armed at the moment. Eden had
pointed to the Italian collapse.
Turkish foreign Minister
and Yugoslav Env#y cooperate to keep Yugoslavia from tying
herself to Germany.
c) A similar announcement of the German march into Bulgaria,
by the Bulgarian Government,, met with an unfriendly re­
ception, without a^y comments, in Yugoslavia,
d) Letter of the fuehrer to the Turkish State President:
"Ho further intentions".. .


c) Meeting 'Aiitonescu-G-ee ring arranged for 5 March in Vienna.


f) Conversation Oshima
Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop urges early
attack on Singapore (from the land side). Leave
Philippines alone-. Cover requirements in Netherlands lasijWants
Indies. Oshima refers to raw materials shortages.
end of war with China.

— IIDuce:

g) Letter Fuehrer

Cannot get anywhere with Spain
The impending' arrival of our Armd.Diva* in Africa sets off
new trains of ideas, which ho hopes he will "be able to
We need
talk to him about-. Anxiety about Dodecanese.
Ehodes for operations against Suez.



a) Current "business

of . the Operations Sec

Id') Hans en at one; time, was instructed to help List with trans­

portation on : condition that the material would "be returned
"by 20 -March, sft as to "be reconditioned "by 1-April. How
350 trucks have "been turned over. Sixteenth Armd.Div. is
spread over too large an area and ought, to recall one of
its Rifle Regts, AT troops have "been detached for service
at Gonstanza and tfhe Danube Delta,

c) Havy has earmarked

six 1? cm guns and six 15 cm guns for

the Thracian coast.

.G-en. Jodl: -^a)lllhe^question as to whether armor should soon "be sent
up to the Greek frontier, will not "be decided "before
fcom6rr6wy:--sitice ;we must first clear up the situation
with the Yugo slavs ,

b)- For the" time "being the
will not use his
influence^ with -XI Duce in the question of the Italian
attack in Albania. Let them scorch their nosesi
On : the : whole ;the ••Fuehrer shares our view.

* caused "by re­
c) Great "excitement '
on the "Mountain"
. ceiiDt 'of a-picture' of an British tank with 80 mm
armorY— What can we put up against it in Africa, and



else could we do?

Buhle^t a) Protection

of our tanks against British 80 mm tank
rtn::lorth Africa. \u25a0':\u25a0:'\u25a0 -"\u25a0\u25a0 .

"b) lufloug^is* ; All must terminate on 11 April.

c)"- Coast artillery: Activate 5 new Bus.
d) 'fraction problems of . the partly motorized Siege Gun Bns
e)< Requisitioning -of trucks in France
f) C&nvO-rs ion of conventional
-12 weeks-. •




to amphibian

tanks takes

4 March 1941,

1100 hrs. Attend conference 'held in G-en Qu office dealing
with supply service for AG-p. South* We must not underrate
the difficulties connected with switching the fuel supply
"base of the entire Army Group to the Romanian oil "basj. The
idea of the Advanced Supply Points must not "be overdone.
With all its advantages, the system has the drawback of
rigidity which we must not take upon us until the develop­
ment of the operations can "be made out clearly. As long as
we dont know exactly where we stand we must "be content with
improvised installations, which later on can "be reorganized
into such supply points.

(Armistice Commission):
a) Control services

in all French western ports. will "be taken
over in the near future. General Eichhorn, assigned to
this mission, is standing "by with his economic staff and
other agencies.
In Oran, Tunis and Algiers, German liaison
agencies ( with 8 airplanes) will "be integrated with the
Italian organization.

"b) JueX will "be very short In suDply in France and Forth
Africa till the middle of April. A 14,000 ton tanker is
on its way from America.. Doubtful whether the British
will let it through „'

c) Seizure of French merchant shipping "by the British.
French want easing of regulations to strengthen convoy
for vessels sailing in French convoys have so far
not "been attacked "by the British,

d) Important points in tlie exchange

of notes: French demand
on permission to recruit soldiers in the Occupied Zone.
Demand release of white Colonial officers from PW camps,
for service in North. Africa.

c) 13,000 trucks "bought "by us. First instalment has arrived
at the Demarcation Line. Transfer will "be completed after
15 March.
f) Eub"ber crop in Indochina: 25,000 ton for us, 18,000 ton
for France (partly for our purposes).
25,000 ton for
is now claimed

Gen. Scherer. the new Headquarters Commandant,
Schmelzer who died today, reports „


of Colonel

Ma.i ,G-en. Mueller;
a) Claer^Stefanie

affair.- Psychiatric


observation of Stefanie

"b) Studies on International Law with a view to a' reform of
Internationa,! Law. Must "be turned over to a Commission
under Bdß after the war.


c) Measures against the .De-Gaulle movement in Prance.


of death sentences.


d) Cooperation of. Replacement Army and Field Army.
change of 3SfCO f s and Officers.


c) Findings on hospital inspection. Social service care can
stand improvement (vocational guidance, vocational trai­
ning, psychological care). Use of Field Hospitals.
Medical service not a problem of transportation, "but one
of supplies.

5 March 1941.
Mo ming Goriferone c: March into Bulgaria proceeding according to
plan. Subsequently conference with OQ,u I
and Operations
©fficer on current matters.

OQai IT- Krafrfre:

a) Hungarian intrigues against our military attache', who has
~ Our demands regarding
"become irksome for them (Krabbe) *
road 'building and railway preparations


b) Negotiations Buschenhagen
ground 1 )


in Sweden ( take in a lot of

c) Current matters.



Exercise Gen Q.i. on problems in the theater of AG-p South.
Advanced Supply Bases, CPs
Question of Supply Points
of G-en Qu is discussed.

Directives for training of Divs. under Generals
will "be their leaders in the Eastern campaign.
Current business of the Training Section.




Ziehlb erg: Death of Col. Schmelzer Hq_ Commandant.
Efficiency ratings and other current Gen. Staff




Gen Q,u : Draft of an OKW directive on organization and
administration of the occupied areas in the East. Behind
the advancing troops, Government Commissars willbe
established, ,who will have Armed Forces Comrranders attached,
to them. The stipulations of the ObdH are to be observed,
but otherwise the Army must not be burdened with
administrative tasks. Special missions of the Re ichsfuehrer

- Keitel;

a) The Fuehrer will not advise Jjk. Duce against an offensive
in Albania, $ he will -merely tell him that we shall .come
in later.



Conference with Regent Paul produces no
positive results. Uo intention to join the Tripartite
Pact, Ho transportation facilities across Yugoslavia.
It is hoped to settle the Greek question without the
can see no signs 'that
use of force. However, so far I
such- a solution has a

b) Yugoslavia:

c) G-reat excitement over Lofoten raid.*

S March 1941.

Advance into Bulgaria proceeding according, to plan.
Quiet day.
Otherwise \u25a0, only telephone consultations throughout the day; .
no important conferences-, except one on AAA problems (Bogatsch)
and current operational masters.
larger studies.

Desk work on neglected

7 March 1941.

Morning Conference*
Advance in Bulgaria continues according to
plan. Uncertainty on the situation in the Aegean persists.­
French canal system seeifrs to "be largely serviceable again;
only the Ehine-Ehone Canal and the canal connections with
the English Channel, paralleling^
the Seine, have not yet

"been restored*

OQ,u IV with Chiefs Foreign Armies East and West: Situation re­
ports. England, no important new information. Hussia:
We are getting a clearer picture of disposition of forces.
Gen 33 rand:

a) lu.-eh.rer order regarding 160 Batteries for Eforway.
This number will include 38 'batteries already sent to
Norway (10-28 em)
The Batteries still unas signed are
to be accompanied each by one officer, 3 I\FCOs and 15 EM*
also, there will be one Battalion Staff for every 6
batteries, and two telephone sections with IS km wire each
for each Battery.. Immediately available: 33 batteries.


The main thing is that there must be no reductions in
the allocations for coastal defenses in the Black Sea
and the Baltic.

b) X Battery can be used against Brest-Li towsk (citadel)


c) Besults of the large Observation Bn^ exercise. Attempt
to centralize
the heavy sections in the Army Corps was
a failure* The solution. lies in keeping the old method
and reducing the number.. of heavy sections.




d) Triajs with E projectile
for 15 cm How, satisfactory.
5,000 projectiles a month; larger output not "before fall.

c) Missions for railway artillery in the East not yet final*
Probably we shall have use for the following:
1- X 12; 5-15; 1 Bruno I; 2 short Broiio (in AG-p
Horth) •


Funeral ceremony for Col. Schmelzer

1500 hrs:

Chief Personnel
O"bdH (on phono):
West Coast


— Hq_ Commandant

Consultation on officer, replacements,



in Libya.-— Defenses


(artillery, tanks) .—- Air missions in the East.

G-en. Buhle?
a) Uorway, Soastal defenses: artillery, captured enemy tanks
(Renault) and 1 Bn (2 Cos) of.2olst Arm! Ecgt.
t>) Organization of the still unallocated 250 3cm AA
into groundforces antiaircraft force? horsedrawn?
c) GHq. troops for Barbarossa
) can get small truck
) column as of 1 May*

20 out of 28 Sng. Bns:
all Railway Bng. Bns:

Rear services' and signal components


will be ready in

d) Two medium Id.How. Bus and four 10 cm Gun Bus "become
new GHq. Artillery reserve

as of 1 June.

c) liaison Staff "ITorth" and "South".

f) Improvement of Thirteenth Armd.Div.
Oapt. yon

Both reports on results of his inspection trip to lajnja.i.
Rommel's operational intentions need a sound basis and
should "be reviewed

in the light of



Supply .services in Libya must be centralized; supply route
to Libya, still leaves room for improvement. (Naples, Rome),

8 March 1941.

Conference: Yugoslavia apparently veering round to the
Tripartite Pact.
Three possibilities for the British,,
Report of British efforts to trade capitalships for
7th convoy arrived in Libya; Bth convoy Palermo; 9th still
in Haplos on account of British Cruisers,

Lt .Coloßeinhard


as Chief of Staff General Army Office.



lv) Rdweiu

lies for Richthof c-


-\nd List

Eastern Campaign ASp
South: One older Officer with, two or three younger
-assistants form a Liaison Detachment.

2*) Liaison Officers for

AGp Center:
1 Liaison -Officer each for AG-p.,
Gu&eriah and Afiq. 9 (Hoth) (total 3)-,
•Hprth: 1-Liaison Officer for AEq_ 16 (Hoeppner)


3.) Disposition of Russian forces at the. front and in
the rear.

4«) Demands on Luftwaffe for demolition and disruption



5.) Defenses

in the West­

6.) Operation in Libya*

G-en,,ott (inf):

Tactical Manual for Antitank Co. in'lnf.Regt.
General training problems (utilization
of terrain., knee'laaag
etc.) *
position for


intelligence from Turkey reveals that apart from air-aS.TSbpo&t
England is preparing to support Greece with two to three
Divs., now standing "by on islands between Lemnos and Crete,
so as to be moved into Greece" via -Tolas, or also into
Turkey, if necessary.
G-v^ek intentions,
At ::' art ,. defense .-" Struma or Variar,
In case of an ac ich: on Vardar ¥-alley
as the
a defense is planned, with the right wing based on Mt«
Olympus, and the left wing extending Over Mt. G-ramosi (op.
the Greek Albanian border) to the present left wing in




a) Organization of road improvement work.- A new map of
Russia showing road conditions (good work)
b) Military-political data for G-rohlmann


s study.

Beport on Yuffoqlav'ia t s Revly* Regent Paul thinks ho can induce
his Cabinet to accept the Tripartite Pact, on thrpo

.a) Ho transit for C-orman

Taj Ho commitment
c) Access

troops. Discussion possible on
of materiel "by rail' and "by Danube."

to active participation in this war.

to the Aegean for Yugoslavia.

9 March' 1941

Work at Home:


of the

West diir.







- Berlin..)*

the 3ar"b&rossa

— Efficiency ratings.
relating to





. -—




10 March 1941.

Conference on situation; Italian drive in Albania 9 March
Bth and 9th convoys due at Tripolis.

Advance of Twelfth Army difficult.


with Q"bdH;

a) Clarification necessary

about instructions for defenses
in Korway.
West Coast, Baltic, Slack Sea, Aegean Islands

b) Clear— cut statements wanted from Havy on
What are the capabilities of the Russian Havy in Baltic
and in Black Sea?
What can our Havy do, and what are its limitations?



a) Current business.
Td) Bommel is instructed not to advance his front too far
ahead before arrival of Fifth %b.*Div an & sufficient Italian


c) Coasts, defense problems in the West and in tho Baltic.



d) Our troops must start building field fortifications on the
Russian border early and on a sufficient
* scale. Handle
rear line more as a propaganda


a) Case Hesse.



show 1

Fired from the Press Section "by the OEM
of clumsy handling of motion picture matters.

b) Inquiry to G-on.Mieth on alleged political indiscretions
at a conference

in December,

c) Recruiting for SSj no danger?
d) Participation of Party members




cannot fill their ranks.
in Church activities
Is held in the back­

only if Party membership

X.t. Col. Koohlcr reports as Chief- of Staff of the B&S. Problems
of coordination discussed.



a ) Yugoslavia. Belgrade Cabinet meets today. Yugoslavia's
three conditions for joining the Tripartite Pact have
been accepted by Germany and Italy.


"b) Greece:

Up to 4 March, only 7j,000 British in Greece
(Air Force), 'in Athens area* In the last few days
additional 5,.000 arrived in Athens area (claimed mission?
protection el' airfields) , Reports state that evr nation
of liiiraee is being prepared* (iresaid to be gutting
read;; for war* Change can *be hopeu. for only if Yugo­
slavia changes her attitude.

c) Turkey 1 s reply to fuehrer's letter still outstanding.

d) Conference Goering-Antonescu:
Increase in oil deliveries*
Sparing of Iron Guard
German production aids accepted.
Wants to form new Party from reliable elements


c ) .Franco : Darlan anounces convoy protection against Eng­
land for French shipping? will use arms if necessary*
Proposal to appoint Laval Minister-President.

f) Spain:

Franco's letter stating reasons preventing his
now demands clearcut statement on

entry into the war
colonial promises.

g) fuehrer's demands on Japan*

iTJapEnecs* capabilities..

11. March .1941.
Report of Russian movements from Moscow
Morning conference:
Military district toward Smolensk and Minsk. Intelligence
on. new :
oads in Icnssia v ' which would indicate existed "\u25a0

of "better rr'adnet. xhan ore. tofere as.d»
Encroach .at on command fraction of Cti.i "by OElv, which orders'
that Forarth Mtn.Div. must join ""Marita" in place, of some
other Div*

Warner (Q-^n Q,u):

Li"byai Shipping space.Separate
zation for li"bya.—
\u25a0Moldavia: Health conditions. Officers mess
'iuaYiy iiae up toe much food)-.


Col \u2666Gren Hoeppner;

supply" ' organi­


Missions for Ai*md*&r» 4in Operation

yo:Tl, (ArmisticQ Commission) :

a) French shipments

to iNorth Africa stopped.

Td) Mediterranean ports now under our control: West of
eg 5 German Control Officers; east of Marseilles,
Mars eill
"by Italian Officers, with Qerman representatives ,
c) French report on progress
Africa expected soon.

of disarmament

d) Food situation in France has deteriorated*

in Horth

ed sufficient only for 1 to ij
more months.



Grain report­

c) Protest against British materiel shipments on Bagdad rail­
road to Greece or Turkey*
f) DJibuti.

Italians release weapons for
for defence against British.

7 French Bns,

g) 13,000 trucks "bought in France.

Only the use of railways will "be
Eeport on Sweden.
open to us. Roads to the Forth not practicable "be­
fore middle or end of June; moreover interrupted
"by water "bodies crossed "by ferries.


Lunch with Uthmann. Jodl (02¥); Showdown over direct interference
with the command function of OKB. (Substitution of Fourth
Mt.Div. for 183rd Div.)



(Central Branch) Current reassignments.
of living of officers in Eq_. Procurement of additional
food directly from France for their Sections.



a) Another AA Bn, for Bommel (ObdL).
b) Bth and 9th convoys have arrived in Libya.

Marada freed.

c) Movement order for Fifteenth




March 1941.

Morning conference;

a) Question regarding relation "between Liaison Officer
Albania and AHtj 12­
"b) Yugoslavia: 3 Divs

. mobilized.

Strength 70,000.

c) Intensive convoy activity in Mediterranean.
d) Eommel i Bulk of Fifth Armd.Regt. now on land. Movement


to the front will "be completed in about 7 days (including
one day of rest)
Enemy reconnaissance
from Ageda"bia to
the south.

c) Transport

station bombed out.


in Bulgaria.

~ Boulogne railroad


a) Magnesium: flare photographs for night reconnaissance.
b) Instructions on missions of AA. in Operation
c) Organization of home air defense



.( Sen Qu ) ( Baen t sch~3T inkh) t
a) Libya* Apart from remaining on the defensive,

of action are open to 1181
Mounting a major offensive from Agedabia with main thrust
against Tobruk,
Starting several minor offensives in sectors along the
Por t}he first -.alternative we woulc 1 3ed four Supply ,
Column 3ns al*­
Column Bns. in addition to the fou.
ready shipped to Libya*
For. second alternative,, a total of four Supply Column
Bus,, would do, "but the drawbacks of plan are loss of
time and lessened striking power* Send Memorandum to






b) Coastal shipping Tunis~-Libya*
c) List of functions for "Command Posts 1f of G-en Q,u.,
d) Fael problem »

Adm. Schuster, Cap t.He ye (lysjvj) with Heusinger and Loyke:
ITavy—Army pro"blems in the Aegean (Samothrake, Shasos,and
Common problems in Black Sea (inshore coastal supply line to
Odessa and points east)..


Lunch with Adm.Schuster,


Capt.Loyke, and Col .Heusinger.

Col* S-palke (Chief, War Economy Mission, Romania) report on
situation of Komanian war economy. Picture of armamenteconomy fairly satisfactory; agricultural production could
"be* increased s Unpleasant s b:r:i/s ahout G-erstenberg.




Hew OEM .Propaganda Directive,,

15 March

-~­ Morale

"building in


Morning conference?
Report from Japan; Shipment of British troops
Africa are said to have "been in progress
since 1 March*
Boetticher reports ,that appearance of German troops in lorth.
Africa had sobering effect on Weygand.
Libya; Fifth Armd.Regt. at the front on 20 March1


Marada free.
Mstrita; Bridge at Bechetu dismantled.
Perry in operation.
Second Armd.Div.
at Turun Magurolo.
a) Sup-ply of maps for Barbarossa




(four to -six sets for

b) Future organization of Surveying Service*
memorandum; idea not acceptable.

An Air Force

Wagner G-en Qu) :

a.) Conference at Ministry of Economics
are getting cagey. Flow of oil down to a
dribble; a 40% price increase demanded for grain. ¥c
stop coal deliveries and delivery of the cruiser.
Bomanian production completely in our hands

oil output will "be increased



from 1.5 to 5.9 million

b) Juel. Aviation gasoline on hand sufficient for one year
(last year 200 000 tons were turned over to us). Motor
and Diesel fuel very tight.
Without Russian deliveries we shall "be able to sustain
a large-scale offensive on existing cgfesfaks for a period
of 2 to'2ir months. After that we shall have to depend
on our own production and on Romania.

c) Supply Columns, 0c,3ac03- "believes he can let us have
additional 4,000 tons for Id"bya.
d) Oil drum factories

in Romania meet production schedules.

c) Supply problems Norway.
f) Charge of duties for Military Commander

g) Conference Wagner-Beydrich;


Police matters. Border

control service.

14 March, l94l,
Morning conference:

!«,) Albania:

The Greeks are attacking,

instead of the


Yugoslavia: Slovenia Is being evacuated,
First, Third and Fifth Divs. are setting up Rear
Flight of population In Thrace; no Englishman

In Salonika up to 10 March.

England: Br^ii-aiß.. requests, 1 cruiser, 119 submarine

chasers, 115 patrol vessels, 2,5 million tons from U.S.

2.) OiCW:

Movement of third wave (Marita) must wait on order

of GKM.

3.) Libya:


4.) Barbarossa:

— difficulties.

2,500 trains of first echelon





• More friction with.
OQxl I: Deception maneuvers in the ¥est
Konrad over
of materiel.

Operations -Sec:

Heusinger,, Grolmann, Gehlen report on plans of

tlae Armies in Operation Barbarossa.

Twelfth Army? Operation against Cernanti
with only one

Div. of the left wing is wrong. Will have to. use also
Romanian Mt Brig. (4) on this wing.

Seventeenth Army: Hungarians and Slovaks must "be mobilized

a"bout two days before the operation starts and follow, "behind.*

Jake commotion on the front "between Tarnow and the Mountains

(Security Div., etc.).

Sixth Array? On the whole in agreement with the very heavy
concentration of forces; should point left wing further to
north (Xowel) t
Fourth Army: Its southern portion still rather weak; its
central portion is getting too close to Bialystok. Concur
on all other points..
Hinth. Army: Disposition with objective Lornza. is waste of
effort. On the northern wing coordination "between Armd.
Gp. 3 and Army not yet perfect. Feel for operational, require­
ments lacking here. Army Hq evidently cannot assert it­
self over the CG cf Armd.Gp. and is reluctant to place
Infantry units under the command cf Armd Qv
Eighteenth Afrtffi.i Our suggestions have not "been paid much
attention to. Teamwork Hoeppner
Inf. Corps must still
"be "brought into line with our ideas,,
Sixteenth Army: Front still too wide. In any event
striking power will he greater when reserves close up.



OQ,u IV,

Report on situation; Libya
with Chiefs of Sub-Sections:
and Sgypt:
Fifteen British Divs. ( including two of Armor)
In Libya .
itself "between four and. eight (including Armd .Divs .).
Activation of 5 Divs. has started. Total of 45
Divs. now in the homeland, including 4 Armd. Divs. (two new).
Of the 41 Inf. Divs., a"bout 21 are ready for assignment.
Flow of materiel permits fitting of one to two Inf .Divs.
per month.
France must reduce her troops in North Africa to 120,000
by 1 April.
Russia: Reported mobilization of four age groups probablyonly replacements,
as the specialists are already in the
Intensified concentration <3>n the borders of the
Baltic provinces. Reported road movements from direction
Moscow toward the frontier via Minsk.



with ObdH: Situation and intentions Libya
Bulgaria.-Heusinger reports on
Personnel matters.
Armies for Operation Barbarossa.

Fuel situation ( stocks for only three months).
Preparations in Romania:
Fuel preparations adequate, ammuni~
Definition of command powers of Gen Q,u.
\u25a0"' Administrative Orders"
Command Posts.
for Barbarossa.

Ifegner Gen Q,u:

3^o on:


of pyrotechnics and signal devices.
Inspection of Zepp elin*signal center.


1$ March 19hl.


Morning conference:
Marada in our hands. Swap of naval craft
(Britain) U.S.
(H.M.S King George V) .

Gen. Btihle:


a) Inspection ObdH. of Training Divs, 101st


Sectional railroad "bridges.
b) Artillery and 2 cm AA for Norway.
c) Antiparatroop


d) Organization of Liaison Detachment


Gen. Brand: Questions regarding us,e of artillery on coasts of $"or—
way7 Denmark, Holland, western France. Bailway artillery?- on
the Barbarossa front.
ObdH reserves allocation for him—
self. Unfortunately ObdH emphasizes security of French
Vest -?oast to such an extent. that his specifications can be
met only by sacrificing striking power in Barbaroesa.
course , when you ask the Eavy and everybody else, whether
they could carry out their missions 100% or whether they
would need some aid from the Army., everybody wants some­
thing from the Ermy» The point, however, Is..not to be lOOfo
sure everywhere, but rather to make sure of the necessary
minimum of safety, and then put everything behind Operation


Current business ,

— Preparations

16 March 1941
iMameday celebration.
current business.


for report to Fuehrer.

(Sunday Berlin)

\u26 6

for Report to Fuehrer,

17 Inarch 1941.

( Ho entries)

Conference on



Operation without conclusive
British troops 18-20,000 strong
(including Air Force). 2To higher
c ommand ,s taf f
Attache"" tour cancelled.


Bus chenhagen:
Fuehrer insists: ITorway must be render­
Solvaer .*
any suprise attack. British now
are in position where they must take the offensive. West is
impregnable j. perhaps Syria; "best chance Norway. Our Air
Force largely centralized; Savy weak, shipping lacking for
large-scale Sand operations.
If the British secure a lodg­
inont ,dS»SS#«^^j?%ith Bissia will become possible.
tion of continuous defense system impractical and, moreover,




Objective of. defense-:

''The English


not "bo

allowed to gain a foothold, not even for two weeks. Safe­
guarding of our traffic along' the coast, "both "by sea and "by
land.. All centers of economic and military importance must
"be secured against surprise raids.. (Air raid, warning posts,
etc.). To insure accomplishment of this task; Set up 160
Batteries, (eehelbnhed in depth, with Inf. and AA cover),
Transfer all replacement .organizations of Norway units to
Norway, as well as one or two of the Occupation Divs earmark­
ed for France, -r- Increase strength of Construction Troops,





cannot "be taken out of Norway.* *— Sweden is
not likely to let us use their facilities. » Dietl will strike
Via Pet same.
Two Divs. to Narvik to relieve Dietl „

Strengthening of defenses;
Falkenhorst 1 s proposal: For Muronly
2 Mt.
Third. Mt. Div. cannot be managed. One
Occupation Div. for Norway; one-third to northern Norway,
two- thirds to southern Norway. 54 Batteries with reinforced
I/O can arrive in northern Norway "by sea on 15 Aprilj five or six large steamers.** Personnel will proceed to Narvik. as
"furlough personnel 11
This plus one- third of the Occupa­
tion Div. and two MO- Bns. for northern Norway will make up
for Second Mt. Div. "by 15 May,
Central Norway.* Batteries by 25 April. 50 Batteries in
ports (lower T/O; reinforced by Inf.).

Southern Norway: 50 Batteries amd two-thirds of one Occupa­
tion Div. will sail from Stettin on May.l,



Operation Sjlberfuchs:
2nd Mt.Diy. will strike toward Polarno­
jo,l Finnish Div. (l2th Brig.) and 1 German Div. from Kenii­

jaervi in eastern direction. Seaborne movements:
days for unloading at Kemijaervi and Uleaborg.



2030 hrs.

fuehrer conference

Allow 6

(with Col. Heusinger);

lo) Marjta;

The operation must be carried to the objectives
that will assure us a base for air domination of the
This requires control: of Attica,
Eastern Mediterranean.
perhaps even of the Peloponnese.
Operation must be car­
ried out with maximum speed. Occupation of Thasos and,
Samothrake if possible should be simultaneous with occupa­
tion of. the coast. To accomplish this we must try to
obtain shipping from Romania and Bulgaria.
Lemnos will
be seized by paratroops as soon as possible, thereafter.

Turkey: Satisfactory letter from the Turkish Chief of
State would suggest that Turkey is desirous to keep out
of a conflict with G-ermany. Forces assigned to watch

Turkey may be withdrawn after we have reached the Aegean
Conclusion: The forces allocated for Marita must be writ­
ten off from build-up for Barbarossa.

2.) Bar "baro sea?
a) We must score successes
be no reverses.

from the very start. There ' must



b) It would be pointless to &ase oar operational plans on
forces which cannot be counted on with certainty,. As
far as actual fighting troops are concerned we can
depend only on German forces* ,
rie Finnish forces can only be counted on to attack
Hangoe and prevent a Russian withdrawal into the Baltic*­

On. Romania we cannot rely»at .-all* their divisions have no
offensive power.
From Sweden we can expect nothing^ for we have nothing
to offer,
Hungary is unreliable.*, She has no reason for turning on
Russia. Her political aims lie in Yugoslavia,, where, they
see something for thems elves «.
Slovaks are Slavs. May perhaps be used for occupation
purposes later.

c) Rokitno Marshes would not restrict movements.-, (l) It Is a
terrain in which. Armies could maneuver freely (l)

d) AGp North and Center will push as far as the Dniepr> } theft,
taking advantage of the protection afforded by the river,, mass forces' for a thrust to the north* Moscow is of no
Importance whatsoever*

c) AGp

South; "It would be fundamentally wrong to attack
everywhere „n Pruth and . nio^tr are rivers^, which will
block any offensive* The Dniestr Is much more impreg­
nable as a defense line than the Rhine 9* no attack
across the Pruth 0 "Here we would only drive the Russian
away from a spot where we should beg him to stay put c


f) Conclusion:
In the Romanian sector, employ only the forces necessary
for the protection of Romania,
Allother available forces
will be used for frontal attack north of the Carpathians^
with greatest weight on the northern wing^ where additional
armor will be brought to bear,,
Armd* units must be pulled
out of Romania at the earliest X

3* Finland -Swed en—Norway t

a) No plans can be based, on the assumption that Swedes will

transit of combat troops,

b) Present defense of Norway not jet strong enough. The
. British willmake diversionary attacks „ Norwajr vulnerable
Fjord Sj roads,

c) No threat in the

Air incursions impossible In day
light. Landings in the tfest out of the question,,. Some
troops in the area can be released for Norway o (Two or
three Divs,)

d) Proposal t^ Emeden.


fe want to relieve two Mt o Divs» in
n Cithern
; and request right of transit for two
by sea).

cannt be made^ exchange must be made by sea

; rvvay


c) One Mtc Div« is to be released in this manners An attempt
will have to be made to ship another Div* into the Gulf :
of Bothnia shortly before beginning of operations© These two Divs o will have the doable mission of keeping the
British from establishing a foothold in Murmansk, and
of closing the White- Sea Canals

fien *

Wagner presents

the great picture of supply©

No comment's


Rear Areas: No difficulties in Northern Russia, which will be
taken over hy Finland, Baltic States will be taken over to- :
gether with their administrative machinery, Ruthenians willwelcome us with open arms (Frank)* Ukraine uncertain, Don
Cossacks uncertain*, We must create Republics isolated against
Stalin 1 s influence* 'The intelligentsia put in by Stalin must'
be exterminate d.o The controlling machinery of the Russian
Empire must be smashed.
In Great Russia
force must be. .used .in its jagst brutal form^
The ideological ties holding together the Russian people are>
not yet strong enough and the nation would break up once the
functionaries are -eliminated* Caucasia eventually will be
ceded to Turkey, but first must be exploited by vs 0


6, Lybia: Agrees to the forward shift of the defensive front*
Current preparations must enable us to pass over to the offen­
sive as soon as a favorable balance of. strength is attained « ;
Sending of additional troops now impractical© Landing operation
in Tunisia is rejected; plan to purchase ships in Tunisia must
be studied©



Gen» Paolus is given outline of the results

of Fuehrer

18 March 1%1

er ence :

Albania! The Italians are relieving their frontline Divs«
British in the .Peloponnes'fe ?nihat use can be made of Rhodes?
Yugoslavia: Report of preparations
to join the Tripartite
Four Battleships must be laid up for repairs \u25a0(Hipper, Scheer,
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau)*



(Parls)i( Par Is)i

a) Balance of securit.y assignments between Belgium and France
b) 103.000 prisoners of war must be evacuated if Operation
Attila comes off© Would, guard units become available?
c) Political situation C^eygandl).
d) SD and SS are spreading themselves all over*



Vooi (Armistlee'



a) Surrender of arms and mate rids Surprisingly good progress*
. 3AI trairf-loads of. material.*
b) aircraft -construction program is running into snag^s* France
wants concessions (prisoners of war^, coal).
c) 7*5 cm Field guns (700) cannot be shipped off* Alternative
Have panoramic ;-^le scopes turned in©
d) Trucks (l3.,000) * are going out'
at very- good rate*. Tires
<_:.; firsts-class©."
. .-\u25a0
c) Altmeyer case not yet settled*
f) Material depots in Africai will not be 'shipped out until





g) Casablanca Commission had difficulties owing to vastness
of area and Italian passive resistance.
0 ehsner


a) AGp D has assigned

ChcituMorta?- Regt, (Dora) to the Armd,


b) Improvised vehicles for terrain de contamination

\u2666 Will be
stored in the chemical
for chemical defense depot. Training with operating units.
Sprinkling from trucks no problems
c) Chom.lMbr&ar-v: 40 is coming off production too slowly c
d) Briefing of chemical warfare officers by Ochsner*


—- —



Hess' letter.
Bco.hler T s letter.
Files on. Incidents in
Case Tondorf settled. (Government--C^ :
Poland closed by

Wagner ;:

a) Moldavia base must be maintained despite change o.£
. .
condition s 0
b) Maritas Strength requirements for rear services^
c) Directives en policies for OKW rear area Issued,


Discussion of

possibilities In view of the changed
• •
and Marita*
Sixteenth Armd 0 Div. can be pulled rut' as of 25 March*
By 15 May all armed units -f AGp S mth^ with the exception
of SS Viking Div..,- can be assembled' north of the Carpathians.
KLeist then will have 5 Armd. Divs*^ 3 mot,
and SS
Adolf Hitler.
9 j-'ivs, GHq reserves will be coming in behind. AGp A, between
16 May and 5 June*

Conference with ObdH ; Change of plans to conform to new situation..
Mission for List In view of new situation*. Norway^ orders
requested from 0KWfl Personnel questions.
jron. Ziehlberg;

Out of turn /seniority advancements



30 ~

and other current

19 March 1941


Yugoslavia will join Tripartite Pact..


British in

Greece 18^000 tc 20,000 strong*
. Port Said-Alexandria?
British troops ready for .embar cation*
interpreted to indicate
evacuation of


Discussion on disposition of forces in Greece,
and Norway* r^-fiUq- reserve s»..-


Foertsch (Colonel) reports completion of the War Academy course*
Remains at my disposal*.
TQppe, late O^u France
for Barbarossa*,

(Gen Qul) ;reports as CO of Gen 0u CP North,,

Krebs (Chief of Staff VII) reports off to Moscow as substit vte for
Kb e.string (during the latter' s illness) » Detailed review
of the military situation and its impending alteration

resulting from assembly of our troops on Russian border «*
Summation of points to which he should give particular atten­
tion* General, questions of line to be followed in talks.

Winter (la, AGp A): Review of revised missions for AGp South,
Depth of disposition and concentration of tanks in Sixth Army,
•Hold Seventeenth Army close toward the northern wing*
Possibilities of subsequent attack from the Moldavian front,
meanwhile deception and sham movements*



Hermann (la, AGp C): Missions for AGp North reviewed?
Armd» Gr« k must jump off together with Infantry.
Strong infantry forces on both <3ides of road to Siauliai.*
Shift, one or two Divs, to MemeSi area*
Problem; of bridges for Memel crossing at jump-off „



AP shells for 5 cm' gun on tanks
Xsf' of total ammunition «
Flamethrowers for Rommel,*
Combat with engineers with flame-­
9I 9 -~~ Development program for Infantry ».
throwers on tank I
Norway; Replace construction troops with' Reich Labor Service,
Reorganize Corps Hq 111 as a dorps (mot*) Hq*


Pa Plus: Points brought out at conference of ObdH with Armd o Dlvc
Commanders? Close control of ivs» by Corps*
Air situation.
Protection of rear communications o.f armd 0 units, *~ Close
.teamwork with Inf9

arch 1941


Current matters:

Enemy Intelligence*
have starts do

Norway *

— Romania* —



Greece 0 Landing of British troops seems to
Movements, also motorized elements, from Attica



Geru Rommel: Beport on Lybia. Overall impression: British passive

and apparently thinking in terms of defense only, British armd;

units apparently being concentrated in direction of Bengasi*

The area to the south, around Agsdabia and Selum, seems to lee

treated as a no-man's land. This would vindicate British in*­
tention§ to defend the Djebel area, which offers favorable

health and tactical conditions*

We shall not be able to attack on the "has© line of the arc *­
in the direction of Tobruk before the enemy in the Djebel is
beaten. But the Africa Corps is &ot strong enough at the present
to do this* Nevertheless We could weigh the possibility of
occupying the no-man 1 s land around Agedabia and m&keKkisg
preparations for a drive in direction Tobruk next fall.
Afternoon? OQ.u 1 and Gen °v confer on details with Gtefi. Rommel, who
then willpresent an estimate of what he ©ould achieve with
available forces before onset of the hot $eason>

Ministerial Director Sarnow:
a) Whale oil? 10,-000 plus 15,000 tons, a total of 25,000 tons,
b) Dutch geld: 35 millions*.
c) Rubber: stocks on hand 4,000 tons* monthly withdrawals
800 tons. ~~'
Belgian gold 235 tons
536 million gold
d) German war finance systeji.






a) Results of conference with Rommel* Ifiline with
morning discussion*
fe) Results of conference with Guderian oil disposition
of forces on right wing of AGp Cente;?»

c) Appraisal of possibilities of operate on a in northern


21 March 1941.
embarking also at Salopiki.
Situation: The British seem to be di i
Perhaps their are making preparations for a stand east
of the Yardar line,, We willhave- to reckon with a total
of no mors than 4 British Divs.,. brought over in two
crossings (six days each).

— ­


with ObdH and Rommel: In line with yesterday's
Assignment for army Hq 11.
Also current matters.,
trip to Bulgaria,
Edirne corner;



General Staff Officers
Generals '
N00 !s

119 6







Current matters of his Section, including questions of protocol.

Gen, Otto (Slovakia):

conf erences,








Lunoho Vogl (Armistice Commission)


Otto (Slovakia) ancV aides.

a) Dispositions of AGb Center (Armdo Gr. Hoth) for jump
off not yet perfect. Reluctance still shown to team
up Inf.. with Armd. units at the jump-off
b) Group Falkenhorst willbe directed by OKW.
c) Police Div. to be put under Himmler and. sent to East
d) GH q troops must be. taken from List and. allocated to
AGPs South and Center. List willkeenly feel loss
of medium artillery? assault batteries, light AA Bns.
Engineers, bridge columns etc.






Demonstration of visual training aids (Scultetus
Wratschko, Chief of Army Film Center)


and Major

No important news

Situations "_yo.n _,Grolmann
Liaison Officers.





Discussion of disposition for List's drive..
Romania. *~ Protection of border in the East.

The question of protecting . the Eastern border in event of
Russian preventive action is becoming acute, HoYiever ? we must
hot allow ourselves to be scared into premature measures. I
not believe that Russia would take the -initiative. It surprises
in. List's plan that no measures are taken to -protect his eastern
wing (apparently Bulgarians!), and that taid. Corps is set to
strike in direction of Yeria and Katerini? instead of Edessa.
Instructions to Grolmann for his conference with list.

Noonj, Lunch guest of State Secretary of the Foreign Office*, with
Oshima, and Alfieri. Discussion of our rleniands to Japan and





Evening ; George

calls, in Berlin on official



2} March 1%1.

George visiting. Max drops in on his way from Jarsav

- Berlin)

to the .West-.

Had words with ObdH over his signing of an operational order for List.
At homes Future organization of the General ..staff,
General Staff personnel,
Efficiency ratings and minor 'desk








24 March 19A1/4
yet of any change in Thrace, Easii of tfre Mesta
river there are still-only.o ne Div, and the border guards,
West of the Mesta 4 to 5 Divs«; British in line Katerini.



Nj signs


Veria Edessao
British reinforcements apparently also on Crete*
Jugoslavia will join Balkans pact tomorrow*
No cause for anxiety*
Turkey 1 s attitude unchanged.
England seems to be under heavy pressure,

- Heusqnger - Beck;


a) Shipment of light*.troops to Romania must be speeded up
after departure of XIV AC and Thirteenth and Sixteenth
Armd, Divs» The danger of having only weak light troops
in Romania must not be overlooked.
b) Instructions to Rintelen on our intentions in North; Africa*
c) Romania must soon be informed on the need for strong
defense measures on the Pruth border..
d) 5 Coastal -Arty Bns-. are leaving, for

Zjehlberg: Reassignment s in_




beginning 5

and current



AT defense in Greece.
Corps Hq Hansen and liaison officers*
Air Signal Bn # ;allocation of trucks<»
Military police patrols checking trains through Hungary,
Bridge columns: March and April 2©j beginning May, eight
to ten each month; target
-Problem of traction, how­
ever, remains unsolved*
f) pecial wishes of the Air Force for 22nd Airborne
g) 15,00® Polish peasant carts with drivers will be made
ready for Barbarossa by beginning of May,

25 March 1941.
Situation; a) In Greece, one






Australian Div. from Palestine, one
New Zealand Div from Tobruk* Troops from Palestine
are being replaced, apparently from Mesopotamia.

British Eastern Mediterranean fleet
off Crete, purpose" unknown » Possibly Crete -gs staging
area for movement s»
British are disembarking troops In Creece: Attica, Voles.
Scattered British detachments reported on Katerini ~
Edessa line. Greek islands rff- Turkish coast said to be-­
still .free from British troops, as are Thasos, Mytilene.
Kephalonia and Lemnos*

b) Roatta/ Chief of Italian General Staff*



c) Alleged trouble between Twelfth Army and Romanian
authorities over: supplies,* on account of demands
by Twelfth Army not previously discussed.


Qu) s


a) Report -on stocks of gas ammunition? Available on 1 June?
2 mill* for Lt* Field How # J mill for Mcd» Fie.ld How*

G-as of several types will be fired at the same time,

s hells on hand in sufficient quantities, need only to be filled;

:has been ordered
The munitions depots can lead:
Prior to 1 June: 6 trains —daily
:10 trains daily.
after 1 June
To speed deli very _, three gas trains willkfeand by behind
each AGpj
The assembly of gas trains in the 2#1.,2 # I., will depend on
availability of sidings to Chief of Transportation.



b) Decontamination: Static decontamination station on the
19 Field decontamination Companies (one for
each Army; Norway and Romania 2; Gen r'u reserve 7)«
Assignment to Armd». Groups is declined.


c) Friction with Schell, who interferes in the business of the
then Gen Qu* Huff between ObdH and Gen r u, who feels offended,
that he was not told about some alleged divergence of opinion

them #

<0 Lybia: Mil, Com*

for Bear Area.­

c) Bulgaria? Establishment of a supply base Bulgaria, after
List has started drive to the south,,

f) Care of wounded for East: 50.000 beds to form hospital
pool for East (base hospital); under BdE* .
g) 3$ hospital trains are readied for evacuation. of the base
hospitals to the ZI..­
•^) Mil.i.tary administration


Question open.

Siewert: Missions of Liaison Detachment Bulgaria «

a) Changes in the instructions on assembly of troops for
Barbarossa in view of the new situation on the southern
wings. Changes in the demands on

b) Comparison of Russian and German strength ready for commit­
ment o We are extremely weak compared with the Russians
up to 20 -kpril* iiftsir that the .^ivs, arrived- in" such numbers
as to eliminate all danger* Meanwhile of course, our supply
base is under a threat y but I
believe that we must avoid
any unusual forward concent rations at this time.



c) New instructions for AGp, South,
Various possibilities o£ operational disposition in AGp
Center (Ninth Army).


d) Mission q$ Army Hq 11 in Romania

Also various minor current


(Gen Qu) :

a) Agenda for conference of Finance Minister with OKH.
Reinforced Border Control Service,
b) Item for discussion, for conference with Heydrich on.
impending Eastern matters.

c) Conference Altenstadt

yon. Bernuth;

a) Motion pictures; Activation of eight new motion

picture unit% (two for' tropics) brings total to

16 (including 2 inZF.j 2 in Libya) ,

b) Program for peacetime officer training
c) Experiences of the Training Divs*


Prof* Mende before the officers' of General
Currents* in' the intellectual life of present-day Russia,

Lecture by

Gen Paul us;

a) Progress of deception maneuvers in the
Review of orders
b) Reflections. on -British capabilities: Shipping space
available at any one. time could, take care of only four
That would severely limit their capabilities for
anything outside their operations in the Eastern Mediter­






26 March


Situation: No important' news, British strength in- Greece is hardly
more than 3®,000 at the moment a This number.^ however, is
reported to include Air Force r.nd supply services } which
means that they would not even have two complete ®±vs* as yet.
British capabilities* For my part s 1 don f t think it
very likely9 at least for the present
that the .British would
send to Kirkenes any of the 20 homeland Divs o they may have
gotten up by now, ' uch a move would be more likely later .on,
after getting in touch with &ussia following the start of our
attack* But even then the mutual distrust of the British and
Russians in this .area is so strong that we can expect more
benefit than trouble from such a move, England' s foremost
concern is the Eastern Mediterranean and the land route to
India, Here they are building up strength, but only with
defensive intentions for. the time being «

1030 Paulus:




with Heusinger in ObdH 1 s Office;
Discussions in preparation of tomorrow 5 s conference
No. new ideas,'


of OGs,

Gen, Otto (Gen -of Inf.)
who is sick.

report? as substitute

for the CG XIX AC

Talk about tactical manuals: MG Co and Inf Regt. willnot

be ready for begin of the offensive.


targets in England: Seaborne supplies, shipping,har­
bour installations* Mines owing. Training against ship targets,
. e tc # Weather questions,
Weather reports,
British food




— -—

maneuver Bogatsch (AA),
Review of Air.Force
of airborne
in Barbarossa.


Outcome, of map



a) Hungary.

Some signal operating troops must be set
ommunication lines AGp South

.up in Hungary*
Army H q 11,

&) Marita: Very difficult without telephone line
Nish ->
Solution by using civil­
ian facilities.
c) Sweden. Same solution,

d) Finland: Senior sig» Corps Officer*

c) Radio communications questions. Dummy traffic in

Romania, and other current matters.


Noon: Japanese Officers my guests at lunch: Chief of the Japanese
military mission, a general of the mission, Military Attache
From 0930 Conference
Armd ff Gps,«

of ObdH with the CGs of the AGps, armies and

AGp, Center: No significantly new viewpoints, O'nlyJ Ninth
Army and. Hoth will need direct orders to get them to team
up Inf, Civs, with Armd, Gp 4 in the jump-off *
AGp,' North: Plan to strike with one Div. (S3 Div. Reich) in
the direction of Kowno is criticized; is changed by AGp. At
Kowno we must do as best as ?\?e can with improvisations and
keep Armda Grp o together,, In this case, too, cooperation of
in the attacking sector of the Armd, Group is dis­
cussed and accepted by AGp c

Called to the Reich Chancellory on account of Yugoslav
coup d' e'tat.

1200 hrs«



- 1430:

Fuehrer demands earliest possible march into Yugoslavia,
Four invasion thrusts:
a) On Lists' s right wing, reaching Axios river via Novo Selo,
to give' quick support to advance of List's right wing*
b) Detached from the right wing, but still under List r s command:
Strike from the area around SS ofia towards Skoplje, to join
up with the Italians and to prevent linking up with Greece,*
c) M'ith a' separate group from the ofia area, in direction of
Belgrade, to- seize enemy capital and open up the Danube,'
d) From Germany, in the "jrorth, perhaps even from Hungary, with


1606: After return*

ObdH contifmes conference with the C(jg of
(AGd South) General discussion* Present?
the AGps.,
discuss with Operations Section the operational.
against Yugoslavia and., the^r: ultimate, effects
oh Barbarossa. Subsequently: conferences with Opejratiioas,
Officer, Transportation Officer. Gen Qu and ObdH on.t&me
needed for assembly and grouping of forces for lugqs|,avia # ,


28 March 1941*

(Ordnance Office), Increase of effectiveness and range:
Rocket projectiles for Lt. Fd* How. . To begin with, only
a few. thousands rounds* Bore tapers from Med* Fd. How*
caliber to Lt # Fd, How* caliber, Tapered-bore tubes are
ground down, e.g» from 5 cm at breech to 3.7» cm at muzzle*


on self-propelled


tubes and

mount (as of May)..­

B*B cm, 10 cm


Hollow-charge projectile: Equal section hollow-charge pro­
jectiles for largej? calibers, 7*5 to 10* ' Fitted with impact
fuse, can be used also by Lt, Field How», against Infantry.

"D" Siege guns 80 cm caliber > maximum range 40,000 m,
available for Spain after March 1942} Railway gun on Spanish



123CReich . Chancellery; (Myself Paulas, Heusinger) :
Fuehrer reviews the courses of operations open to us: Thinks
that group against Nish. must be made as strong as possible,
because strongest resistance may be expected: in this sector"
(armament center, capital)*
Q&-&head given for negotiations with Hungary* Accordingly I
instruct Paulus to proceed to. Budapest immediately. Negotia­



tions with Bulgaria must refer only t-o preparative/ measures*


Italy_: Fuehrer's letter to IIDu.ce* Speaks of situation which
is serious but not disastrous,, and of determination" to crush
Yugoslavia B Demands suspension of drive in Albania,, covering
of northern flank of Albanian front, and readiness for attaok

in I
Duee 1 s letter to the Fuehrer: Promises to call off drive
in Albania, to cover three, northern approaches to his wing and
stationed in northeastern
to add six •Piv^s* to the seven
Italy (in addition to the 15,000 frontier guards) * Also
pledges support of. Croat separatist movement.

List must report djnmediatel^T. if Turks march
such a move is not
appraisal of Turkish attitude is highly optimistic* He has
told the Turkish ambassador that Russia did not join the Tri­
partite Pact, because the fuehrer -would net agree to Russian,
bases in. the Straits.


Other matters put before the Fuehrer:

a) List- should not be confined to Mt« Olympus line.
b) Timing: List is to strike_iat the earliest; the drive toward
'Skoplje should coincide with List's' attack, if possible,
c) Air Defense ,i£ri©a« Fuehrer .thinkvS Romjnel should try to
make the best -Titirteil^feogets..
d) Airborne operation* Fuehrer suggests an airborne landing at
siavia !s arsenal) » Regt. Goerilng to Vietinghoff,

Buhle* k) Orders for .Corps Hq Hanserw
b) Light ?Road Construction Bns: Five activated by the Reich
Labor Service,
c) Tactical control of 22nd Div» (under XI Air Corps)*
d) 10.5 cm ATAT Gun, SPM a
of Maintenance NCO T s during the war*'
f) Make preparations for reconditioning of tanks, etc after
Greek and Yugoslav, campaigns.
g) Make best use of postponement of Barbarossa which gives
us at least Zj, weeks*


Lt« tbl.. Spaeth (Liaison Officer in Albania) :
Orientation on situation for his personal information, with
instruction to talk to the Italians only on matters regarding
Twelfth Army*


Composition Second :Army


Ist Mt.
carried by Truck Transportation
\u25a0fey il-Spril. XXXHX Corps (fully motorized) Kuebler,
LI Corps^ Briessen LII
Corps, Reinhardt XXXXVl Corps, yon
Vietinghoff Temesvars Reihhardt^ XXXXE Corps (mot/)., plus SS
Reich, One Artiller^r Regt* Staff, one medium
HoWo and one 10 cm Bn« One Eng* Bn^^ Bridge 8olumn; •Div©
k Artillery Commanders, A Artil3.ery Regt.
Staffs, -g Medium
2 15 cm
How. Bns a 2 Siege Gun- Bns 6
Gun Bns«_j 2 Observation Bns*_, 2 Assault
Bns* [from the





3 Sng. Regt* Staffs,

mot* ; 3 Bridge
2 Ltft aA Bns o
Army Hq Schobert

s.6' Bridge Columns,

Construction Ens*, 3 Mi^o&Cos._,

3 Eng. Bns.,
2 Medium and

will be sent to Romania sometime later*

Capto. Qjess, Capto Obermayer report in* assigned

to Operations


Gen*. Konrad: Briefing ,ou
' operational intentions
of.OKH against

Gen* Jodl OKlf calls' \up: Hungary agrees to everything and accepts



29 March 1941,
Kinzel( report s from Finland ) r
a) European Russia's 15v"Bivs* more than previously estimated*
b) Russian ArjncU Corps Pskov with two Armd*
: 2 Tank Regts.,
1 filgle Regt* Stc,
c) Paratroops: 10 Brigs, of 3 Bns.» each*
Situation: Q.Qu IV: Italian defense measures against Yugoslavia in the
jjiorthiji and preparations for attack in Albania (contrary
to promise to Fuehrer) »
to Libradz_, Kukes
3 Divs.j including 'Armd,

and Scutari,
Italian Fleet: Motor torpedo boats to Suda Bay (Crete) »

3 British Divs. left Alexandria for Crete on 9 March (re­
ported by Japanese Gen Staff)






0p» Off o v 2 ships of the 15th convoy- to li%!a (supply)
torpedoed* #th MG Bn» arrived at ED. ,-agheila* Operational
order for Yugoslavia issued*


Tv a Off«> ; Two movements
get through

shifted from Bar-bar ossa will not

OQu IV: Requests

of foreign governments to accredit officer observers.

Tours of Romanian Gen Staff officers on Western front*
Werth (Hungary) wants us to recall Krabbe*

Hq 2-Ek^aysjp-«for Fuehrer


Coirununi cation lines between Army;
krnw Hq 12 ft Tunnel shelter -

'Fellgiebel reports on possible Signal


train south of



(Gen Qu.) : Basic factors of supply operation against Yugoslavia^
Instruction for rear services to, detrain along railroad line
Vienna whenever practical and keep line to Graz open for..;


troops* .


Group Temesvar must be based for supplies on Merk 1 s
Have everything- ready to use Danube below Vienna l
Army Hq 12 needs more trucks*,




with Mat\u25a0^ska -apparently successful.
Noncommital on
seems to be contemplated*
dates, Mats-^oka •; was informed that we are not interested in a
Russo '— Japanese non-agression pact; agreement on fishing* right s_,
etc, would be enough©
St, ate Secretary is. being informed on dates for attack on
Yugoslavia and for Barbarossa* Watch Belgrade diplomatic corps!


Attack "on


Hq* 2,
-*±t Commander (7) 1 Long-range re con
• Staff el, 1
Courier Staff el, 1 light Sig* Bn.

LI or pS
1 Close-range reccn -Staff el ') q^ type

LII Corps: 1 Close-range recon Staff el )

i4ir ommanderj 1 Close~range
(mot#) J 1

1 tir

Staff el;plus 2
recon Staff eln for iirmd,
Signal Net- Operation's Co,

XXXHX Corps mus t be helped out by XXXXVI Horps.




8 Close-range re con Staffeln (including 4 for
ivs*) Long-range reconnaissance (2 Staff eln to be lent
orps), (Silent reserves: 2 Close—range re con
Stafflen it
Army H.Q».12:

Wagner (Gen Qu), Baentsch, Krumpelt (Supply Officer, Army Hq 2)4'
of Administrative, Orders attached to Operational
25" *
willdevelop in Romania and Bulgaria owing
to scarcity of transport* Nevertheless, despite unloading
points far to the rear and with the remainder of the frontward
movement having to depend on trucks, they will squeeze through
with getting the supply troops going and just manage to complete
stockpiling before start of the operation,



from Vienna i

a) Reports unexpected delays in arrival of Infantry units*
b) List wants to put Kleist in command of the entire Western
drive, n>t only o£ Group Nish,

c) List d:es not want to strike against Greece until way is
open for attack toward Ueskub*

These wishes have as basis the' desire to assure success of the
Greek campaign, whereas my considerations aim at speedy con­
clusion of the lugoslav operation*' I
think that Group-Ueskub

will be ready to strike on 5
and believe it is sound to
postpone List*s Greek drive until then*
210© ObdH, (on phone) .: 3V>rt



2200 Geiilen ;Fm&sh


:vt.;. y
.ulua^'^id. my view
.divergent idoa| we must watch out!)

drafting of asserably. orders

30.. March 19A1»

for "Operation




0830. To Berlin, Phone talk with ObdH on List's


proposal and my


General meeting at Fuehrer Office, Address lasting almost
2 % hours. Situation since 30 J'uime, Mistake of British not
to take advantage of chances for peace.
Account of subse­
quent events c Italy's conduct of war and policies sharply

criticized* Advantages for England resulting from Italian


England puts her hope in the U«S,
and Russia. Detailed review
of U*S, capabilities , Maximum output not before end of four
years; problem of shipping, Russia 11 s .role and capabilities.
Reasons for necessity to settle the Russian situation, Only
the final and drastic: solution of problems
enable us to. accomplish within two years our tasks is. the air
and .on the oceans, with the manpcwer.rand material resources

. at our


Our goals in Russia: Crush armed Forces, break up State.
tanks; redoubtable;
Comments on
4.7 cm gun (at) a good
medium weapon; bulk of tanks obsolete. Numerically Russia's
tank strength is superior to that of any other
nation* but



they have only a small number of new giant types with long
1© cm guns (mammoth models, 42 £46 tons) Air Force very
large in number, but mostly eutmodei. ;only small number of
modern models.


Enormous expanse requires
s vastness:
concentration on critical points. Massed planes and tanfcs
must be brought to bear on strategic paints. Our Air Force
cannot cover this entire huge area at one time ; at the start
of the campaign it will be. able to dominate orily parts of
the enormous front » Hence, air operations must be closely
coordinated with ground operations* The Russians will crumple
under the massive impact of our tanks and planes.*

Problems of


No illusions about our Allies! Finns will fight bravely, but
they are small in number and have ~not yet recovered from their
recent defeat. Romanians are no good at all* Perhaps they
could be used as a security force In quiet sectors behind very
(rivers) Antone sen has enlarged his
BtrQSg natural obstacles,
Army instead of- reducing and improving it. The fortunes of
large German units must n^t be tied to the uncertain. staying
power of the Romanian forces.


Mines { Questions regarding Pripet Marshes: Flank protection, defenses,
mines© Problems arising if Russians should make strategic with­
drawals Net likely, since th@y are anchored on both the Baltic
and the Ukraine* If the Russians want to pull out, they must
do so at an early stage; otherwise they cannot get away in g6odt



With our 'goals in the East achieved we shall need no more than

50-60 2ivs c (a£S£>%). One part of the Ground Forces will be dis-*

charged into armament production for Air Force and Navy; the
others will be reaulred for other missions, e«,g, Spain*

Clash of two ideologies. Crushing denunciation, of Bolshevism,
identified withasocial criminality,. Communism is an enormous
danger for our future*
must forget the concept of comrade-*
ship between soldiers* A Communist is no comrade before nor
after the battle. This Is a war of extermination a If we do
not grasp- this, we shall still beat the enemy-, but 3© years:
later we shall again have to fight the Communist foe. We do
not wage war to preserve the enemy*

political .g&jffiF of

Finland. Protectorates:



Northern Russia goes' to
Baltic States, Ukraine, White Russia.

of the Bolshevist Commissars
Intelligentsia© The new states must be
Socialist, but without intellectual classes of their own* .
of a new intelleo-Jsfcsflii GxLass must be prevented, A
primitive Socialist intelligentsia Is all that Is needed*
We must fight against the poison of disintegration.
Is no job for Military Courts* The Individual troop comnanders
must know the issues at stake... They must be leaders in this
fight. The troops must fight back with the methods with which
they are attacked. Commissars and GPU men are criminal^ and
must be dealt vdth as such. This need not mean that the troops
should get out of hand. Rather, the commander must give
orders which -express the common feelings of his men*

and of the


'This war willbe very different from the war in the West,

In the East,, harshness today means lenience in the future.

Commanders must &ake the sacrifice of overcoming theip
persons! scruples*

Embody in
ObdH Order



Allinvited to lunch.


Afternoon: Fuehrer


a ) Yugoslav Question* Decision in conformity with my ideas.
List will attack with X. Corps and on- his Marita -front on
5: April. SS Adolf Hitler attached to Corps.
and 1

Kleist will attack with 3 Armd.- and 2 Inf.
Bulgarian Div, mn 8 -^pril*

Group' Temesrar on 12

Weicbs likewise on 12 April©


S£§i2L is no help as a partner* In -Albania they are paralysed
with fear. On the&i&Lia Frontier they claim they cannot attack
before 22 April, No need to define a boundary for them against
sector of Second Army since they will not attack anyway.
Assignment of Regt.
Details? Airborne landing Krusevac.

Bering. -Location
Op. Sec-esShip

of. GHq...

22nd Div. to Hungary*

k) Reports of AGp leaders and of Several subordinate
commanders (Guderian)© Nothing new^ except a clever plea by
Rundstedt for assigning the Carpathian sector to the Hungarians
and making the. Pruth line an offensive front.

31 March 1941.
Reporting- in or out; Several Gen* .Staff officers, leaving
v.d.Heyde) or joining us (Nippold) o


Situation iYugoslav

movement to south (Skutari-, Skoplje); British
movement toward the Jugoslav northern border c Yugoslav mobili—

. zation continues.


Returning, reports on conferences

with List and with-Weichs and
High Command,
List,, as was evident from his cabled report^ wants to give
precedence to the drive into Southern Yugoslavia and conse-'
quently would like to cut Group Nish down to two^ Armd o %vs f
Wants to keep back 60th mot*
.as reinforcement for the
Ueskueb Group. Morecver^gie insists that he is too weak with
respect to the Yugoslav concentrations in the gouth«

Weichs accepts mission assigned
Hungarian intentions.


him. tillbe

informed en

Kg 2»
Hungary readily acceeds to our demands concerning
7fents to attack along Lake Balaton and Tissa. river, and with
smaller force.s east of the Tisza. Hungarians will^.fight under
German High omraancU


reports on organization - of the war economy with regard to
Operation Barbarossa*

Gen# Thomas.


Conference with ObdH;

a) Transfer of GHq to Wiener Ncmstadt or Baden near Vienna*
b) Problem of protective measures for Iron -Gate.*
c) List sends message that he must have 60th mot*
Ueskueb under
Heusingerls Availability of new Pivs. for "'Operation 25 '•
,101* Lto Div. (as of 9 **pril> Brody)
100, Lt. Div. (as of 15* April^ Doellersheim) *
Twelfth Armd. Div* perhaps ready before 18 April (i*e,l2 Apr).
Perhaps bring over fourth -^ruid^ Div* (Bordeaux) \u26 6



Teletype talk with &ist; Need of strong &Q-%s^^£egs i
emphasized* Pleads again for 60th Div.
Bulgarians do not want to ,take active part in campaign against
Yugoslavia, Are afraid of Turkey.

vo.ft Zjehlbergi


Organization of a"


in Belgrade. New Balkans alliance: England ~ Greece
lugoslavia". 'Movsraents to S-outhorn Serbia continue. Increasing


signs of disintegration

of the Yugoslav State,


GG onference with
Transfer of GHqs* to Vienna area,.
"j-hiele and Pellgiobel on signal facilities. Target date 8 April
000© hrs»





of offensive possibilities against southern Serbia.
plays with the idea of having Second Armd,
Divft strike toward- Veles instead of against Greece;, in order
oppose this disposition^
to be stronger in .Southern Serbia* I
which would allow the entire Greek Second
to get away from
devastating •
must steel our nerves to believe
vs a
effect of the attack of Ninth Armd. Div<> and SS Div. Adolf
Hitler on Skoplje*
Hq 2 in Operation. 25 with
Must yet talk over missions of


Hq 2« Discussion of dispositions for drive
C/Sj, temy
of Second
» Main effort on left 7 wing; first objective:
Hills north of Zagreb*


Yon Brauchitsch

, Jodl

(OMft") : Fuehrer wants maximum railroad schedule set in
operation at latest possible date.

Wagner (G-en Q.u) :

a) Currency arrangements for Romania are now coordinated
those in effect in Bulgaria*




Is). Flnkhls report* Rommel shows total lack of interest
in supply organization* .Transportation lying idle in
Naples \u2666 Staff
(Komg) very good*
c) Preparations for Military overnment in Operation 25 •
Hq km Temporary
Gen» Brand: a) Artillery* commander for
Gfen*. Berlin with Staff drawn from
Artillery School*
b) Set-ting up of heavy artillery on the Channel
(fcoast* Turn over to Navy four 34 cm French
railway guns (range 4© km)«
c) "Fortress gun emplacements !l» Trials with X 3ugun
tube reouestedv
Must be put off »



Bernuth: a) Reorganization of training supervision after

, . .

departure of Army Hq 2.
b) Tactical employment of di©n; Mortsaa? I' " tunits.
c) Regulation and coordination of military training
projects of Labor Service and Hitler Youth*

Qen. Paulus* a) Fuehrer will leave for Hq South on •? April at the,
earliest, but more likely on. $ or«9JU'tpril.
b) Discussion of outcome of visit to Hungary.

Gehlen comes with report that Army Hq 12 cannot launch operations
Reply: OKH demands
before 6 April (7


2 J^pril..l?41 a

Situation? Tartar reports from Bulgaria about Yugoslavia.
Claim. 3 Divs» and 9 Brigs,, and very much .Artillery and
Engineers in Southern Serbia* ~ Must be seeing thingsl

Reports from (Free ce speak of four British
one of Armor,' as well as 2 D.ivs« disembarking at Piraeus,
Considering the time factor alone
this is quite impossible.



Turkey is said to have changed sides' Suddenly* Popular
sentiment is in favor of war with Germanjr, Military attache
in; Ankara reports the opposite*
reports out (was in charge of training manuals in
Section of Chief Inf. Off.) j takes over command of an Inf. R-egt.

Colt G-reiner

1400. fuehrer Conference on over-all situation in Yugoslavia
(fie usinger with me) • Nownew viewpoints* JSmph'asis again on Nish.
Mission of Twelfth Army discussed*- JPian regarding Croat auto­
nomy. Strong language about Italians, who should use their
Air Force on front of Twelfth rirmy> instead of on their





Gen. Heiner is briefed on his duties. Suggestion is made to set up
a German Administrative Hq in Budapest©



a) Refitting of ipot. units after Operation 25 •
b) Ban on furloughs lifted. 5 %' for farmers.
c) An units in Operation 25. have their field replacement
Bns., except 164 Div*
d) Brigade 90©> assignment possible as of 15 Majr, while
training go-os on» Components t
Hegt. (two Bns.)
1Lt. Arty. Bn«, plus A.ssault
1Eng* Bn # / two
1 Sig0 . Bn« two Gos«
1 -AT'Bn., of three Cos' (l Go 4*7 cm)
&ear Services (far upply Columns)/

— and
— Reconnaissance

c) Use of Tank iraining
Training— Bn. (mot.)
f) Use of French medium B 2 gun in Barbarossa
g) Tank 111 with long 5 cm gun«, '-^übe too long.
h) Waterproofing of Tank 111 .and IV t Wording depth increased?
to 2*2© m. (Work must be intensified to attain depth of 4m);!
Waterproofing must be accomplished throughout Third and
Divs., fourth, Tenths fourteenths Seven- I
teenth iirmd. Divs* In all other E>ivs, for 2-3 tanks.
i) Greater carrying capacity for ammunition and fuel in tanks.
drums; as yet no solution
Gasoline in outside steelhooped
for ammunition*










reports as Liaison
briefing on situation.


officer OKH to




List of duties*

business: authorization of forward shift of Divs.
Uq» £ # -Employment
"Reporting schedule fcr
(Mc^vemeinnt"' takes 12 daysl) Take Jarachute

in the East©
'of Airborne
Regt. instead.

yon Bock on phone:
Gienanth is at the end of his
to check
in. the Government-General.
action by OKH_, tp back him up in the question of evacuation of

Field Marshal




(Gen Qu) : -Transfer of Executive Po^er from iirmy Goinmanders to
. Corps Commanders in Operation 250 Definition' of jurisdiction
of the Special Detachments etc.- of the SS and Secret Field





Agedabia taken by German Africa ? Corps (which reports
-^nemy in hasty retreat to the .-lorth..
heavy British losses),
Turkey estimates British strength inGreece at 3 Divs. ? as we do.


Heusingerii a) Airborne Div. 'needs 5 trips to get to Nish« Air route {
via Bucharest.
15 days (starting 7 April). Better
to transfer Parachute Regt. to Bucharest, which is then \u25a0/-,
.available for missions anywhere. (Yugoslavia,, Greece).
b) Date for jump-off of Operation 25 willbe set by OKW.


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