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Tank Gunery .pdf



Nombre del archivo original: Tank Gunery.pdf
Título: ETO, Tank Gunnery
Autor: United States Forces, European Theater

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Tamaño del archivo: 5 MB (116 páginas).
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i.il:;S-r3N:

isrepave rleport and liccomendntioris on T u l k Cun$-ery
'Iec:mique and Other ?actors I?IClucncing Bccuracy
and :!,Lrectiveness of F i r e froi?. Tar.1~''capons.
-:?-

., ... .... ., . .
Chayier 1: Par,'.: i!uiuansr; Tcckmi(.ine . , . , . . . . . . .
S e c t l o n 1 - C:kioral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sec5ioi; 2 - Dirocl,
..,.. ,.... ..

&rt.pE:

Technique an? 'YminiEg

I

:.?.~iii&

- .L~dvyi.mi'&of T a n k s A r t i l l a l y . . . .
Care e;-.d I V & ~ I : ~ B I M I I C B
'7eapor-s
Sectioi;
Fire C o ~ r . 0 1&pipmenL . . . . . . , . . . . .
9ililiography ._
... ... .. . . . . . . . . .
Ck.L;ptcr 2: Tank L-cmel:;
Training . . . . , . . . . . . .
Seciion i h{!et r.. . . .. ... . .
ni.: aUi"q?
, , . .
..,
i3ihl!.cg%p&j
..., .. , . ... . ., . ..... . .
Section 3

LC

1,

o€

,

od 9

30

aaC:

,

,

*

I

l72
ti

R-S-S-T-IL-I-C-T-E-D

--.^-II_-

SUSJXT

- Projectiles . . . . . . . .

S e c t i o n 3 - Fuzes . . , . . . , . . . . . . . . . . W

Bibliography . . . . , , , . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Section 2

Chapter 7 :

F i r e C o i i t r o l and O b s e r v a i i o n Eqiipmerb

...

i,'?


- General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

S e c t i o n 2 - Vision Devices , . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Section 1

. . . . . . . . . L+G

S e c t i o n 4 - E'he C o n t r o l dquiprient f o r the T E I ~
Co,mandcr . . , . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45;
Sec:ion

3

-

- F i r e Control.

Section 5

Eqcipment f o r t h e Gunner

.

51


. , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , 55

l l r e e : Sumnary of C o n c l u d o n s and Hecorrmendations
. . . 57

Chapter 8: Technique and T r a i n i n g . , . . . . . . . , . 57

S e c t i o n 1 - Technique . . . . . . . . . . . .
, . 57

S e c t i o n 2 - T r a i n i n g Methods . . . . . . . . . . .
58

S e c t i o n 3 - Srai.nlrig Requirenients Esse:itj.al t o

Eich Staiiclards of Tank Gunnery . . . . . . . . 57

Chapter 9 : ,:qui:xnent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Sec",ion 1 - Genwal . . . . , . . . , . . . . . . . 61

S e c t i o n 2 - Tanks end Tan!; Cannon . . . . . , . . . 61

Section 3 - T a l k > a c h i z e Guns . . . . . . , . . , . 63

Sectior! J+ - Amnunition . . . . .
, .
.....,
BibLiographjr

@-t

Obsorring I n s t r u m e n t s

,

.

,

,

S a c t i o n 5; - F i r e Control and Observation Equipment

612.

, 66


Appendices:

1. Procedure €or Conccn1;rating t h e ?ire of a F l z t o o n by
D i r e c t Laying
2. H i s t o r y of IYATCH ELY BURST" P r o c e d u r e P r e s c r i b e d in
FEd 17-12, Tsnli Gu;untle?y, 10 J u l y lY44

3. Method of Night Firin;:, Employed i n the European Theater

L.

The f f A h i r L gSta!;e" and I ' I n t e r s c c t i o n " Methads aP Determining Data €or Night F i r i n g

- 2 -

IR-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
i___.

----

l?,-S-T-R-IG
-T-E-D
--.
~

SUE"

5. F i r s t Uriited

Statb.

Group P o i i c g o n Em~loynentof


Tani-s as A r t i l l e r y

Adjustmenl; of Uachine Gu


5.

6-X. 12th U.S. Amy Group

basic

r and Z'NIJSA i n d o r s a n m t .


6-A.

D e s c r i p t i o n of proposed methot.


6-B.

Comparison of p r c s c n t nnd propose,.

n

I .



s

d s .

Delay i n Ccvelopneiit of Gimnery T e c h t ~ i ~

' i r a i n i n k of u n o r c r l Replacements

9. ..5litarg C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s Co:mon t o a l l Tanks
10. Cnaracteri.si2cc Cmi:;cll t o a l l Tank Cannon

11. Cannon iteco!a:ia~dcd f o r F u t u r e Tanks
12. ldacliina Guns Iieco;.-i.;ended l o r Fuitu-e Tanlts.

13. liachine

G i n S p a r s F a r t o Authorized L i g h t Tanlcs hi24

14- Advanta!:,as oC a Caliber .50 Coaxial Machine Gun

15

Anmiillit i o n

16. p i r e Co n t rol Fquipine nt

17. Comymr4.son o,f i;:!ierican ana Geman Binoctiiars

I.&?.
1S-A.

lIbyLl.;ey Siplyk 11

Ph o to g r a p h s

13-B. idethod of E;nployi lent

.

I3r.i.g C-en Joseph A. H o l l y , 012363
Lt Coi. John 13. iiouth, 032621tD . .
2 a ; h Josai5-1 G . MclJarnara, 0S011102b

. . Chiof, m i o r n d Snct'ioii
. . Artnored Section
. . Annorxl Section

- - - --- -- --

R-E-Y-T-k-I-C-T-h-D


TANK GUNNEHY

INThODUCTiON

1. Purposc. This s x d y p r e s c n t s th6 c o n c l u s i o n s and ricomr n m i d c , L i o c m L C c n e r a l Roord, U n i t e d States Iooroos a u r o p u i n Thcazc.r
on the. f o l l o w i n g f c o t o r s i n f l u e n c i n g t h a p c c u r w y cnd i f l ' b o t i v m c s c o f
f i r i from t n n k wcepons:

TANK G U N X R Y

4.. War D e p a r t n m t P u b l i c a t i o n s . - The c u r r e n t War D e p a r t i e n t pub1 . i c a t i o n on t a n k gunnery t e c h n i q u e is F'U 17-12, Tar.k Gunnery, 10 July

i944.
5. Scope o f D;scussioq.The d i s c u s s i o n h e r e i n is l i n i t e c l t o
t h o s e phases of t a n k guniiery t s c h n i q u e which a r e c o n s i d e r e d t o w a r r a n t
conlnient o r change. Omission oE a p a r t i c u l a r phase i n d i c a t e s t h a t , i n
t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e General Board, United S t a t e s Forces, Amopean T h e a t e r ,
p r e s e n t t e c h n i q u e should n o t be changed.
6 . b s i s o f Reconunended Changes.- Changes a r e recommended where
b a t t l e e x p e r i e n c e diota-tes t h e need. The f a c t t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r t e s h n i q u e HCLP n o t used i s no t considered s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant i t s abandonment o r r e v i s i o n . T h i s a p p l i e s p a r t i c u l a r l y t o c e r t a i n r e f i n e m e n t s i n
t e c h n i q u e s a t f o r y h i n FK 17-12, Tank Gunnery, 113 July 1944. The manual
was n o t d i s t r i b u t e d t o u n i t s i n t h e hkropean T h e a t e r before December 1944
anC was not r e c e i v e d by 8ome u n i t s llntil October l 9 4 5 . l
SFETION 2
-DIFlEC T LAYING
-

7.

C o o r d i n a t i o n and Control. of Eire by t h e P l a t o o n L&aj-eL.-

a. C u r r e n t t a n k gunnery d o c t r i r e s t r e s s e s c o n t r o l a r b c o o r d i n a t i o n o f t h e f i r e of & t a n k pintoon by t h e p l a t o o n l e a d e r t o t h e e x t e n t
that:

(1) "He should personally s u p e r v i s e t h e firin&, o f t h e
tirhole platoon.
"He i n d i c a t e g when each s e c t i o n or tank i s t o open or
c e a s e Pire. 11'
b.
Iii%ervie"s r e v e a l e d t h c t t h e extent t o which p l a t c o n l e a d e r s
coordinated and contro1Ued t h e fire o f t h e i r platoons v a r i e d g r e a t l y bet n e e n u n i t s , ?he governing f a c t o r s were: t e r r a i n , t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i c n , and t h e a t t i . t u d e o f t h a p l a t o o n l e a d e r t w a r d s c o n t r o l and c o c r d i n a t i o n , P e r s o n n e l who concurred i n t h c need f o r c l o s e s u p e r v i s i o n of
thi. f i r i n g < on s i de r e d it unwiee t o e s t a b l i s h t h e above a s a g e n e r a l policy.
The rmsons were:

-6-


R-E-+T-R-J-G

-T-GD

(1) 0 3 e n %he p l a t a o n l e a d e r couid not s e e a l l of h i s sect o r o r a l l o f h i s t a r k s a t t h e sane time. In t h e s e
c a s e s , h e c o u l d n o t e x e r c i s e c l o s e con;rol.
( 2 ) Unexpected daryj-erolJs targets vere o f t e n e,icountereti.

Iridividcal tanks rn-at engage t h e s e targets i, mediately,
t c prevent t t e i r OIW d e s t r u c t i o n .

( 3 j k l a r g e volume

o f f i r e from i n d i v i d u a l t a n k s a c t i n g
lipon t h e i r o::n i n i t i a t i v e o f t e n r e s u l t e d i n d m o r s l i z i n g t h e wem?.

6.
Th.: conce?t th.t ,+atocn laders must c l o s e l ~ yc o n t r o l t h e
f i r e of t h e i r p l a t o o n s nas ba.sed pirtial1.y O:I t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r c o ~ s e r v i n g t h e l i m i t e d sunplv of a l m n i t i c r . c a r r i e d i n a t a n k . Hovever, p e r SCNIB
inturvie.iad s ?,atcd:

(1) Tank c.nei's lL:ani Pron evperienca t o conservz m u n i tion.
( 2 ) dmmurdtion exnenditure c a n be eqcalizec. by r o t a t i n g
the lead tank.

d . The G m e r a l Bo r3, Unitad S t a t e s P'orcas, Euronean T h e a t e r i s
c f the @ ? i n i o ntha-L co:):dinaticn, c o n t i u l , and s u p e r v i s i c n of f i r s by
:;riiui&nders i s a x i o m t i c . fiawever, expurienci ~ K t Ih e >ropean Theater has
siiom t h a t t h e c c n t r o l must n o t be exiended t o the p o i n t 0.; d e s t r o y i n g
t h o i n i t h t i v e of t h e indioiOual t a n k coiiunandzr.

It i s r e c o m m d - d t h a t s F p r o p r i a t e
e.
t.'ia,s be: r e v i s e d accordingly.
P.

1,';ar

Dep .rtn!ent pitblica-

-

~ a c h - , o _ f _ ~ ~ ~ V
~ eer iti c~a ,i ~ProfiLe.
~ ~ t ~ -

a. Ta& t a r g e t s a r e of two g e n e r a l typos: tho82 7vith l i t t l e
o r no ver:ical p r o f i l e , such a s a n t i t a n k o r na-nine
s; arid, t h o s e
h a v i n e :onsii',arabla v - r t i c a l $rofile, such a s tanks.
As r e g a r d s t h e
l a t t e r , FLi 17-12, Tank Gunner:!,
states:

r

..

t h e t r a j e c t o r y necessary t o o b t a i n a h i t is on?, iuhicb.
i f tht: p r o j u c t i l c xcre t o continus throuph t h e t . r @ , z t
would s t r i k e 3 1 s ground bceyond t h e target. ..IT :he ro:ind
passes the t a r g s t , and i s not, 2 h i t , thd p a t h of t h e t r a c e f u r n i s h e s nore ncciiratc inform.Lion than docs t h o p o i n t of
s t r i k c . When tho round passas o v m t h e t a r @ ,
th, h e i g h t
O T t h z t r a c e r above thi: c e n t a r of th; tsrgc-t J.G.:! bs inaasurcd
and tiia c o r r e c t rsnbc chango a y l i a a t o o b t a i n a !lit."5
1'.

,

b. However t h e minual doc3 not provia', a method by W i c h t h e
Exparicnce i n t h , .5uropsan
o o r r c c t range chance can be c!,:torminsd.
'l'nat<:r i n d i c a t e d need f o r such a n o t h o d .
Y u n p h a s i z 4 Lhz n w e s s i t y f o r g e t t i n g a
t h $ e n m y d i d , pzrticul.arly \..!i~,n : i r i n g at

tanks.

(:<) kfjustmsnt of t,rnccr ki,iSkt c a n r e s u l t i n obt.aining
h l t s in f ' , s c r rounds than b:; f o l l o 7 f l i n gb r a c k c t i n g
p r i i l c i p l c s , ivh;;n i i r i i i p z t v.ertica1 t a r g z t s .
a:urbiiLbnt of t h 8 height of t r a c - r above t t i d tarweapons. 3 i n c c t h c t r a d i s
r?it.ion, t h i s i c c h n q u e n i l 1
!;3v:, g r c a t b r value i n tho f u t u l u .

-

7 -

E-BS- T- H- I-C-T-FrD
--.-.d. It i s rccomondod t h a t a p p r o p r i a t a a g e n c i e s os" t h e Y!ar
Department develop a simolc nethod of f i r e adjustmont f o r h i g h VSlOCitp
m u n i t i o n by which t h e h e i g h t of t r a c e r above a v s r t i c a l t a r @ can be
converted i n t o t h $ proper r a n g e ciizngo.

9;. J&i&ial F i r e Ordxre..
a. An c+xam.deof an i n i t i a l fir6 o r d e r
Tar,k G u n n a y fcllows:

a5

szt f o r t h i n FL; 17-12,

------GUi;lA.JE
(1) k l a r t t h e gmi,ur- --________--

( 2 ) T a r g e t dcacription-----------------TkNX

(3) Type of ammunition t o fir+--------

SHOT

( 4 ) f i i r a c t i o n t o t r a v o r s 2 tmum<t------- T M ii 2 s 13 RIGHT
( 5 ) Stopping travcrsii------------------Si:,~i;CV-----ON

______________________-______
ONd 'HOlJS&ND
( 6 ) €;ange
(7) Conunand t o opon

fire----------

-----FIW'

b. Most of t h z pErsorinal i n t e r v i t - i r d m a l n t a i n d t h a t t h e p r e s c r i b u d i n i t i a l f i r e c r d d r s ylcrJ n o t usdd. The r a a s o n s givivcn vdcrz:

(1) Formal f i r e o r d m s w e r F n o t nzcussarg T o r b a t t l e .
(2) Tne p r c s c r i b d conn;ands wh1ox t o o 1or.g.

( 3 ) Cr;.x;s d o v i l o p e d t h c i r own systoms which t h g cons:i.dmdd
quLcka,

( 4 ) Lost of t h s i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e command; v a s uimvli;s~ssary, p ? . r t i c u a l r l j r i n t h - cas,:: of apL:riLnc:o crcws.

c,

On furthcr qu.:stiohj.ng, a l l i.ntarviejwJLs iiivariab3.g a d m i t t s d

that thd dc"rits

of th;. nrescrlbod f i r i o r d o r w r z esscnt,ia!

oxsnt:

(1) Opinion was d i v i d G d on t h c n c c s s r i t y 01 alsr-ting, the
g u m '21'.
( 2 ) A s u b s t a n t i a l nwnber m a i n t a i n j d that d o s i e n a t i o n of t h e
ammunition :a3 nacossary w i t h an d p d r i s n c c d l o a d c r only

;uhcn Lhc tank commandcr d o s i r i d .to chango frcm t h c t y p e

normally amploycd a g a i c s t t h o t a r l ; < t unccr
was agrdad t h a t , d e s i g n a t i o n was n-caasar:
was i n i x p z r i e n c d .

a-i;t,nok.

It

if tho loadtr

d , Notking i n d i c a t e d t h a t tn; srstems d a v d o p u d by tank c r e w s
wme d a f i n i t z o r c r y s t a l i z c d . It i s bcliuvcd t h a t t h o s e systems consj.,qtsd of comrnands such a s : "G;t t l i a t t a n k o v z by t h ; barn o n t h u s i d a
of t h e h i l l . "

a . Tho f l j w pooplo who u s e d th- p r e s c r i b d f i r e o r d u s c o n s i d i r o d thum both c s s c n t i a l and h i g h l y s 3 t i s f a c t o 1 y f o r COJllbat.
f . It i s concludod t h a t d x p x i c n c a i n t h s Europban T h c a t a r h a s
not shown t h o a d v i s a b i l i t y of b i t h e r r e v i s i n g c r d i n i i n s t i n g t h e i n i t i a l
f i r c o r d e r s p r o s c r i b d d in Fbi 17-12, Tank Gunnery, 13 July 194!+.

- 8 R-E-S-T-R-I-C
--

-T-E-D

R-X-S-T-R- - --_
I-C-T-E;D
-___
g. It is r c c o m m d o d t h a t t;icrz b2 n o char.ge i n t h c i n i t i a l
fire o r d c r s as s3t I"or.i;h i n IM
' 17-19, Tan!: Gunncry, 1 0 July 1944..

10.

C o n c e n t r a t i n 3 t h e F i r e o f th.aAl-?-.-

a . Fh' 17-12, Tank Gunnery, p r a s c r i b o s a mcthod by + i c h t.he
p l a t o o n l z a d a r c o n c c n t r a t a s t h e f i r e of h i s ? l a t o o n by d i r 8 c t l a y i n g .
It i s com.nonlg r z f a r r c c l t o as 'II'ATCH I f l BURST". It c o n s i s t s of t h e p l a toon l-adzr a d j u s t i n g on t h e t ? i ' g 3 t , tharoby i d c n t i f J i n g t h e t ; r g o t and
dctsrn.ini.:ip: t h o r a n g e f o r h i s p l a t o o n . %cn t h 3 rar.gi: h a s bz-;n dotzrmindd, bd aniiouncos it t.0 t h ; oth;?r t a n k s and t h 2 y c2on l i r e . (Sue Appcndix 1 f o r d e t a i l e d p s o c c d u r s . )
I c t c r v i e w m i reported c x t c n s i v s m p l o p a n t of t h e ll7I;TCH LT
D e t a i l e d , r c c c d u r e v a r i e d b s t w z m u n i t s , being govsrnad l a r g e l y by t h e i r p r e v i o u s t r a i n i n g . I n soma casGs, t h z o t t ~ t~a nr k s
o p w e d f i r o as s a o n a s tt:G:. i d e n t i f i e < the target a n d d i d :jot : l a i t f o r
t h c p l a t o o n Lac1.x t o d d t - i m i n o and announc2 t h e rac2e. It $\!as r e p o r t z d
t h s t t h e t a r p & u s u a l l y ?':as i d i n t i f i a d a f t h r t h o p l a t o o n l,ad;r had
f i r 4 OW o r two rounds. Usyelopinant o f a s a t i s f a c t o r y range f i n d e r f o r
a l l -tanks s h o d d o l i i n i n a t z t h r p r a s u n t d s s i r a b i l i t y of t h i Flatnor. 12ad o r dzt<rmi.ning th,: rang- bafore t h e rcnaind.:r of t h ? p l a t o o n opons f i r e .
b.

EUBST" p r i n c i p l e .

c.

Thc intarviz:.:s r m o a l z d a g - n e r d l a c k of f m i l i . z r i k y u i t h

thG proccdur;z s o t f o r t h i n FIT l'i-12, Tank Gunndrg, 1d J u l y 19L4. T h i s
can bi: p a r t i a l l y explaincti bjr t h , ; r c l s t i v o l y l a t e date of i n c o r p o r a t i o n
o f t h z c u r r m t , procedure i n l'hr Do*prtr.;nt p u b l i c a t i o n s ( s m Appendix 2 ) .

It i s b d i c v z d t h a t t h i s l a c k of faniI.iarit;fl can also b e a t t r i b u t d d t o
inad\:quat .: t r e i n i n g ,
d. O f f i c e r s vho s t a t u i t h e y w r c f a m i l i a r w i t n t h e p r c s c r i b o d
proccdurc f o l t it r.,quir;d t u o m w h r a d i o t r a n s n i s s i o r . . Thoy s u g g e s t i d
simnpiificition.

i b r c s p x i f i c r i . c a n n m d a t i o n s could n o t bs cbt;inL;d.

\:.

Tho German t a n k o f f i c s r s iiitdrvicw;d i n d i c e t a d t h a t ttieg
did n o t f a v o r t h o f l V A T C f ~ ,.XBUiiSTfl nicthod. Thsy p r d i r r a d t o hr.vo onc
tank fir; v;hilo th..; rerminlaindGr o f LLc p l a t o o n mneuvi;red.

f . Tha Gmcral D o a d , I l n i t s d S t a t i s Forccs, E u r o y a n
i s of t h c o p i n i o n -thnt, a l t l i o u b t h a c r i % i c l s m of t2.u ! x u s c i i t I'
.hfbT" mcthnd was due Inri.,oly t o l a c k of f m i l i n r i t y r i t h prescribed
procodiirs, combat d:pcr.icncc! h ~ ds2monstrat;;d t h e d o s i r z b i l i t y of d o v e l oping a procodurz r d q u i r i n g a mil?i.rnun of radio t r s n s i n i s s i o n .
g.
It i s ri;co(:GTmdod t h a t a D 7 r o F r i a t c ?genciGs o f t h o 'kr kATCiI I.iY BUii5T" proccCc.ro
p r t m s n t i n v u s t i g r r t o s i m p l i . f i c a t i o n of t h o
3s sdt i o r t h i n PM 17-12, Tamk Crunn~xy, 10 :uly 1944.

11. L i . h t F i r i i i 4 . -

a. Fcrsoilnol i n t i n r i m c j , reportt;d thzt, t h e y h e d bcen c a l l e d
Tho eidthod u s d , as r.211 3 s thos,; 2I?Ipb3icd
upori t o f i r 2 st n i g h t .
th.4 Gormans, ari? d i s c u s s e d I b r i d f l y i n Appcndix 3.
b. KO inoiancr? 112s rc?pcrtod o f t h o cmploymdnt o f tho "aiming
and l l i n t c r o u c t i o n " msthcds of duturming dsca s a t f o r t h i n FM 17-12,
Talk Gunn-ry, 1.0 J u l y 19/&. The a i m i n g s t a k u method p r n v i d r s a mbans o f
a c c u r a t e l y s s s i g l l i n g s p c i f i c t a r g : ! t s t o i n d i v i d u a l tarus m c of a c c a r a t c f o r i n j . t i 2 , l d c f l u c t i o n . Thz i n t a s e c t i o n inetliod p r o v i d b s
l y 1,;yying t?d<:cs
an tlccurati. m.ans of dut;rmin:ing
rangG by m a t h m a t i c a l c o m p u t a t i o n s . ( S e e
Appzndix 4 for S c t ? i l + d d o s c r i p t i o n o f the33 mzthods).
st,&oll

- 9 -

~R-&S-T-lt-I-C-T-E-D
- .____.
. -

The f s i l u r c t o usii t h e aircing s t a k o md i n t c r s c c t i o n mothods
c.
can tl: a t t r i h t < < dt o :

(1) Lock o f t r a i n i n g , which was dus t o tt.z Leclc of m?!iasis

In-

plec;d o n n i g h t f i r i n g t r a i n i n g ir. tl?c Zone of thi:
ta i o r

.

(2)

?hc f a c t t h a t t h e i n t e r s u s t i o r , mcthod

3ii.s

n o t i(Dcorp0r-

at,& i n a ?kr Dcpai-tmxC. F u k l i c s t i o n u n t i l Ji?r.'J%ry
lSiil+, and t h c aiminc st-.k.? nstho3 r-ot m t i l J a y 19L,b.7

d.
O f f i c d r s who hxd b j c n i n s t r u c t o r ! i n thr: i n t c r s w L i o n method
S i l t i t - a s t o o iavolvzci .znd cumb;rsomc, p x t i c u l c r l y ivhw dL?tmnLninc!
t h : rxigi: d u r i n g dnrkndss. T h g h l i i - v c d it xould bs d i r ' i i c u l t t D t r a i n
cr,!;s Lo olrcrconi.: th: h n d c n c y t o r o t u r n ;nomy f i r e b<:foro thsg had con-

a.
D f f i c a r s i n t s r v i c - 2 1 .,rwh-.siz;d t h r t n i g h t f i r i n g rdonld ~ B V L :
,,L-n us6-d morc oft.un h n i n simpl- mothod of d e l i v e r i n g accuratc f i r e bsen

L-

availsblo.
f , Ihno Gancrcl k a r d , Unitzd S t . a t i s Forces, ?hrop?.n T h a t c r
coficlodus ttirrt:

(1) &n,:riancs ir. t h o 3 i r o p b m ThvntLr has c l m o n s t r a t c d
t h c nzud :'or n simpl..;?, qcicli mAiod of d o l v u r i n l g
curstcj firs st n i g h t .

IC-

muthodu wwe
hlvo poson prc-solccillninin?tin&
t h . only x c u r n t s imthods nv.ii.1t h e ter,ot, t h y
?.Llc f o r ? r u s c n t f i r ; c o n t r o l cquiplncnt.

(2) Rlttou,?! t h e aiming stak:: ?rid i n t u r s c c t i o n
not oiijdoyod ir. ;hd Zmropci11 T h c n t x , thoy
s i b l c u t i l i z a t i o n f o r p13nncd night firing
t i e targets. In t h c shsonc;: cf a m m n s o f

g.

It i s ruco.nmended t h s t :
(1) Aporopriztti a g z n c l c s of t h o 'Tar nopartn:c.nt cicvclop t h o
: - q u i p x i t , namuiiition, and i x c h n i q m r c q u i r n d t o provide tanks v i t h 2. simplo, quick, and ascurati mcthod
of xL&t f i r i n g .
imine s t n k c and i n t c r a ; a t i o n x u t h o d s ba rc-Luincd
17-E, Tank Gunnery, 10 July 1.94!,. as c x p c d i c n t s
pinding c v n i l n b i l i t g of m o r c s u i t : i b l o nicthods.

"only undur t h o si1p;rvbsion a d c o n t r o l o f t h o r a i n f c r c s d a r t i l T h i s s u y o r v i s i o n e n d c o n t r o l i . i l i l n c l u d z t!x sstabl.ishment of pl?.cL inarks f o r aach t a n k p l a t o o n , 2nd t h i ; cor.iput?tion
of 2.11 f i r i n e d a t a , until such tim3 1 s t h c ?.rtillcr:7 cqmr..?ndor
is s a t i s f i e d t h e t t h o tmk uni'; i s csp?bli. of opcr~otinp;i t s o a n
iiri d i r c c t i o n c s n t o r . ! ' (SCG .ipp:ndix 5.)

lery.

c . 1 n t o r v i e . c r c v e a l c d thit tanks warc not eniploycd c x ~ O l l S i V a ~
as r e i n f o r c i n g ? . r t i l l q , .? survey and fire c i i r a c t i o n wurc no.m-:ll.y }L.Ld l c d by t h o r c i n f c r c o d a r t i l l d r y . T h i s WBS r c p o r t d 2.s sntia.f':-cl;orJ.

Deviation ' d s i n t h c C ? S U of f i r o d i r c c t i o n r-.thcr th?.n s u r v q d In son.,-:
cises r e i n f o r c i n g tanks sank computors t o t h c r a i n f o r e - d :rtiLlcry' B f i r 2
d i r c c t i o n c z n t c r . Rhcn t.-.nk u n i t s r a n t h o i r owc f i r c d i r x t i o n cat.:r,
it was u s u a l l y uidsr t h s u p i r v i s i o n of An o f f i w r f r a n t h c rcin.forcod
w t i l l ary ,
d. A l l tank p;:rsonncl i n t e r v i i w a d , fro;? Comb.-,t Coma-nndors t o
onliatcd mzn, f e l t t h n t t x k s d ~ n u l dnot ba rcsr,onsibl.., for survuy or
f i r c d i r o c t i o n . Ih; Di-Jisj-on A r t i l l G r y ccnuimd-rs of t h \ j 1, 3, I+, nnd

lh Armorcd D i v i s i o n s ?.grmd. Ths 5 Armorad Division Artil.lcr;y Comm?ndcr
f e l t Lhcy sh o ul d b 3 q u i l i f i e d i n fire ciirGct.iori ;..rid S L I I - V ~ : . ~ . Tho 3 Infantzy Division A r t i l l e r y Comnmdcr considx-ed i t w s n o t x c m t i 2 l .

e . Tnnk b ~ t t c 1 , i o n st h i t were c;u.slifi,xl in s u r v q ?nd f i r e a i r o c t i o n whim i n i t i a l l y conunitLud t o s c t i o n l ? , t o r f o u n d thcmsclvos s c v e r l y
handicclppr-d by c 2 s u d t i d s SIJICC?rcplecsnicnts had not, reccivcd ?rt:lll?ry
t r a i n i n & . Considoring V c 1:l.iy;~ turnov-r of porsonncl i n t a n k b z t t o l f o n s ,
erest weight n u s t bs giTim t o t h i s point.10
Elopl;zc<.mcnts r c c c i v j d i n t h o
Suropcan T h e a t e r w r z n o t qu?.lifiLd in primary tsnlc gunncr7.ll T o tr,!.in
r s p l n c . m x t a q u s l i f i c d b o t h i n surv;y and f i r c d i r c c t i o n and i n tnnlc gunc d y ivoiild, by n c c c s s i t y , unduly lengthen khc! tr?.ining periotl.
f . Axpa-icncs i n t h e Ztirop..?sn Thastcr i n d i c a t e s th-,t t k c r c quirwnent t h t tmks plrform t h o i r om survcy and f i r s 'directionogu-1.t i o n s is unsound.
g. Tho Gunoml 3o?rd, UnititJd S t i t s a Forc~s, Buroponn T h c i t o r
rccoiimicnds t h ? t a p p r o p r i 2 , t J ?'ar Dcpertment p u b l i c ? t i o n s bc r o v i s c d t o
r o i i o v e t a n k s from t % c r o s p o r . s i b i l i t y for survey nnd f i r s dii-octiori ?r!wn
Tank u a i t s "it, rezzin gm&icc.l
crnploycd 3s r e i n f o r c i n g w t i l l c r y .
f i r i n g t ? b l c s and allir?d cnui-mcnt :or computatio;: of individu.-.l :iring
d+ta f o r their b i s i c VJO?_pOn.

13.

on.

-

a . ?hr Gcpartmcnt p u b l i m t i o n s p r c s c r i b c thu f c l l m i n ? mcthod
3f claaning c?.nnon tubds:

llSvnb t h c bcrc ;mmodi.taly i3.a f i r i n g , ~ v h i l <t: h 3 t u b 6 is
s t i l l h o t , 2nd d a i l y t h a r m f t c r o n t h o f o l l o v i n g thra-. d s y s ,
with -Is o l u t i o n of cne-hAI po'md of sod2 ~slit o o7,c.h gol.lon
of m r m 'fitter. Iurinso t h o r U g h l j :.rith c l a m ' w t z r nnd dry
thoroughly b i f o r c oFling.

llpz

b. lippravsd n l t z r n ? . t i v v s i n o r d o of c f f i c l i n c g Irk: first 3
s o l u t i o n of one pow.d of soep ( c a s t i l o profarreci) i n f o u r g:,.llons of
-.lntdr; second, "cleaning, brushing, and wiping w i t h lots of bot s-itdr";
m d t h i r d , r i f l e boro ~ 1 e a n a r . l ~

- 11 &-s-&.I'-R-I-C-T-&.D

,

-

d. The Gonc-sl gorrd, U n i t c d S t s t s s Forces, Europc?,n Th eat - r
c c n c l u d e s t h ? t dxporisnco i n t h e E u r o p m n The-Iter h s s shovn:

(1) T h t t h c p r c s c r i b s d hot watt? mcthoda of cldi-.ing csnnon ?.IT n o t p r z c t i c d f o r coinb-t uso.
( 2 ) T!iqt t h c r c i s nccd f o r ?. c l c m i 3 E ni?thod dovval.opcd
primarily f o r combit. u t i l i t y ,
e.
It i s r.;comendcd t k e t o p p r o p r i q t u n g e n c i c s of Lhc Ybr
Dcpartmcnt d c v c l u p 2 method for cl.xmi.ng canncn t u b - s u n d c r comlxt cond i t i o n s . The d e s i r i . d m t h o d should n o t requirc p r e p s r - . t i o a of ?. s olut i o n by t h z t z n k c r o ? >.nd should bc cap.nblc of cle?.lL!ig ?,. c o l d b o r e i l l
t G n minutas.

14. Ad,jusiment ,p,g M?.chinc Guns.
Appendix 6 c o r . t . i n s n o t e s on tni; Ammrzd s c h o o l nmthods .of
3.
a d j u s t i n g machind guns. Thesz n o t a s , with a d v o r o e c o w l m t s h; Hd.?dqa-l,rt c r s Europem T h m t e r of Opor?,t;ons, were forrmrc.od t o Lhs ':,v3ew:rtmcnt by t h e Europi,an I h C i a t c of O p e r a t i o n s i n FdJi'u,?.Tg 1945 w i t h ths u e e e s t i o n t h ? t t h e y b c coiisiCcrod i n r e v i s i n g c u r r e n t p u b l i c p t i o n s .
b.
Tha s m a l l nunbar of i n t z r v i c w o c s mho w m u i"i1j.m w i t h
t h c s d mez'?ods c o n s i d o r x l t h c m s u l w r i o r t o t h o s ; prest:rib;tl hg t h d F'nr
Dcyrtmmt.

c . E x p i r i a n c ; i n t h o Europc7.n Thcitcr i n d i c a t . u s th?t, th,
Armored School methods n1z.y 5 , s u p e r i o r t o pr.scrj.bu6 , x c t i o d s .
d , It i s rccomwnd.:d t h t cp:-roprintc a g e c c i o s o f tixu V%r
D t p z r t m m t d c t mliinc w h o t h u p r o x r i b i d mcthom of .xi
jvoting cclib-r
.30 Ii1919Ak ininchine guns SIIOLIX
be r e p l 2 c a d by t h o Armortic1 S c h o o l m ~ t h o r l
d c s c r i b c d ir. Apgcndix 6 .

15, Cordcns.ztion o f M o j s t u r e on E x t e r i o r S i g h t Lo,n:5.25.
a . ?kr T ' q e r m e n t p u b l i c - r t i o n s providc ti-.it m o i s t u r u cniidons a t i o n on c u t Trior l O n 5 0 S n i q b: r a i o v i d by tskin:: t h c Snstrw>.crit t.o n
:i?.rm
In ib?.LLl.e, i t i s n o t f c a s i b l o t o r m o v r : t h ! l c s i g h t s and
p c r i s c o p u s from t t , o i r mounts t o d o t h i s .

b . S i g h t s t z h d t o f o g b i d l y on c o l d mornings, cnd -1.lso, irhon
th2 t m k i.s "button3d up" , l 5 I n t m v i c w i r o s r c n o r t i d g::s mask .-.nti-dim,
.?.pplicd t o m t c r i o r la",
: ! a s somc?>ihntc f f o c t i v z i n p r u v c n t h g foggirlg.
Th;: g i n c r c l o p i n i o n IVLIS n o t c s c n t h u s i a s t i c 9 s t h z t of 2. pl?.too;l l c - . d u r
from t h c 21 T?nk B n l , b . l i n r ~who s t l t c d : "Ani.i-din
12i.rs v i s i o r l con:p l 2 t e l y " rind 1fl:ists b c t n c c n SLYrmd e i g h t h 0 u r s 1 j . l ~
c.

Expcricnc.: i n t h o Eu r o p a m T h m t < r i n d i c n t G s :

(1) T h o n s t h o d o f removing moisturi: condcnsnt,ion Irom cxt e r i o r lcnscs, 7s p r c s c r i b c d i n !
!'wCq:rtmGtxt puL>l:~c e t i o n s , i u not. p r a c L i c n l , undcr co~nb?t c o n d i t i o n s .

- 12 R-E-5I_.--._-T-H-I-C-T-E-D
_._-.___

- 13

-

RI; S T , R I C T E

n

V.

19.

il.

12.


13 *
-.

1%.


SIiiZPTbH 2

-

7" GUKNdRY TWLI T i N G

SbCTiON 1

TM INING TbTHODS

17. Scope, The i n t e r v i e w s indica:ed t h e n e c e s s i t y o f c t r t o tn

refinemena p p l i c a t i o n of t r a i n i n g methods, a s w e l l a s i i i c r e a s e d

emphasis on c e r t a i n phases o f gunnery. The follornnp, d i s c \ A s s i o ni s

l i m i t e d o: t h e s e m o d i f i c a t i o n s .

18. Adjustnierlt o f t h e Fower 'Traverse.
6,
m n y i n t e r v i e w e e s r e p o r t e d t t a ; t h e power t r o v e r s e de-

veloped d r i f t . Feu!, i f ' any, hnd r e c e i v c d t h e n e c e s s a r y t r a i n i n g Lo

e n a b l e them t o make t h e mechanical adjusLmsnt f o r e l i m i n a t i n g d r i f t .


b. I t was p o i n t e d c u t t h a t t h e speed and f l e x i b i l l t y of' t n e

power t r a v c r c e gave h m e r i c s c t a n k s t h e one advantage t h e y had over

the German PANPtM? and TIGER i n a f i r 6 'ight.


c. I t i s rscommenied t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e Nar Department pub-

l i c a t i o n s be r e v i s e d t o r e q u i r e g r e a t e r emphasis on t h e nbovt: a d j u s t -

ment, and that it b e , i n c l u d e d i n gunners1 p r o f i c i e n c y t e s t s .


19.

Cre-s D r i l l .

8.
J u n i o r o f f i c e r s a n d e n l i s t e d m e r stGted t h a t f o r m a l crew

d r i l l had l i t t l e , i f any, p r a c t i c a l ap;llioaii.on i n b a t t l e . However,

t h e y agreed t h a t g u n d r i l l and s i m u l a t e d f i r i n g , which r e q u i r e d them

t o perform t h e i r d u t i e s a s crew members, was e s s e n t i a l .


b. Gerrran t a n k o f f i c e r s sLuted t h a t 'cheir crews w e r e r e -

q u i r e d - 0 perform t h e i r d u t i e s i n p r e p a r i n g f o r a c t i o n , e t c . , i n

t o t e l d a r k n e s s b e f o r e q u a l i f y i n g f o r conibht.

C.
C r e w d r i l l i s t h e o n l y s y s t e m a t i c mcthod o t s o f & m i l i o r i z i n g crew members w i t h i h e i r d u t i e s t h a t they- w i l l f u n c t i o n a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n b a t t l e , The d i s c i p l i n a r y v a l u e of c n c c u t i n g t h e s e d u t i e s
by formal oommanc i s o t v i o u s . However, over-emphasis o f t h e d i s c i p l i n a r y phase r e s u l t s i n l a s s of i n t e r e s t and l a c k o f rsiilism.

d. The General Board, U n i t e d S l a t e s F o x e s , European T h e a t e r
concludes t h a t t h e u l t i m e t e o b j e c t i v e o f crew d r i l l i s combat o f h o i e n c y
. a n d t h e t t h i s o b j e c t i v e nus'; be Emphasized i n t r a i n i n g .
e. It i:: recomn;enried t h a t e p p r o p r i a t e war Department pub-

l i c a t i o n s be r e v l s e d t o c o n t a i n t h e n e c e s s a r y d i r e c t i v e s .

20.

C a p a b i l i t i e s o f American and Enemy l a n k Zeapcns.

a. O f f i o e r s and men s t r e s s e d ~ k el a c k o f a c c u r a x inzorma-

t i o n , d u r i n g t r a i n i n g , r e g s r d i n g t h e c a p a b i l i ' l i e s of our owci 2nd cnemy

weapons. F e i l u r e t o d i s s e m i n a t e complete and a c c u r e t e i n f o r m o t i o n o n

t h e comparative c a p a b i l i t i e s of Amorionn and enemy wcepons and fnnks

r e s u l t e d i n r e d u c t i o n in combat c f f i c i e n o y .

b.

9 x p s r i e n - e i n t h e European Thcowr indicwtcs that:

(1) Tank orews must be provided w i t h u c c u - a t e infortnat i a n on t h e ermor p i e r c i n g c c p n b i l i t i e f i of American

- 15

-

23.

Sub-Calibc,r FI r i n g .

-k-E-S-T-K- - - - _i-C-T-E-3

___C.
I t 1s r e c o m s n d t d thac n p p r o p r i a t o \Tar Dtpnrtmcnt p u b
l i c n t i o n s be r b v l s r d t o c l i m i n o t s t h c s t a n d - r d 1i)OG i n o h moving t n r g e t c c u r s t as q u c l i f i o o t i o z r c q u i r e m t n t f o r Clank macLint g~m.u"s.

Servicc Amwnition F i r l n g :

24.

Q u a l i f i c c t io n i n Gunnmy.

G.
A n l i s t e d msn s t c t c d t h a t , i n t h t li,l?it of their o o n b ~ i t
t x p w l c n c c , they would not c o n s i d c r -thsmsclvis q u o 1 i f l t . d f o r b c t t l v
u n t i l xhsy had f i r e d &tl e a s t 100 rounds o t s t r v i c t F I I I ~ : ~ I ~ ~t:l&
V : ~
p r c f c r e b l y 150 rounds.

b. I t i s rucormsnatd t h a t cppropri8t.e 'Uar DtpcrCnitnt publ i c a t i o n s b e rasis6.d t o provide t l i c t g u i n s r s I q u s l i f i c h t i o m r c . q u i r a
successful c o m p l t t i o n of a f i r m & cour30 l n v c l v l n g s u p c r v l s t d i n s t r u c t i o n a l f i r i n g o f c t l t e s t 1CO rcunds of sorwict snxunition, inc1uciil;g
a suitablt qualification tist.

S e r v i c c nmmunition F l r i n g :

25.

Gumbat F i r i n g .

A 1 1 pLrsonnal inttrviawr-d s t n t t d thct the most i n p a r t -

g.

a n t phcsc of e l l t r e i n i n g was r c . r . l i s t l c sor.i?x,.t: f i r i n g . Sor12but CXp t r i c n c r shoxed t h m t h i ; q u i c k uccurakc s h o o t i n g i s r e q u i r t d t o k i l l
t h a c n m y b d o r a hc, kills you, end t h a t such s h o o t i n g i s cbhlcvud

only by

mort

s h o o t i n g ir. t r h i n i n g ,

b. I t i s rccommendcd t n c t t h e "ilor D.pcr-.nlent r o q u i r f i n crc.osLd cmphnsis on cvmbet f i r i n c ; f o r crow, s t c t i o n , and pln-kaon t r z i n ing. E v u y t f f o r ' t must be madc t o c r e n t c th' m n x i m m rcslism.

26.

S e r v i c t Amnunition F i r i n g 1

Targz ts.

c.
I n t L r v i c w t c s p o i n t t d out t h s u r i r o c l i c t i c .cruinin& r - s u l t i n g from f i r i n g crmor p i c r o i n g nmiuni:ion at c l o t h t u i k s i l h o u c t t c s .
bbsenca of the. f l c s h o f L? p r o j c c t i l e s t r i k i n g iirmor mndc s t n s i n g of h i t s
difficult.

S t c t l p k t e o r o b s o l c m t r n k s wtrt suggestt:d o s p r o p t r

b.
torgcts.

c.
Tlic G t n u r c 1 Bocrd, UnitLd Sttites Forccs, & u r n p ~ m'Ihe::.-Lar
concludes t h s t n w d a.xists f o r s u i t ~ b l attirp-l;s for c.riiIG1' p i u r c i n g
ommuni t i o n ,

d. It i s rucommcndcd thct a p p r o p r i i i t t ',:c.rD c p r r t s c n t :igencics
provide I e r g e t w h i c h ehLn h i t w i l l produce t h , cht.r!'.ctoristio f ' k s h
of an armor p i e r c i n g p r o j c , o t i l c s t r i k i n g vrincr, O b s o l L t c t c n k s ort
sug g ss -tsd

.

27.

SurvicL dmnuni. Lion Firinr?;:

Kcrigas,
-

O f f i c e r s f t . m l i c r wi'th t h b mooing 1 : r r e : t t r i n g b s ct
i..
C e , s t i t m u r t i n , Mngl::nd, cnd Rad i i p p s p r i r g c , Gcrm:.ny, c o n s i d c r d thmi
g r a s t l v s u p t r i o r t o m y i n ttt. U n i t t d Ste-tcs in rcclistii cnd t r a i n i n g
t f r g t t r s n g i s i n t h c United S t 1 s were i l t s c r i b c d E S
v s l u ~ : . hfovine
~ ~
unr cc.li s t 1c

.

b. hxpcritnca i n t h i L u r o p t t a Thti;t c r i n d i c c t c s t!mt thcri.
is n i i d f o r improvsmcnt i n moving t i r g o t rcngLs i n t h e Zoni- c f I;hC
Interior,
C.
It i 6 rocomiendcd t h l - t o p p r a p r i c t c Xf-r Dbipartmmt s g i n a i i s
provido mora r t r . l i o t l c moving t c r g o t r t n g G s . Daaireblt. ft.i.turcs o f
B r i t i s h cnd Germen rfagoa should bt 1 U C O r p r F . t c d .

- 17 -

-Ir-L-S-T-3-1-C-T-E-D
-_-_---26,

Ten% Crew G u m c r y Tests.

n. A l l pGrsonne1 who h F d teksn t h e Army Ground Forcc; Tank
3 r w T;unnery t s s t s oonsidcrod thcm o f g r t o t vcllue, when c o n d u c t 4
propcrly.
Ir. t h e l i g h t of b e t t l c t x p c r i t n c c e n l i s t e d mcn Lxpressed
e. s i n c a r t d e s i r e t o l u x n t h c c m o t s t e t c of' t h c i r FrDficiLncy btfort:
going o v w s e c s .
b. Thht G i n c r n l EoLrd, 1Jnitid S t c t t s Forces, EuropLm T h t t t o r
concluddcs t h f i t t h e v a l u c of t h t . t v n k cret': g u n n t r y t e s t s msy bc cor.promi8t.d i f t h e y ? . r C n o t conductcd by d i s i n t c r L s t L d p i r s o m t l .

It i s riconvntnd;? t h . t r g p r o p r i s t t ?Wtr Dcprrtmtnt ugc-ncics
C.
provide d i s i n t c r i s t c d u n p i r a s t o conduct t h L Army Ground Force TF.nk
Crew tiunntry T c s t s .

c.
Junior officers cnd i n i i s t t d m m s t a t t d .thet their t r a i n i n g h r d riot i n c i u d c d Lmploynmt of t r r k s i n towns. BowovLr, t h y found
s u c h ixploymtnt, t o bc ccrmoii, Th;y p o i n t i d out t h c t C0;vn f i y h L r u g r t q u i r i s fcLstcrs h o o t i n g end c l o s c r coordinotior. thr-n f i g h t i n g i n o p e n
t L r r s i n . T h L lac?: o f t r s i n i n - i n ~ m m
f i g h t i n g W:Q considLrad II 'nrndiCLp.

b.
E;xpt.riLnct in iht h u r o p x n Thir.tcr incl.ici.t~s tP.1
f i g h t i c g v i t h tGnks r c q u i r e s s p c . c i ? l i z = d t r c i n i n g .

t tmn

It. i s rcconmLndtd t h c t r p p r o p r i c t t Krr Dcprrtmcnt pubC.
l i m - t i o n s b z r L n e L d ko i n c l u d c gunnvry end t o c t i z s t r a i n i n g i n i;my l o y m n t o f ti,nI.:s i n t o w s .

30. Indoor Gwincry T r a i n e r . ?.ntiuirori>Pt u i i i ts fo,md t h o "3om;
Tr':.ind'' :o hr VL g,rcr.t v c l u o . I t 3.s recommindLd t h E t c s i m i l n r t r r l n o r
bL J l i v i l o p i d f o r t c n k gunntry, knd be mcdc, rv:.ilc.llc f o r y~nr-crounj.
U S L to en;r.blc. t-.nk gunnwrs t o r t t t . i n i h t i r p r o f i c i c n a y .
This t r r i n c r
i s d i s i r c . d i n r : d d i t i o n tc t h e p r L s d t .turret t r c m c . r ,

?&.ININti I<&OI~-&,LA&,IV;L

31.

L . ~ ; ~ ~ I : Y ~ 'Ib
A L hl;jI-!

-

P..
This s L c t i o n covers t h a requiru"-:s
n t c a s m r y t o i: t:i.in
uniformly t , i p s t m d c r d s of t o n k guxncry i n t r r . i n i n g rnd t o m . i n t r i n
thcsc standrrds i n t e t t l e ,

b.
ThL i n i t i t I rLquircmLnc6 c r c sound gunnc-ry techrique
:.~<ndtr c i n i n g mcthods. T h 6 s t w r t d i s c u s s o d 12 tht. prLct:ding s L c t i o n s ,
Th, f o l l o w i n g d i n c u s s i o n indicrLLcs th'. nction r c q u i r a d t o obt!.in nc.xi!nun v o l u c from gunnLry tcchniquu rnd tr *.ining mctliods.

32.

Uniform T m i . i i n g .

In g t n e r i , l , p c r s o n n e l from u n i t s whorc i;unm,ry tr:.ir.c.
i n g w,:s cmphi:sizLd by s t n i o r conavndcrs rnd w 6 cor.ductcd i n s l o s c
c c o r d r n c c w i t h prescribed nicthods, d i s c u s s r d gunncry more i n t e l l i g6nt;ly rnd wi.re m o r h c o g n i z n n t of t h e netd f o r s t o n d c r d , prmise
8

t t c h n i q u t t h m p c r s o a a s l from o t h c r o r g s n i e c t i c n s ,

b. Thc. lnok o f u n i f o r m i t y i n t r r i n i . n g , i n d i o c t o d cliovt., o r n b~

- 10 -

(1) T r t m i n g l i t t r c t w c , t o i n c l u d e tr.ohniqut: o f r-mp l o y n m t , must b i ~ v ; : i l ~ b la tu t o m c t i c ? l l y !:t ' t h t
s:.mc t i m r n y ~ L : V rquipmtnt i s i s s u b d t o u n i t s ,
b o t h i n thL ZOXL of the-. J n t L r i o r r n d in ovc.rS<.!:S
thi.t&rs. ~ T L W L q u i p m i n t rt,ochtd t r o o p s i n t h L
b u r o p w n Th\c t L r b L f o r ; .trr.iiiiag 1 i t C . i - 1 t u r t .

( 2 ) E s t o b l i s h , i n t of f i r i n g c i n t c r s , s l m i l r r . t o thl;
T?nk D L s t r o y d CLnt&-r nnd thc. D t b i r r t Trilinin!:
C.x.ttr. All o f i i c c r s i n t t r v i c w L d f " v o r i d 1.
f i r i n g a b n t G r L:S ?roviding i d w 1 t r c i n i n c .
d.

I t i s r,oon"nd,-d

t h n t t h . k r Dons.rtniLnt.

(1) T ~ k ct h t ncceesfry r a t i o n t o i.?surL th2.t t r r . i n i n g l i t L . r r t u r , , i n c l u d i n g tcohniqur; of' cn.]~loymt.nt,
is cvz.il:blc r u t c m c t i c e l l y a t thc. s ? m L Limc n(iw
-quipncnt i s i s s u u d -ta units. Full i n v L 3 t i g i : ' t i o n
o f d i s t r i b u t i o n of' 1 i t a r z . t u r e is i n d i c c h d ,
( 2 ) Give s e r i c u s c o n s i d e r o t i o n t o e s t n b l i s l m o n t 01'

u n i t f i r i n g centers.

33. O f f i c e r s ' Schools.
e . . The l a c k o f u n i f o r m i t y discussed i n >he precedirit; p a r a g r q h con a l s o be a t t r i b u t e d t o absence o f a u n i v f r a l a p p r e c i e t i o r i
by o f f i o e r s of t h e raquj.rements of a c c u r a t e f i r i n g . This i s shown
by the f a c t t h a t ;
a d i f f a r c n c e in t h e evnluut-on of' g u m c r y between c f f i c c r s who lxul tulccrl t l ~ e
gurnery c o u r s e a i the Armored School and. t l L o s o w h o
had n o t .

(1) The i n t e r v i e w s r m e a l e d

(2) Junior o f f i c e r s mid e::] ... s t s d nien f ' c l t t l i a t rjlflny
b a t t a l i O I I c o m n m l c - r s had i n s u f f i c i e n t k ~ ~ o w ~ l c d , , ; e
of gunnery t o f u l l y q - p r e c i a t e t h e i r problems.
b. The laok o f u n i v e r s a l o p p r s o i a t i o n of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s
o f gunnery was t h e n a t u r h l r e e u l t o f t l m r a p i d expansion of t h e
Armored F o r c e w i t h o f f i c e r s who l e o k e d p r e v i o u s mxpericncc vr:it)l 75",,,
c m n o n . This vms emphmieed b y a combat cainmander the t h r i 5 ,jmlorr:d

D L v i s i o n %rho s t a t e d :
e.

':I was embarrassed by my

l h o k of krloalcdge,ll

T h e n s o s s s i t y for f u l l understandinF, 3f t h e reqLxiren1ents

t h e i ' o l l o w i r q s t a t a m e i ~ to r
b n t t s l i o n co~mander i n Lhe 5 t h Aimorad D i v i s i o n :
of g u n r e r y training i s i L l u s t r a t e d h:/

,&

"You can n c t have t o o nuch gunnory, It 1 s tile n ~ o o t .
Araportant phase and t h e l e a s t ilkelj; t o ~ m ~ i r o v01,
c

- 19 -

k-B-S-T-R-I-C-T-6-E


...

...

battlefield.
Gunnery must be a m o m a t i c .
,
The b s t t l e f i e l d i s a poor p l a c e t o l e a r n s h o o t i n g . "

d. Both j u n i o r and s e n i o r o f f i c e r s who had t a k e n B gunn e r y c o u r s e a t the Armored School a f t e r Maro:? 1943 c o n s l d c r e d i t of
g r e a t v a l u e , b o t h tc t h e n s e l v c s and t h e i r o r g a r i i z & t i o n s . A. b a t t e l i c n
corriminder i n t h e 5 Armored Div ieio n a t t r i b u t e d the grsnte2- l o s s a s
of C Company t o t h e f a c t t h a t i t s gunnery t r a i n i n g had been b e l o w t h e
He b e l i e v e d t h i s resulted from t h e
l e v e l of t h e o t h e r companies'.
o t h e r company comfianders having t a k e n t h e gunnery c o u r s e w h i l e t h e
C Company aommander had n o t .
e , She g r e a t m a j o r i t y of s e n i o r o f f i c e r s f e l t t h a t
o f f i c e r s of t h e i r r a n k should t a k e a c o u r s e i n gunnery. This o p i n i o n
was s h a r e d by j u n i o r o f f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d men.

f. It i s c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e n e c e s s a r y a p p r o c i a t i o n by
a l l o f f i c e r s of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r h i g h s t a n d a r d s of gunnery can
b a s t b e o b t a i n e d by r e q u i r i n g a l l o f f i c e r s t o t a k e a gTmnery c o u r s e .
It i s recomnanded t h a t sll armored o f f i c e r s be r e q u i r e d
g.
t o t a k e a gunnery c o u r s e .

34.

Replacement T r a i n i n g i n t h e Zone of the I n k r i o r .

a. E f i l i s t e d men t r a i n e d a t t h e Armored Replacement T r a i n i n g C t n n r o o n s i d s r e d t h e i r gunntlry t r a i n i n g i n a d e q u a t e f o r oombat.
The p r i n c i p a l d e f i c i e n c y vzis i n s u f f i c i e n t f i r i n g . C e r t a i n s u b j e c t s
were c r i t i c i z e d as n o t b t i n g p e r t i n e n t t o t h e i r t a t t l e nseds. ixemplds
c i t e d were l e n g t h y compass-course p r o b l a m a n d frequent dismounted
road marches.

b. O n 3 December 1944, Heedquarters Euraj-ean T h e a t e r of
O p e r a t i o n s informed t h e l a r Department t h a t the Everage t & n k c r c w man
rsplacement was "t.tlow t h e s t a n d a r d of p r o f i o i a n c y r e q u i r e d f o r o o n ~ b a t ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n gunncry and tank d r i v i n g . "
It was rocormended t h t i t
t h e t r a i n i n g p e r i o d be extendcd from s e v e n t e e n t o a t l e a s t n i n e h e n ,
and p r e f e r a b l y t w c n t y wesks, and " t h a t during t h i s R d d i t i o n o i t i m e ,
Tho Tima t t e n t i o n be focused on t a n k d r i v i n s a n c t n n k gur.ncry."
Department r e p l i t d t h a t , w h i l e thc. r e g u l a r t r i i n i n k p e r i o d co.Jld n o t
be extended. A r m y Ground Forcss had baon e u t k o r i
p o o l f o r n o t more t k a n f o u r weeks, a l l armorcd rsplecemtnts who had
oomplettd t h e 17 w6tk a c u r s e n t F o r t Knox and wLrc n o t r a q u i r e d f o r
immediate shipment o v c r s t a s . "
During t h i s p c r i o d trsir.6os were t o bc
g i v e n f u r t h c r i n s t r u c t i o n i n d r i v i n g and g u n n t r y . (See .4ppcndix 6 ) .
Xc e v i d m c o i s a v a i l a b l t t o i n d i c a t e t h t e x t e n t t o which this txp-5i t c t remodisd t h t . d f ; f i c i c n c i e s ,
C.
TJnit conunandws, a s wcll BS e n l i s t c d mtn, s t a t c d
t h a t men hud bc.sn a6sigric.d c l a s s i ' f i c e t i o n n3~ib6r6 for w h i c h t h y were
n o t q u a l i f i e d , by r ~ p l o c c m t n to r g a n i z a t i o n s b o t h i n IJte Cor16 o f the
I n t e r i o r and the, Eiiropcan T h s a t c r , In 2racLioc u n i t commcndcrs r o q u i s i t i o n - d only "a,wincr3" and " d r i v e r s " , s l m s m n w i t h t h c s c clnssiP i c a t i o n s w c r t found t o bs b e t t e r q u a l i f i L d f o r t h L i r p o s i t i o n s t h a n
~ n t r s o m e l c l a s s i f i e d tis : ' t a n k crewnan". I n g t n e r s l , i t was f L l t t h a t
r t p l a c c m e n t s 8 0 c l a s s i f ' i t d wbre n o t q u a l i f i c d t o a s s m c t h e dutits Df
t i t h e r gunner o r d r i v t r . 1WO e l t o r n a t e rcmodids a r c suggest ud:

(1) Limit t a n k crcw r6placcinmts t o

0r.e ca.tbgory,
namrly, " t a n k c r e w a n " .
To q u d i f y ufi a tank
crownan, t h c rsplacemtnt must b e f u l l y q u e l i f i c d
both as n gunnEr and a s o. drivc;r.-

- 20 R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
---I-..--&--

(2)

of

thL

If t h e s v a i l a t i z t r a i n b g t i m 6 dces n o t pcrrriit
t h c complatt t r a i n i n g of t e n k c r m m t n , l i m i t
t h i c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t3 " d r i v s r s " and "gu n r s r s " .
I n a d d i t i o n t o being P - d l l y q u a l i f i L d i n tank
d r i v i n g , d r i v e r s must z l s o b c q u e l i f i t d ir.
weapons mow-ted i n thh driving coinpertmant.
C l e s s i f i c a t i o n as gunnLr m u s t i n c l u d e q u a l i f i c a t i o r . ia thL szandord g o n n X qualificeticn
c o u r s i as p r s s c r i b b d by t h t \hr Department (Sic
rtcommindation i n par 24, a'aov-j.
T'r.i. dogrze
o f q u a l i f i c a t i o n and stork sho;lld bi entered
on t h c 4 C 4 Form 20. No rcplac&mment who ! x s n o t
q u a l i f i t d E S e i t h d r gunncr o r d r i v c r should
r c c t i v t a c l a s a i f i c t t i o n numbcr f o r my p o s i t i o n
w i t h i n a tknk.

d. I t is rrccrmoadad t k x t t h e ':%x
Departinant a d o p t t i t h d
above. s o l u s i o n s fn u r d t r t:o provide q u a i i f i c d t a n k c r i v r re.-

pleccmtnts.

35. kiylacLinLnt Training

iii

Cv<rsi.cs ? h c a t i r ,

ti.
Ir;plc.ormcnt o f f i c L r s and m;n s t r . t s d t L y were ou% o f
p x c t i c c whtn t h s y f i n a l l y r t a c t c d I o c x t e t u n i t t c c n c s r . of tht 1t:ck
of t r r i n i n g -+!hilt i n t h L r c p i e c t m m t " p i p i l i n r " . T his was @Is0t h c
viiw o f m n y orgcr.izs.Tions End senior o f f i c c r s . 2 0

b.
Thc !Isr Dep&rtncnt d i d n o t ProvidL t h t huropbon T h w t e r
w i t h p L r s b n n d or Lquipmint f o r cunciuczing r t f r e s b r r t r e ining.21 Constquently, it way n t c c s s a r y to improvise. E q u i p m t n t s o u l d b e c h t a i n t d
only by d c p r i v i n g combst t r o o p s , which w L r 6 s i l d o m a t PQI 1 f i t r b n g t h
after "3" any. RLLeosi: of tquiprnent f o r r < . f r e s h t r t r s i n i n g wes opposed
by :he f i i . l d f o r c t s . F o r + t c nost p a r t , the fiepleomcnt S y s t e m hod t o
, x t i l i e i , O S i n s t r u c t o r s , p e r s a n n t l fivxitinc ussignmuit. xovcver, i n
D t c c d x r 1944, R s m ~ l pl Lrmnnf.nt w a i n i n & cadre 1vtifi formed,
C.
I n i t i E l l y , r t f r t s h e r traiii:n& in tht; c a n t r e l d e p o t v a s
RccomFlishcd by \isc of G t m k b c t t r l i o n . 9 p ; r a t i o n a l rcquiramcnts
n b c t s s i t z t e d r m o v s l cf t h L b a t t a l i o n f o r combat i n A'ugust 1944. A f t e r
a i c . p s c of thre.c t 3 f'cur rr.or,ths, duririg whFoh t h s r c v i ~ sno t r n i n i r . g ,
t r c i n i n g W I E S a g a i n i n i t i s t c , d bi, ~ s oe f' m i ' k s s h i f t rquipniknt rind psrsonncl
oscignti? t o thc dcpot. T k c f f t c t i v o r x s s of c l l of t h c t r E i r i i n g M S
minimiztid by t h t . s h o r t a p e cf t s n k s , T ~ L S Lmeii6urts
.
did n o t p r o v i d e
for r C , f r b 6 h x t r a i n i n g i n the dLpoLs supporting c n c h ermy. ConsLqucntl y , urii:.s w6re f o r c e d t u conduct t h t i r o m r c f r t s h r r trc.L.ring.

6..

3x'Jcric.ncr i n thi. E u r c p t a n The,? t c r i n C i c c . t L s t k t :

(1) Rtfrtshtr t r n i n i n g in t r n k g'mntry is is s m t i e l
i n o w r s m s rLplocemdt dipots.

( 2 ) lmprovisntion d i p r l v c s combat troops of nuei.t.d
m t c r i 6 1 , p l r c e s an unrcc.sonsbli. burdtn om t u c t i c n l

u n i t s , ~ n ids unsatisf8,ctory.
E.
I t i s rccornmtndr.d t h c t the War Dcpcir:r,ent p r o v i d e o v t r s e t s
r.Apiceement depots w i t h t h e p a r s o n n t l m a m;.tiricl neccssc r y t.0 provide
r i f r G s h i r t r c i n i n g f o r tnnk o r L w raplaccmeiit.

Bibliogrhphy
ChRptar 2

19:

Far l o c p t l c n of BElD LIPPSPItINGr, s e e GSGS 4416, s h e e t P3,
i/1000000.


20. h G F C b s e r v t r s Eeport N 408, 29 Novtmbcr 1964; AL-F Obscrvcrs
k t p c r t NG 488, 1 J c n m r y 1945; LRS from C G , GFES t o G-1, Com
Zont: subjcot "Trnining OS Tsnk Crcas", d u t t d 2 2 Oot3bcr 1944;
L t r f r o m P r i g Gcn .I. A . Holly, !PV & 8 S e e t l o n , Eqs ETOUSP. t o
C G krmored Csnttr, Fort Knox, d c t a d 11 O o t a b c r 1944.
21. A k t e r i o l f o r t n l s 2nd fcllo.viny. pfirogruphs o b t a i n c d f r o x followi n g documents.
c . Mbmorc.ndm, Hqs 9 t h X c p l m t m t n t Dspot, t o AFV dt !ii S e c t i o n .
Con Zone, dated 5 Jenuerjr 1945'.

b, AGP O t s c r v E r r R b p o r t !To 488, dfltad 1 Jtnu.;ry
C.

Memar-ndum, AFV 6; \T Scczion, Hqs ETCUSP.,
mcnts", d e t t d 24 Dcccmbar 1944.

sub;:t-ctl

d. IHS, froin CG, GFRS t o G-1, Corn Zont-, E!KlUSi,
"Tcnk Crow"", d c t t d 22 DeccnhGr 1744.
c.

1945.
"Heplccb-

subjcct:

Ltr, Iiqs 9th Roplncemcnt Depot, s u b j e c t ; " T r n i n i n g Armored
Force R ~ p l s c e m s n t s " , t o CG, GFES, deited 1 7 3ctobc.r l Y L 4 .

Am & R S o c t i c n , Eqs ETor~&h, s u b j e c t :
H:b;>lacemmcnts", dr.l;od 25 S c p t m b e r 1944.

f , hlomornndum,

IRS f r c n CG, GFRS t o 0-1, ETOUSP., subjcci;:
@.
P-rmorcd Force R r a o n n e l " , dctad 13 Octobtr

"Armored

"RCtrainlng of

1944.

h. IRS From AFV & W S e c t i o n , EqS ETOUSA t o P.G, subjc;ot: "Traini n g o f Armcrcd Heplacbmcnts", datc,d 12 Novmbtr 1944.
i. Finn1 N i s t o r i c n l R a p o r t , A F V &

w Section,

KQS E!KIUSP

-R-p?;-pL+-;-g-g
THX GEIGRAL BOARD

UNITED STATES FOXES, EUROI'W' PEIEATER

APO !LO8

TANK GIIMERY

?ART TWO

EQUlTMENT
3HAP'ER 3
GENERAL

SXTION 1

sc OPE
36. Eqkipment Hequired f o r Maxinum Accuracy and E f f e c t i v e n e s s of
F i r e . :he weapons, anuliunition, a X T i E T c o n t r c l e : ; u l p ~ ~ e ~ u i rioied
=nun
a c c u r a c y and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of fire are d i s c u s s e d i n this p o r t i o n
3f t h e s t u d y ,
Because t h e y e f f e c t the e f f i c i e n c y of the crew i n s e r v ing t h e t a n k weapons, c e r t a i n o t h e r m i l i t a r y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of' t a n k s
are a l s o i n c l u d e d .
37.

-bny Ground Force Equipment iievierv Board,

a. The iiliny G~OundI'orce Equipment fieview Board's recoxiuoenda t i o n s z . d c o n c l u s i o n s , and c m c n t s of t h e European Theater 3f Opei'ct i o n s and 'Twelfth United o t a t e s Army Group w i t h respec-; tkereto, are
quoted i n t h e appendices i n d i c a t e d a t t h e beginning o f each s e c t i o n .

5 . The Eurcpean Theater of Operrt5~nsand Twelfth United
S t a t e s hrmy Group reviewed o n l y the krrny Ground Force Bosrd's prelirninary sbudy which a i d n o t c o n k i n many of t h e complete recorrunendations
Therel'ore, omission o f a r e f e r e n c e t o t h e
quoted i n -,he appendices.
cornaunts of t h e Guropean T h e a t e r o f O p e r a t i o n s and 'Prelfth United S t a t e s
Army Group i n any d i s c u s s i o n c:' t h e mny Ground E'orce Board's recomendations i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e l i a r t i c u l x recommendation was n o t c o n t a i n e d
i n t h e p r e l i m i n a r y study.

3 8 . Limits of t h e Discussion. In g e n e r a l , .she d i s c u s s i o n i n -the
body of k h w y - G
l i i n i t o d t o t h o s e p o i n t s n o t ccvcx-ed, o r i n s u f f i c i e n t l y emphasized, by the Amy Ground h r c e Gciuipmnt Heview Board,
a d t o e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e non-concurrences o f ' h e !;enera1 Board, U n i t e d
S t a t e s F o r c e s , L k r o p e m T h e a t e r x i t h c e r t a i n reccrrmenddions of t h e .Wny
Ground Force Equipment iieview U o a d .
SECTION 2

CHAHACTENISTCS 01' FWI& DEir!3b3H,!ENT

39.

linprovement i n m i s t i n g Type Equipinelit.

a. In e f f e c t , t h e recommendations o f %he Ariny Ground Force
Equipment Review Board p r c v i d e f o r t e c h n o l o g i c a l hproveinent s i n exist'The General RWd, United S t a t e s F o r c e s ,
ing t y p e tanks and cannon.
EuropOsn Theater b e l i e v e s t h a t 5k.c European coupaign d e n o n s x a t e d t h e
need far The rec~mnieriddedimprovernents.

b. T h e r e f o r e , it is urged t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e a g e n c i e s of t h e
Bar Department e x e c u t e t h e recomnendations of t h e Army Srsund l , o r c e
Equipment Review B0,a-d quoted i n t h e appendices montioned i n the f o l l o w -

- 23 -

R-3-S-T-H-I-C-T-E-D

--_-----__
CHkPTER b

TANKS

AND TANK C!aIIION

SECTION
-1




CHAHI1CTEdlSTKS CUz?ION TO ALL ThPKS

h2. Arrriy Ground Force Equipmcnt Review Board. Append& 9 cont i h s ;h,, -und
Porcu Equipmcnt Xeviev Board1 s recomundations
on p u t i n u n t m i l i t a y c h a r n c t a r i s t i s s xhich a r t . not incliidud i n t h e
f o l l o ~ ~chaptnrs
g
,

k3, Liquid Frotec tod !uuununii,ior. Sto1wgc.
a. ApproXimzLdy 75% of tti: i n t o r v i s i w x bslicvocl t h a t l i q u i d
p r 9 k c t o d s'towagc wa3 om a s c c t , e i t h w a c t u a l or psychological.
The
majority of those who liad t h e opposita cpinion 'Look t h e cynic,?1 virr;w
that, !'the t a n k m u l d burn anywap.
Th,i ~ o ~ ~ m i m d lcffi.c,:r
ng

of t h e 1 9 1
Tank B a t t a l i o n , vhich fou;;ht i n both thc. Europccm and Bloditcrrmncnr.

ThuaLrs, s t n t o d his b a t t a l i o n had k ~ q xrccords which provccl t h a t

l i q u i d p r o t e c t e d stowg,: had pcrmittod c r m s t,o C S C , ~ ; I : unburned.

b. It i s raconn,iendcd t h a t t h o I'Vx Dqmtmcnt; s u r i o u s l y con-

s i d e r incorporatior. o f l i q u i d , o r s i m i l a r l y , p r o t c c t d xrunun.ition stow-

3gc i n a l l future tanks.


Jk4.

!"unitj.cn

Stowaga Sicks.
-

a. All i;;!rsonncl intervicwcd. c o n s i r l c r d c llrGa$y rackll
o s s , x i t i a l . 2 % C q m c i t y dcsjl'ed vias a t l c a a t t c n , and p r e f c r a b l y f i P zein, rouxls.
From t1ii.s ,s-t;nndpoirit, stowagr: i n 2arI.y inodcls o f t h e
lvlh series modium tanks, vrhhicli includoa a lilrge 1,uaciy r a c k undcr t h e
gun ant1 a row of p r o j o c t i l o s around t h o p r i m e t c r of t h e basket, .;[as
considered idec.1.

b. Stowage of the b u l k of t h c runmunition wdcr t h a f l o o r
Hinged covors f o r mluniwas p r u f o r r e d t o stowage i n th(: sponsons,
Lion bins l o c , ? L d unci?:r t h c turrek f l o o r w u r c reportcd t o be u n s a t i s factoi-y, Lvld .they usud.ly wi?rc renovcd.
Intcrvicweos suggcrstod s l i d I.ng c o x r s .
c.
I n t?ic m 6 heavy t,nank, tho n e c e s s i t y of t r a v c r s l n g t h o
t u r r e t t o rcniovu f l o o r u.d sidc w a l l rounds was dislilcncd.22

d.
incorpor&:d

It is rocorrnionded that l;ho following chclrcctorj.stics be
i n future t m k s :

(1) A roaly r a c k capablc of holdi-ng at L a s t 1 0 rounds.
(2)

Bulk of t h e ammuxition stowed unccr the f l o o r , unl e s s aqucil.protsction from f i r o c m hc obtninud i n
t h o sporisons.

( 3 ) Sliding c o w r s , o r o t h o r s u b s t i t u t u f o r hinged cowrs
on runmunition bins.

(4)

m u n i t i o n rcmoval f r o n sto'rragc: r a c k s bo not dcpendc n t on t r a v c r s i n g t h e t u r r c t .

!&.ConstrucLion

of thc Fighting C o m p x t m n w .

a. Fcw IntsrviL:wecs f w o r e d a !!half f1osrrl in tho t i i r r * c t
Whon t r a v e r s i n g t h e t u r r o t ,
such os i n madim, tank MkA3 (76" gun).
1q3ty c x t r i d g a cnsas
m u n i t i o n b i n covers, and miscullanuous ecr.iiprliunt which o f t o n falls t o f l o o r , e a s i l y bscomes j m c e d bo.tw<.:;n t h c
Also, the: l o a d e r
half f l o o r and t h e top of t h e a m u n i t i c n compartment.

,

.

- 25 -

must gu:;rd. :Igainst h i s feet boconinng c n t a n g l c d w i t h tkic h a l f f l o o r :uhm
quful,ck r1ofl.m t i o n chmgcs arc ro;.dc-.
Approxinatdy 30% o f 'the i n t u n i c w o c s d e s i r e d il moving
Thosc opposod t o thti ful.1 f l o o r f c l t it, complicatud amu n i t i o n stonagc under t h e f l o o r ririd mndc it moic d i f f i c u l t f o r porsonnol i n t h d d r i v i n g comp-rtmnt t o oscapc t h r o u e h t h c f i g h t i n g compwtb.

fuli f l o o r .

ment.

c.
tal!<I12b.

A>proxiiUctOly 60s proforrcd no f l o o r , SUCII as i i i l i g h t
Ho-nvdr, i - t i n s f d t t h 2 t t a n k s s o dusigncd s h o u l d iricludc:

(1) A f o o t . rusi f o r thc: g ~ n n d r . ~ 4
( 2 ) F o l d i n g p l i t f o r m Tor ti:: tank c;ornroatidw.
I t , zlrould,,
revolvu r n t h t i i ~t u r r e t "3 br: a d j u s t ; l b l c in ni:ight.'>

(3) k soat f o r tho loader ?:hich would ruvolvo w i t h t h c
turret.

d. It is rocoi!miondi'd t h a t :
(I) Th:: half f l o o r bc considurec! iinsatii.;factory.
(2) Tssts be confiuctod t o i!ct;rminc vhctlicr 2 f u l l movi n g floor o r no f l o o r should bc incorpora-tcd in

futurc tLmlx.

( 3 ) A l l t'mks *quippxl with e no f l s e r fi;htinf: c o n p i ~ t mcrit bo proviclod w i t h t h e devices l i s t i l d .in p m a g r q h
c . abbov;.

a. 'fkc accuracy 1i.h of o u r gun t u b c s excci:ds L h A o f high
h i o 50 t h e short, b a t t l e l i i ' o o f tarllcfl, t h o
v d o c i t y r;crm:i cnnnon.28
p r u s s n t accuracy l i f e of gun tubos g r c - t l y cxcocds t h a t o f tho tmks
i n which they are mounted.

b. The Ari$iy(;round Force Equipment Ttcvlcvr B o z d conc.i.ud6d

- 2t -

-x-Z-S-T-2
- _ _ _ _-I-C-.T-E-D
____
t h a t 2. lubo l i f e of n o t less t h a n 1000 rounds is t h e s n t i c P n c L o r y mini-

mum.29
B h h h i r o p a a n Thi?r?ter of Op;rntj.or,s and W d f t h United states

.umy Grou;, ststcd t h a t " l o n g t u b s l i f e should be rcduced in f a v o r of

higher v e l o c i t i u s " , but d i d not g i v 2 a s p e c i f i c figurc.30
In v&cwof

t h c urgcncy of incrr~nsedp o n e t r a t i o n , it i s considered t h a t n tube3@j;fe

of only 200-300 row& of a r m o r p i e r c i n g . m m u n i t i m is acccptnblc.

C .

It i s recomncr-dded t h a t :

(1) T h e WGr Depmtmwt c o n s i d w a tub$.. lifd of

200-300

rounds o f " n o r p i e r c i n g " m i t i o n m c c p t n b l c f o r
t a n k guns, i f mccossary i n c b t a i n i n g r e q u i r e d pen+
tmtion.

( 2 ) Gun mouhts be S O d e s i g n d is t o p w m i t o x y and
q u i c k replacement o f zubes, bccause of t h c s h o r t
a c c e p t a b l e accuracy l i f e .

119.

~ i x c dmimunition.

a. Th,: A m y Ground Force Equipment deviow Board recommended

t h a t a l l tank ammunition bc f h c d . 3 l
TwdfTh United States amy

The , b o p e m Thcatcr of Opcrations rnodified t h e

Grmp c o n c u r r c d . j 2
rccoiiunendation t o bi, applicobla to p r e s e n t t a n k gun c d i b c r s o d y . 3 3

Thz l i i t t c r h e a d q u a r t e r s f d t t h a t m n u n i t i c n stowage and l.oz~ding c,m

be davoloped f o r il 1 : s g e r tznlc canncn which %ill
pcmit the inointcnmce

of p r e s e n t riTta of f i r e plus h i g h e r s t a n d a r d s of combat e f f i c i a n c y .

b. The Gc'nerd B o x d , United 3 t n t 2 5 Forces, W o p c - a n T h s a t c r

considcrs semi-fixed ,unr;iunitlon e x t r c m c l y undesisakle f o r -t?.nk ems ,33O

(Thi: p r c s o n t semi-fixed m u n i t i o n i s s a t i s f a c t o r y for t h c lO~nudhcw9taer),
Hovrover, i z i s rxommended t h a t semi-fixed m u n i t i o n be nccoptod, (is a
1.xt rcsor:, i f t h o requirt:d pcrformmcc c a m " oth;:rwiss bc o b t c i n c d .
50. O v e r a l l Size and WciEht of i u n m c n i t i z .

a.

Inturvlcwes

easy handling i n o t u r r c t . 3 e

that. ?;he mimunition f o r the
t o 1oc.d.


onsidcrod 9Ckiza cmnunition lltoo largc.fr Per

76"n vms s o t i n f x t o r y .
They bclicvod

75" gun in tns PANT!CGd t a n k vrould 13,: e m y


b. The Army Crounrl Force Equipment dcvievr B o x d r u c c g n i % ? d

tllu desirnbi i t y of h o l d i n g down thc! ovcrall 1cn;:th m d weight o f

Twolf'th Unitod S t a - t c s Army Group ~:mphoui,cd .that m u n i -

r.munition.j$
t i o n s5,culd be flshortlr, Lo f a c i 1 i : t a k l o r d i n g . 3 0
Th\; Europwa Thcotcr

01 Gpurations rocomnmndcd t h a t c o n s i d u r n t i o n 3140 bt: g i v d l t o t h c &in-

mctzr of tlw base of thc she1.l CDSLI: cn t h e >t a s i s t h a t t h i s dimmsion I s

a5 j q o r t c n t c1s t h e l e n g t h o f t h o round i n detdnnining stowcgi! c:ipacity.37


Intcrvicwccs mphasizcd ';he urgcncy cf being z.bl; t o S i r e
C.
t.x f i r s t acciirntc round.
Ease in loadCtj_rg i s governcd more by c v c r d l l

Thc G s n o r d 3 o ~ r d ,

1 c n g m m by w i g h t 01d i m u t c r of ,th3 round,
United S t n o s Yorces, European T h o a t d I s of Chc o p i n i o n t h a t t'm ruqu-

j,rcd r c . t ~of rird is of g r e n t c r irr.pdrtance t h a n mu.nunition stowage cilpa-

citj,

d.

It is rlicidlnnuncr:d that:

(1)
Rcducticn i n ovjroll lcngbh of aimunition be g i v e n
F r i e r i t y o v w r e d u c t i o n i n dime-tcr of t h e baso o f
.the sholl c a s e , o w n 2.t tP-2 cxpcnse of i m g c r gun
b r c x h c s and crad.lc;s.
(2)

fiimlunitior, stowngc c a p a c i t y be s a c r i l i c u d , i f n u x s sp~?cy, t o provide NnmurLition
which c m bo loaded with
sufficient e3se t o o b t n i n tix r c q u i r o d r o t t ! o f f b 6 .

n. ThG hrrny (;round i~oi-ccG~.,uipa~ntit u v i m bomci rcdormilcnded
t h a t c l l t.mk guns be equipped f o r :utonctic locdiiig.38

b. It i s c o n s i d m o d th2.t ?.utonutic loading is of k n c r imp o r t a n c e f o r a " n i t i o n coinp::.rab.blc i n s i z e and wcif:ht t o ihc p r e s e n t
70mm rounds.
For m u n i t i o n similm t o , o r lC?r?I'g3r
th::n, prcs1:nt g 0 h
rounds ::utoinztic loilding Irould bo desirobl::
Komver p ~ c u r c m u tof
c gun o f t h e requin;d performLmc* s h o u l d n o t bo dolrycd ponCi1.g dcvolopindii-t of z u t o i n r t i c l o a d i n g .

.

,

,

52. Sani-Auto!n.:tic Breech. Thc Amy Giiowic' Sora.: 3
b o ~ ~ . E E Z Z K Z Z d Z ' - t 3 Z & d c guns tx equipped with
breecl1.39
It is c x t r c n c l y d o s i r r . b l c t h z t thi, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e
r c c o i l laechanism and brccch be such t h a t automatic opcnirg i s c b t n i n c d
regardless of d i f f u r o n c e s i n muzzlz v e l o c i t y b c t w c n the v m i o u s t y p c s
of anmunition employed.
Howevcr, n scmi-autom?tic brocch s h o u l d n o t
be p r o v i d e d at t h 3 expense of accuracy cmd c f f c c t i v u n c s s .
ILsi.s&

n. T m k guns s h o u l d b? designcd pr%a-.rily f o r t h Q i r d i r c c t
Thc ratL?of firt: of p r o s u n t t c n k gun6 i s s2.ti.shying capabilities.
f a c t o r y f o r this mission.
Tka r c l n t j . v o l y l i m i t e d use of t-nks for
a r t i l l e r y type firing i n t h c hXropc:.n T h s a t e r indic:&:s th.-.t thc c t i l i t y t o QXOCUtC! t h i s role should r c c c i v o r d y n i n o r c o n s i d o r a t i o n i n gun
design.
Hovievcr, tho e x t m s i v c cmploymnt OL i u d i r o c t 1-yiiig by 105m
hov5.tzar medium t,mlcs and 75" Hovritzor Yotor Onrri:y$s, 18, i n d i - c z t c s
t h a t t h e b a s i c vrecpon of t h e " a s s a u l t gun" pl:.toon nnis't bc 7 k l o t o f i r e

prolonged x t i l l c r y inissinns .39a

b. It i s ruconcnmrlod t h a t : thi: e b i l i t y of t:mk guns t o fire
prc1onC;sd i m t i l l . r y typc m i s s i o n s bo d i v m minor consirlar-.tion i n f u t u r e
Ilowwx?r, th; t.mic mounted howitzur o f tlio tlnssi?.uJ.t gun19
gun d e s i g n ,
p l a t o o n s i n s m o r c d :livi.sions, t:-nk b,?,tt,,:lions, ?.nd c?.v:\lry units must
1- of such m i s s i o n s .

54.

gun Travel Locks.
3.

'Tho Array Ground Forcd Equipm;,nt rd;viuw Board sL':.tcd:
ruggod gun t r a w l lock shnll bc p r o v i d c d
t h a t cnn rumlily ba 2.pplicd f r o h thL%gunner's p o s i t i o n .
I n a d d i t i o n t o thd i n t e r i o r trcivl. I.cck Ln u x t u r i o r
t r a v e l l o c k zhal.1. bu providcd i n the noniial. carryin[:
p o s i t i o n of t h c p r i n c i p a l . wapon.ll@

!!A p o s i t i ' r c

b. Thu nornizit - a m d i n g p o s i t i o n o f t h o 9Chin g;m i n i;hc
hoxvy t a n k 126 n u c c s s i t n t a s tr:vuling w i t h gun p o i n t i n g Co thL r c m .
Fo~tcvcr,
iTor p i i r e l y a d n i n l s t r a t i v ; : iar.rches, t h i s i s s:liisfnctsry.
provision must bo mafie f o r c x t c n s i v c t r x c l w i t h t h o gun forvrnrd.
An
e x t e r i o r t r m d l o c k loccitod on t h e f r o n t slopc j k t c and c?.p:blc of
being o p u r n t u d from w i t h i n t h e t;mk is rccoiiunondcd.

- 28 -

b. iinclysis of t h d p e n e t r a t i o n pzrfomimco m 8 . i o w r r : l I c?Toi:lunn
d m i g h t , i n d i c tc!s t h a t t h o guns recarruilcndcd b y t,hc: A m y
i t i o n s j 23 a
.;rowL; Forcc Equipinont &cvicv Boclrd ; ~ r ua s u b s t a n t i a l improvcia,.nt OVCT
prcscnL :mnament.
' k c r d f o r i : , it is consiciclud t h r t t h e y will spkisfy
i n i t i r . 1 roq-airo:iL:nts. T h z i r p r c c u r m u n t should bo oxpuditci..

8. s p e c i f i c C z l i b j r s . Tho rocornwndations of thL ilri,:y Ground
Fox.-Ecpipi4.xt R c v j a w B o x d i n c l u d e s p c o i f i c ? . t i o n of t h e c:,libur of
ti?., guns r o q u i r o d .
Thc; c d i . h s r of c tank gun ;s irm;intcri.,?l ns l o n g o s
t h d &unhas th,: r2quircd purfor1;imcc and r s t e of firc.
Consuqucntly,
it i s rxOiNF.2ndCd th?.t ccvclopinont n g m c i e s no-t hi: r c s t r i c t o i . t o t h z
dLvdopuicnt of t n n k g.dins of t,hc s p i i c i f i c cr.lihurs rccot;tucn LcSr by t t c
Brk$ Ground Forcd Equipixnt Review Docrd.

-X-S-S-Y-+I-.C-T-&D
--------_
c. The .;l;nm:?l Bonrd, United S t a t d s Forces, Eur3i)czn Thcater
rcccnuncndcd t h a t llnssault gun'! pl.2toons i n a n o r o d divisi0r.s snd
t m l c b c t t l l i o n s i n i n f n n t r y d i v i s i o n s bc equippcd with 10!h11 hcwitzor
tala .45

112s

d.
Thc: rc~oi~mondations
of t h o ATny Ground Forcc :3quipaii3nt
Review B o x d do not include a w ~ ? p osimil.?r
~i
t o mcdi.m t,m:cN[ll s c r i o s
v e t 1 1 ld,iimn homitzur.
Ths only sclf-propelled l0Smm howitzur recomnandcd 112s 45" tr,wv;rse nnd is not mcuntcd i n a tank.
T h i s wcnpon
would n o t b c satisfactory for thc llnssnult, gurLllplrtoons.
c.
It i s rccoimncr.dcd th7.t 11nssmlt gun11 p1:~toonn i n nrnorc!d
divisions and t m l c h,?ttnlicns i n i d m t r y d i v i s i o n s bc cquippcd with
l05m howitzer, lib, lnounicd i n i. standard t m k with 360' power tmv.xsc,
c i t y not l o s s th,m t l i n t cf ci.dj.u!i
h n v i n g 105rm "nuni:ion
s;ow-gc c

talc

rik s c r i c s ( n i t k

l O ~ r mh o r r i l z c r ) .

Biblioer z.phy
Ghzptcr

4

22. Sc;. a l s o inciikornndum Hqs 30 Cav iicn Sqn t o C h i d , Amiordd S c c t l o n ,
F i r s t US i,r!q-, dttttcd o I i p r i l 1?1is, 2nd c o ~ t m t sof 6 C,:v 3cn 93y
in .AGF Obsorvcr Ruport NO. 7 5 9 , a A c d 25 i.?.rch 1945.

23. .{-port o f 3 Anlorrid Uivision i n Ynr bcp.'rtnimt ubs,;rv.:r Bo: r d
.!kport o n K26 Hcwy ' I m k , dntdd 2c) July 19~5.
2h. S-o .?lso docum.nts r d s r c d t o ir. Motl; 22.

25. 3 . x ,-J.so docwnuirts r c f c r r z d t o i n Not2 23.
26.

s;:.
2..


b.

C.

d.

C.

f.
B.

h.
i,


a1 so follo-.iing clcciundts:

30. L t r Hqs EOUSB, s u b j o c t: "Army Ground d'orcc E q u i p m n t Rcvj,,w B o m r l ,
P r c l b i n o r y S t u d p l , d 2 t c d 27 June 19h5, m d Stoff Study used i n
prcp:ration of 2bcv;i l o t t c r .
( B o t h docuiiunts r d c r r u d t o horcc f t e r as Z : T ~ U %study).

30a. krmorzd

O f f i c c r , F b s t US .iriny d s o rccornr,iont!cd t h i s f i ; u ~ - . ~ . SCC
l s t t o r s , C o l o n e l P.C. H?.ir.s, Brtnorcd Officer, E'irst U S
to
B r i g G . > n x d J . i , Holly, C h i e f , iiFV 9 Y! S c c t i o n , ~ ~ I ' O U Y X ,d?,tud
28 J u l y 194:~
m d 3 Dcccnibor 19W.
Docununt r o f c r r e d t o i n 1 T c - t ~Zkh:
s t A c d t h ? t u n i t s s p c c i f i c d r,ccur?.C?cy liic
n o t b,: o'cur 1
'
2
'
0
t.o '

LOO raundsll,
31. AWSdBR, Part I, Annex IC. p a r lid (1).
32. STOUSA S t u d y r a f e r r e d t o in Note 30.

33. Ibid

33% T h i s was a l s o the o p i n i o n o f a l l personnel intervievrsd i n t h e
prepnra:.ion
i?ote 2be.

of t h i s repo?t a s well as t h o Uoca.diits reirorred

$0

in

3b. See also document r e f e r r e d t o i n Xote ?be.
35. .&lUrlB~i, Part I , Annex E. par 14d

(3).

36. ~CAJUSA Study r e f e r r e d to in Note 3 0 ,

37. Ibid

3e. AXP&?Bti, P a r t I$ Annex C. p a r 8b.
39. AClXdBR, Part 11, I n c l o s u r e A-G, par 6.
39a. XiF Observer 'zeports No. 406, d a t e d 2; Movernber 19kL1, and Nc. 085
dated 27 h b r u a r y 1945, rnd No. 1072 dated 30 June
and 140.396
dated 28 November 1Ykjr.

lY!~s,

40. 1 3 i d J par 1Oc.

41

See a l s o t h e i ol l ow i ny, documents: Iieriiorandwn U V ,> !
IS e c t i o n ,
H q s FTOUSA, suh3ec.t: "i3eport of 'Prip to ;irln.es';, dated L Doc
>9il;l, recordin;. comments of l i a ' j o r C-onera1 It.(?. O~olri, CG 6 Ai-lnwed
Division;
Observer { s p o r t s >!o. 3yO d i l ~ . ~;8d Noveinher


lybb
and No. LO8 d a t e d 29 November l V k k .


,@V i i 1.i Yect,ion, ETOliSA; llNot,es
o n Use of' iO5icn !iowitzer. Nit Mounted i n lik Tanicl' by It. George Deiser.,
r?ssaiilt Gur. O f f i c e r 7b3 'i'a.11~ B a t t a l i o n .

142. see alsri ,l'inal Historical d e p o r t ,

43. see documents r e f e r r e d

t o in Note hl.

44.

soc a l s o A[;F Gbserver ,&ports No, 685, d a t e d 2: r'ebruary 19/45,
and No. 775, dated 29 llarch 1945: AGF Cornbat o b s e r v e r s Report
b3; Colonel Seorgc 11. Dean.

45.

deport o n IlOrganizotionJ qquipment and i'octical Emp1oplen.c o f t h e
.,rrnored Uivisionll Study No. Lib; and rc?port on W r g a n i z a t i o n ,
Squipmont and Tac-Lic,a1 .hployiicr.t, o I' S e p a r a t e h n l c an-ita l i o n s I'
Study No. 50.

,

Gai4 LIi.J.L,

59,

of b!r.cIiint: GUX.

%rtc.nct

E.,
Tht cmmphzsis during t h e 6Luropsnn campsign cn t h t ntud
f o r c aEnnon c c . p r t l 6 o f p a t t r e t i n g hccvy C - ~ r m ~f rno i i t c l irmor may
c ? . u ~ c .t h o importanct of mpchinc. guns t o bt o v s r l o o k z d 111 f u t u r e dc%,.~lopmtnt. This m s t n o t GOCK.

b.

h,ur op.; F n Thi

Thr. i n i p e r t c n c a o f t h c r o l a of I-rnlc m c c h i n L guns i n t h e
S e r i s s h o m by t h e followiiig f'ccts:

(1 )

,ill pcrsoniitl i n t t r v i u r c d d e s i r c a t h a t t k . ~bow
mcchinlj gun bE msdt. more idfLctivC by :<ddition o f
L. s i g h t nnd by i.,1crccsing i t s 'iriivcrsc r n d doprt. s s 1on,

u n i t s cErriLd r.pproximcttly 51, p i r c t n t morc
c c l i k t r .30 :~miiunitionthan t h c t 7 r o v i d t d i n t h e
orgcniz t d stowcgt. 46

)!;est

S0n.t u n i t s ziountcd c r l i b e r .3b ~ncchin:. & W S or. t h e
t u r r e t f o r use by ihc. t n n k corrmndcr r . g r l n r t ground
1;yrgh
., t 5.
T h i s e Buns cith'i. r t p l a c b d o r cupmciit;.d
i h c c c l i b L r .SO m z i r . i r o r r i't guns.47
(4)

),'my t w k s c r r r i c d . spcrL mnchini: guns biceuse t r x r u
n o o p p o r t u n i t y t o r c D L i r dcf'oativc guns i n battle.

v i s

U S t of' L C d
n i x _.uns ciid t h L t x p s d i m t s
-Llitir d Y t c t i r i n t s s indiCiltL n r t d f o r i n c r c r s L d f i r 6
Ground Force i c.; u i.p m L n t L v i L w tionrd rLcorrnizcd
this
ne,:d c a d r;coimmd,:d i i i u l t i p l c c0r:xir.l puas L S ~ 1 c s1 p o s s i b l c du.1
how &.u.rLs. (S& A p p a d i x 1 2 ) . Thc G t n c r r l 9 w r d , Uni.trd S t c t a E ' n r c < < s ,
Buropc,. n TliLCttr 1s not 3 b r t F . i r i t h c t t h L s L rcc~mai:!dr t i o n s :r L t h i
opti~r~urn
r c c F i i s of' ii.xrri sing f i r < . powL.r.
Tli~r c f o r t . , it i s rLcofimcndLd
tl.,.yt thc :ivrr U;,prrtrntnt inv, s k i p t i . $11 p o s s i b l i m w n s ai' iiicrLcsing
ali:ohins gun f i r e p o v i r . i\.mmunjtion stowr.gt pr;r gw. i i i u s ~be c t t L a s t
t-qur.1 t o t h r t ?rovidcd i n prt,,sirrt t - n l c s .
tXtL..Sl-JL
fir.

60.

C n n r z c t L r i s z i c s o f !dccnini Suns.

L. Prisciit t: nk rw.chinL
Iri. ctnndid-d ground 6;U:is
nrtxvILw6k.6 s:F.tcd till t, with Lhcisc. ~ , u n s , b::ri-d cli.:iiging, l o r d i n g ,
d ri.au.;ti.cn of s . t ~ p gsu
P ~ i s timt-coliaumi:lg.
In c d d i t i o n , t h . . w c i b n t
d s i z t of t h ~
c c . l i b c r .50 gun wt s consid.;rLd t x c E s g i v t . D t v c l o p m m t
improvbd ground guns s h o u l d Lliminctc. T h c s t d c f i c i u i c i ; ~ , m d u l s o
,fT,ct duuir::b-;
r t d u c t i o n s i n s i z c :md wight.
./

h.
A h o s t cll p r s o n n L 1 intLrv;bvucd c o n s i d i r t d t h r p r o s k n t
c y c l i c m t L s s c t i f i f r c t o r y , They f d t th.t g r w t t r dfc.cti-gmLas I*Z*S
otti3,ined from s c s t c i n e d f i r i n g rn-ther thi..n irom high r r t i s o f f i r L .
i-11 intirviLr8ices s t r t L d t h c r c N E S m a d for ~ & u nc:.pi'bli. o f f i r i n g
long*r b u r s t s , tht.n p r b s c n t f:uis, withour; ovLrhc:.ting.
Ovtrhcr ting
r.) uiiid most stopp::gLs.
c,

X utoin: t i c

k a d s p e cc

i dj u s h

- 32 -

Lnt

WL

s u ~ i nci mous ly r tqci s t c d

.

Rupturtd o c r t r i d g c c o s w
~ c~r i st.cond t o h w t i n & i n cr,using s t o p p s p,r.s.
B v i d t m t i n d i c e . t & s t h t T n o s t af t h t s t s t o p p r . g L s wcrL d u i t o i i n p r o ~ ~ r
h;cdsyici. r e t h e r then t o dui'totivc, cnunun;ticn.

I t i s rroommt.ndc.d t h c t 1mprov;d mcchina guns br. p r o v i d c d
Thti w l i b t r .SO gun must bi s m c l l i r cnd LightLr t f l 5 . n tht,
p r c s t n t M2 gun; s i i n i k r raductior. i n thlj c c L i b c r .30 guq i 3 d t s i r e b l i .
A l l s u n s must h a w t h t f o i l o w i n g c h r r - . c t L r i s t i c s :

d.

f o r t-nks.

(1) h u t o m t - t i c hLcdsprce r d j u s t m n t .

( 2 ) Quick mt.thod o f chrnging b t r r c l s .

( 3 ) .e,,i:sc. i n l o c d i n g end reducing sto>p:ig=s i n f i g h t i n g
cor;iDcrtin,.ntq,

( 4 ) h b i l l t y t o f i r 6 b u r s t s sf 20-30 round f o r maximun
p c r i cd w i t h o u t ov- rhLcting.

(5) Cyclic

r c . t c of c c l i b c r . 30 MlY19A4 gun.

(55U rounds

p u minuto).

el. S p c r i p a r t s .
:.. acch tFiik i s p u t h c r i z t d n m L . r o u s m.-chinL gun p r t s .
(SCL
.4[2p(.ridix 13). Intbrvic,wcLs r t p o r t ; d Lhi. t ihts, p - r t s wcrc iiLvLr u s c d ;
i n b c t t l c t h t r t w:'s n o opportunity t3 r e p r i r guns. Inst,F.d, m.my u n i t s
c p r r i t d oiic o r two t x t r c m . c h i n t L u n s , i n Lxch t r o k . Thc couqcny r.rmar-r w r r i c d ell t h , s p z r e ?e.rts.
Guns r i e d i n g r L p : ' i r w L r L t u r n i d i n t o
him by t h L t-nk crCws. Brokm pi'r;s wLrI rL.partL.d t o hrv, ccuscd tho
l i c s t nunbLr o f stoppc.gc,s.

b. Evhyon: i n t b r v i t w c d w: s i n f s v o r o f orrrjring s p u L ti,:.o:iin6
guns r r t h i r s h c n spr rs y n r t s . T h u d o r ; , it i s rtcomiiii.iidbd t n r - t ,
storicgL s p r c b p c m i t t i n g , sprrL m:ichini. ~ u n s ,r r t h c r tl-inii s p F r b p c . r t s ,
hi c u t h o r i z L d cr.ch t ! n k on t h c b e s i s o f ,'t L w s t oiic 8 ~ r . rgun
~ for
i . v ~ r yt h x L guns, or Z r E c t i o a t h r u o f .
S p c . r ~p r r t s t o b r c u t h c r i z d
on l;h.conipeny l v - ~ ~ l ,
SbCi:ioN 2

62.

.

t
Army Ground F a r o t F , ~ U ~ ~ I I I L hijvic.a
CN~
go& r d ' s rtcoinm-ndd
i.rmcmcnt f o r r - c o n n c i s s e n c ~i-rnks inc1udi.s
c - l i S i r .30 boll mcchins
For 1F.rgLr t > i n k s , iC wrs riconimtndcd tlli t c o x i d u r C . t i o n hoc
gun.48
;ivLn to mountinb thL bow gun ''or euns i n rimotL c o n t r o l l d b ; d l i n t i c
b l i s t c r s .'149

b. L11 i n t c r v i c w i L s d L s i r c d z cl.iib.;r .3O l m
i r - v L r s c , i n c r c c s c d deyrcnsion, r.nd j n c o r p o r c t i o n of r s i g h t worc: u n i v u s c l l y r L q u c s t < . d . 011 26 S c p t i m h r 1944, Twcll'th Unilittd S t r - t t . s Army
Group rcqurs t,d dcvLlopmmt of f sigh'; w i t h r . t l o r s t two @ o m r m o g r i i fit' t i o n . 5 "
ThL Xur0pcr.n TIT-cttr of O p u r t i o n s mncurr,d.-l
The
Army Ground Forco Xquiprr.tnt I3tvi:w BoTrd rLcommLr.dLd thr t ":-n i n f i n i t y
s j g h t b nd liiik:.p" hL providcd.s2

c.

The 50.: mrchint. gun xoun'; wc:.k,ns thi: f r o n t p l c ti,. GonG:rm?ns cftLn nimcd o t t h e bow guii.53 N o u n t i c g thc, gun
i n :' b l i 6 t t r on tht sidt o f tb.t t.-nk ail1 ovircomu t h i s prob1t.m.
squratly

i;hL

- 33 -

-R-E-S-T-h-I-C-T-E-D
--------Howsvcr, t h e i n t e r v i e w s r c v c r l i d t h r t t h c bow g u n ( ~ ) must bi F . b l G t o
covcr t h i ground i m n c d i c t t l y i n f r o n t of thi. t r n k rnd bctwtsri thr.
t r c c k s , i r r c s p i c t i v c of 'chi, f i e l d of f i r e of t k t c o c x i e l g u m .
d. The CcnLre.1 Bonrd, United S t n t t s F o r e L s , E u r o p t c n ThL,c.tcr
roconuntnds t h s t :
(1) A 1 1 t m k s b i rquippcd with t c d i t t r .jS kov; mrciiinc.
gun, equippe.t w i t h s i g h t , r n d h r v i n g grt."c.cr iiL3ri.ss i e n and t r n v t m c t h o r e . t pr'ts'nt.
(2)

El;lccr.tion of t h e bow g u ~i n cll t h & s bt, i n v c s t i g e t s d . Bow g u n ( s ) m u s t b L c t l ~ t o
c o v t r thi ground
i m e d i e t t l y In f r o n t of tht t r n k end b c t w t n t h c t r o c k s ,
bc g i v i n t o pro.i.iding n1cgnifici:i;ion i n
s i g h t s ?or how rmchinc guns.

( 3 ) ConsidLrrtion

63. Cocxicl m c h i n i Guns.
a. The Army Ground ForcL Xquipmdt 3 L v I a v 2 o r r d r i c o i n m n d t d
Thct rcconnE.iss?.iici x n k s bi. i q u i 2 p i d w i t h t h r e w c a r x i r 1 mcchins guns :
036 c r l i b i r .SO gun i n t h t t u r r i t kind two c c l i b c r .3O
i n blisters
on thL t u r r ~ t . 5 ~>.n r d d i t i o n r . 1 c f l i b r r .3O gun i n s i d e t h c t u r r L t WC.S

rccoinmcnded f o r 1:rgGr

tenks.55

b.
Thc grcc.t !riajcrity o f i n t c r v i i w c s s t r t t d t h r t E Sir-glL
oo;!xirl gun w:~s s u f f i c i e n t . ThcssF. rnswers wcrr bctscd on t h t o p i n i o n
thxt;

(1)
L o a d i r s could n o t kbap cnathur ~ u fnu n c t i o n i n g c n d
lorded,

( 2 ) In viL.rr of thc limitd q x c i now i v s i l o b l ~f o r
s t r v i o i n g c o r x i r l mc.chini guns, it is n o t p m c tied t o mount cmother mrchinr. gun.

( 3 ) Tht.ro wo.Jld b i i n s u f f ' i c i c n t s p i o i f o r t h i :"int i o n f o r d d i t i o n r l kuns.

C.
I b s t j u n i o r o f f i c t r s c.nd e a l i s t c d m c n shc-,iid 1it;lL
imcginctiari cnd weri n o t s u f f i o i L r . t l y txpirit,ncr.d CCI d i s c u s s ii". j o r
ndvmcas. The G t n c r r l Boord, United S t c t i s Foi'c-s, Europccn '1htmth.r
fttls t h r t , if t h c -bow. o b j e n t i a n s Erc avlrrconL, Lrnk o r w s woeld
f r v o r a d d i t i o n a l oac.xir 1 guns, 56

d.
F i f t y p c r c m t o f t h e i n t d v i t - i r c c s s t : : t c d thi, c r l i b t r .3O
gun w&s s n t i s f s c t o r y , whhcrccs t h t b r l n n c e d t s s r , d 5 c 2 l i t i . r .5O cot-xir.i
gun.57 T h t fo?mLr group b'.std t h i i r i-nsbvtrs p r i m c r l l g on t h i q u i s t i c n
cf r . m u n i t i c n s s o w c g t c c p n c i t y . 111- c c l i b t r .30 rJun is mor& t f f i c i t i i t
than t h t c ' l i b a r .SO cgrlinst p c r s o n n o l . Jn c t h t r i . c s p ~ c t f i , thi. c t l i b L r
.SO o f f e r s d c l f i n i t c F,dvrntcg;s.
( S e e % p ; ? m d i x1 4 ) . All i n t u r u i e w e o s
e.inph::sieed t h e i n o r c f s e d s h o c k r . c t i o n o f tht, c.1ibe.r .SO gun en t k c
SLrmen s o i d i o r ,
t.
~ p ? r o x i m o t ~ l40
y p e r c s n t o f thi. i n t t r v i t w c c s st? tLd thky
ntt6mptc.d t o b c r c s i g h t thc conxir 1 mcchinl; sun vrith .thL cFnn3n. T h i s
group r c p o r t t d t t s t t h t m o u n t s f r . i i e d t o kold thL guns I n r.djust.mint.
This d e f i c i t n c j r inc1'wses t h t t i n L r s q u i r t d t o cbtcin t f f 6 c t i v c f i r e ,
und p r o h i b i t s r m g i ne-in.

f.
The GLnerr.1 Borrd, U n i t t d S x t c s F o r a t s , Europsi'.a T h c r t b r
r c c o v m n d s tCu.t:

- 34 ---------3-h-S-T-I+.- I-C-T-8-D

H-h-S-T-E-I-C-T-E-D
- - - -- - - --




(1)

Wherever f e a s i b l e , a l l tanks h e equjpped wlth orie
c a l i b e r .SO c o a x i a l rraohine gun In a d d l t i o n t o a t
l e a s t one ooaxial c a l i b e r .3G gun.

(2)

In t k e development of m u l t l g l e c o a x i e l m a c h i n e guns,
c l o s e atzenLion be paid t o ease o f 1oadir.L: Rnd
servicing.

( 3 ) C o a x i a l machine gun r.ounts b e developed which w i l l
hold t h e machine kun p a r a l l e l t o t h e cank csnnon.

64. Guns Kounted on 'Top of the T u r r e t .

a. The Army Ground Force Egzipment keview Eoard reco:nmencied
t h a t a l l t a n k s be equipped w i t h a c a l i b e r .SO anT,iaircrsff maohine g u n ,
c o n t r o l l e d by t h e t a n k commander end mounted f o r e n p l o p i e n t e g s i n s t
ground a s well a s a i r tar,qe:s.SD'
b. Approximately 8 s p e r c e n t of t h e personire1 i n t e r v i e w e d recommended r e t e n t i o n of a c a l i b e r .50 a n t i a i r c r a k gun. 811 w a r t e d
t h e glwr s o mounted t h a t i t could be employed e a s i l y i n t h e a n t i - a i r c r a f t
role.

The p r e s e n t a n t i a i r c r a f t g w mouots iverc c o n s i d e r e d
C.
d i f f i s u l t t o use. Many suggested that a ring niount would Le a n inprovenent. The c h i e f demand vas f o r & nnwit which would p e r i n i t f i r i n g
t h e gun without exposing one's body t o t h e e x t e n t now r e q u i r e d .
d.
N ~ n j iu n i t s mounted c a l i b e r .;O guns on t o p o f t h e t u r r e t
f o r use by t h e tznk commander a g a i n s t s u r p r i s e , c l o s e - i n ground
t a r g e t s . 5 9 The c a l l b e r .3O sun was p r e f e r r e d t s the c a l i b e r .sU because it could I J ~ swung a r o m d e c s i l y and yulokly. The ; r e a t i n & > o r i t y
of i n t e r v i e w e e s were i n f a v o r of D c z l i b e i .30 gun f o r t h e t a n k commander.60 They a l s o reoommcnded t h a t t h e l o a d e r f i r e t h e a n t i - t i r o r a f t
gun.

e. Speed and armor p r o t e c t i o n o f n i r c r r f t undoubtedly w i l l
i n c r e a s e , n e v e r t h e l e s s i t i s t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e Ge!ierd Eoard, U n i t e d
S t a t e s F o r c e s , EuroFea.n Theater t h a t t h e v a l u e o f B c a l i b e r .50 a n t i a i r c r a f t gun i s s u f f i c i e n t to warrant i t s r e t e n t i o n .
f.

It

is

rscominended t h a t 8 1 1 tanks b e equipped w i t h :

(1) 4 c a l i b e r .50 h n t i a i r c r n f t gun s o msunted t h a t
i t can be f i r e d , withcuz exposur.6 of t h e p,unncrls
body, by e i t h e r the l o a d e r or t h e t a n k conn:.mdtr.

( 2 ) 4 c a l i b e r .3O mnchine gun m o u n t e d f o r use by t h e
t a n k comrrander a g a i n - t c l o s e - i n t.rzund t a r g e t s .
Bibliography
Chapter

5

Organ46, ,$,GFCombat Observers Report by C o l o n e l GewgF; B. Dean.
:zed stowage i n M4 s e r i e s med3.w t a n k s provides 6250 r o u n d s .
I t has b e e n r e p o r t e d thst t h e 15 Tank B a t t a l i o n c a r r i e d 10,000
rounds (AGF Observers Report No 346, datcd 5 Wovembtr 19/14),
and t l i b 2 Armored D i v i s i o n 13,000 ( L t r , C o l C. A . Slack, Armored
O f f i c e r , Ninth 3s Army t o Brig General J. A . Holly, :FV & .7i
S e c t i o n , ETOCSA, d a t e d 31 March 1945).

-

35

-

R-L-S-T-fi-I-C-T-h-D
-- - -- - - -

I

47. See also A G F Observers R e p o r t s No 693, d a t e d
P o 767, d a t e d 26 bkwck. 1945.

3 Ifarch 1945,

and

8. BGFEREX, P a r t 11, Inclosure 3-C, p a r 6b.
Ibid, Icclosure 4 4 , par

49 *

6b.

" S i g h t f o r Tank Bcw
50. L t r , Eqs 12th ;IS Army Group, subjec;:
Xachinc Gun", d a t e d 26 Septezber 1944.

51.

Indorsement t o ebove letter by Eiqs ETOUSP., dated 8 C c t o b t r 194.1.

52. AGi'EHRR,

P a r t 11, I n c l o s u r e 4 4 , p a r 7b(7).

53. S e e document r e f e r r e d t o i n n o t e 26e.
54. AGFZRBTI, P a r t 11, I n c l o s v e

55.

I b i d , I n o l o s u r e 4-C,

56.

3-C,

p a r 6b.

p a r 6b.

S e e comment o f General G. S. P a t t o n , Jr, CG Third US I.rmy,
23 :lovbmber 1 9 4 4 , i n r b I ) o r t of t r i p t o armies by iirig GEII
J. A . h o l l y , A F V & W S c c t i o n , ERUSA, d o t o d 7 D6eexiber 1944.
Also comments of C o l C. 3. Lwing, Armored O f f i c e r , Seventh UE
Army, and Col L. T. Hsath, hrmorr,d O f f i c e r , 5 t h US Army Group
i i i l e z t e r from A W & ',V S a c t i o n , 2:OuSA
to p r e s i d e n t , X r m o r e d
Board, d a t e d 10 A p r i l 1945.

57. O f f i c e r s from t h e
c e l . .5@ a i r c r a f t

4 Armorec D i v i s i o n s t u t e d they had Younted
guns 5.n n & d i u i ~t m k s and con6iderf.d them
s u p e r i o r t o t h e co;.
.3O f o r t h c c o a x i a l gun.

56. LGFZRER,
59.

p a r t 11, Iriclosurc, 3-C arid 4 4 , both par Cb.

6er. documents r e f e r r E d t o i n nota 4'1.

6@. See n l s o : L t r , tiqs 6 Armorbd D i v i s i o n , s u b j e c t :

"Operationnl
I n f o r m a t i o n d c s i r c d on 164 S e r i e s Nicdiuon Tanks", d a t e d 14
Ceosnbsr 1944; AGF Obsorvers Report No 408, dated 2 9 !,,ovtmber
1944; an4 docuzcnts r€!'orrGd
t e i n n o t & 47.

65. .irq Ground Fozce G$u&@nt
Review Baord. P>ppcndix 1 5 c o n t z i n s
t h - p c r t i n e i i t rocomioiid=.tiocs of t h e Army Ground Pcrcc Equiymont R W ~ W J
b ? . r d o n ?omiunizion.

66.

Type, LcXtth-atKd+':{&ht

OC Tank h m u n i t i c n .

2..
i'hs u n & s i r n b i l i t g of o t h o r th,i.n f i x e d emmunition, .md t h o
niod f o r h o l d i n g do-.m t h c o v o r e l l l e n g t h 2nd w i g h t o f t a n k ;.nmuni.tion
uorc indic?.tcd i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n of t h c c h c r a c t a r i s t i c s of t z n k c?nnon
(3ce p-?r?grr'.phs 1+9 mti 50, cbovc.)

b. The G c n o r a l Bo?.rd, Unitcd S t z t c s Forces, Europ
urges th-.t %he%IDc
hiicnt 7 s s i g ~? h i g h p r i o r i t g t o thc
r ! ~t i c rcquircd p r f o r m n c o and ovcr..ll I z n g t h
of fixcd cmmunitl.on h
m d i!JCight necessary f o r 22s.: o f londing.

67.

Smokclcsr, ,?nd F l a s h l e s s P r o D c l l n n t s .

The Army Ground F o r c e Zquipmont Rcvic? 5 x r d s t z t e d c h n t a
i?.
t'unifonr." dini.-.nd Gxists f o r smoltcl?ss and f l ? s h l u s s propellmts.bl T h c
Europoan T h c x t m of Cperations . n d Tuiclftk Unitsd S t z t c s kriiiy $roup dcsc r i b z d t h e dcmind 3 s " u r g e n t and uniform".b2 Tho :,rrny Gromd Force R o v d
n l m -sconmcndcd th7.t o b s c u r a t i o n o f v i s i o n by rnuzzlc b l c s t bc rcduczd
t o 3n l t a b s o l u t o miiiiinum b y m y m.3ns.1163
b. Th;. u r % c i x y of anlolcclzss and f l a s h l o s s p r o p c l l n n t s -.nd of
uncbscurcd v i s i o n c m n o t bc cvcr-cm?hosiz;d.6&

(1) I n t e r v i a r o o 3 u n i v i r s n l l y lnnicntrd thc: i e s o v i t h which
t h - G z r m n s loc.a.tdd jhcrican z m k s bj t h c gun f l T s h m d
smokz, ?.nd Lhs c o n t r a s t i n g d i f f i c u l t y of l o w t i n g u n m y
zanks.

(2) The uiigoncy of being ab1.c io f i r a t h c f i r s t :.c:c.urntc
round :"?.s p o i n t x i out i n p?.r?gmph 50 c , ?hove. F?.st,
3ccurz%c f i r i n g r q u i r c s t h n t t h , tnnk com.,?.ndor's 2nd
gum.ar'5 o b e c r v z t i o n be unobscurad by muzzlc bl.?.st.
C b s - r v a t i o n o f i v s r y ruund i s ncrcsss?.ry t o m?.!r;. propor
r m g i : zrd d z f l c c t i o n c h i i e x f o r t h c succocdinz round,
Even ?,!ith 75mm guns ?.nd lO5m ho;,itzcrs, ?.t s h o r t x
ranges, t h o round o f t c n stri!cds boforc: t h e bl-.st h::s
cl-?.rcd s u f f i c i m t l y uc pcrmit obsdrv?tion. Obscurit i o n o f v i s i o n by niuzzlL b l z s t m?lcos 7'611un x i d 90.m guns
"ono s h o t " r.!oapons.
c , Thz muzzlz 5rdcs m d f o m ? r d v m t i n g pri::or rsducod. ohscurstion of v i s i o n . Hcvovc;., t i i L muzzli: bre!cu incrats,:s t h o V!~:L&~Lo f t h e
p n ma n c c o s s i t - . t L s .?.ddinc u n d e s i r n b l o c o u n t c r - w i g h t s to S r o s c h . A
n::mbwr o f :;?.nlc oomm-.ndms r c ? o r t c d t h a t , w i t h t h c .v.uzzic: br?.k?, th,: olnai;
s - c , ~ d.to c o n c c n t r - , t s i n Lhcir v i c i n i t y , knocking o f f t h i ? i r h c l i i s t s znd
king it d i f f i c u l t f o r inf::niry t o st:-.y on t h o rc?r dsck c f t h c tmk.
It
r!gruod, thog$,
th7.t thc illuzels br-.k,: g r a t l g i n i p r o v d t h e gunI I C ~ ' s obscrvn t :on.
i61-s

R-&j-T-n,-'IG-T-L-D
~
-- d.
It is rccomncndod t h a t t h z W
r: Copvtmznt
p r i o r i b j t o dcvdopiaont of smokul$.ss :nil flq.shl-ss pro?ell?.nts .:nd t o
p c r f z c t i o n o f o t n e r mr-ns of di,minin?tinp obscurztion o f v i s i o n .

68. D i m I g n i t e r

Tr-.

a. The Arkv Ground Fcrce Equipment i k v i e n Board recomended
t h a t t r a c e r s "be provided v i t h a dim i g n i t , e r i n o r d e not t o b l i n d gw-n e r s or d i s c l o s e gun p o s i t i o n s dur5ng n i g h t f i r i n g . " g 6 lhropean TneaLer
o f Operations and l h l f t h United t a t e s Army Group recoiiuneiided t h a t il1w.finaticn com.ence a t 200 yards. 27
b.
The n e c e s s i t y f o r improving night f i r i n g c a n a b i l i t i e s was
i n d i c a t e d i n paragranh 11, above.

c. I n t e r v i e v e e s reported t h a t ranging i n with t h e co&xuial. mc h i n e gur. i n d a y l i g h t o f t e n revealed t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e tank and drew
f i r e b e f o r e t h e tar@ coula b e destroyed with c!-i.e canrion. The;, a l s o '
s t a t e d that. German tanks had been l o c s t e d i n t h e same mnner.
d. Ranging-in w i l l have i n c r e a s a d a p p l i c a t i o n uith c a l i b e r .53
c o a x i a l m c h i n e g.uns.68 Also, a c a l i b e r .5p gun can e eniFloged a g a i n s t
t.2rget.s vrhich formerly !!o?ilC r e q n i r e t h e t a n k cannon. 9 DLn i p i t e r
t r z c e r vill. p e r m i t m~&num e x p l o i t a L i o n of t h a s e advantages.

2

e. It i s recomiended t h a t 6evelopment o f di:a i s i - t e r t r a c e r ,
with i l l w n i n a z i o n coirmencing n t 3CO y a r d s , f o r b o t h cannon and machine
gun m u n i t i . o n be a p r i o r i t y p r o j e c t .

4 ~
a. inttervieyiees reimrted d i f f i c u l t g in sensing 3 ~ Tomids
because c f f a i l u r e t o d e t o n a t e on izlpact n i t h t h e firoiLid. Incorporet i o n o f a t,r::cer elenLent
p r e a t l j . f a c i l i t a t e sexsing.
v j i i l

b. I n c o r p o r a t i o n of t r a c e r i n HE (high cxrilosive) and ''P
{ v h i t e phosphorous) rounds Y Ui ~
n c r e a s e f a c i l i t y of ad jiusLing f i r e :

(1) InLsrviev'ees r e p o r t e d d i f f i c u l t y i n i d e n t i f y i n ? . r o u n d s ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y HE, 'men s e v e r a l guns ..ere :"ii*ii~;- i n t h e
sane a r e a .

(2) Lost rounds o f t e n o i c u r i n ~wootedare2,V and i n terrain
i , i l e r s p e r s e d x i t h g u l l e ~ - sarid xivines
! were employed a g a i p s t tergeets i!:ith ver( 3 ) Both I-IE and W

t i c a l p r o f i l e . U t i l i z i n g t h e hoight o f t r a c e r above
t h e t a r g e t a s a .near.s o f a 8 j u d i q f i r e , r,hen .P ir in g
a t v e r t i c a l targets, was discussad i n pz.r:.paph 8,
above.

c . No i n f o r m a t i o n "'AS obtained from intarvie:!ees regsrrling
t r a c e r f o r HE and 'AP round,?. The o n l y disadvantage ;mulcl seem t o be
p o s s i b l e d i s c l o s u r c of t h e 2ank's p o s i t i o n , even with d:in i g n i t e r t r a c e r .

d.
De? artment:

It i s recomaendad that. a p p r o p r i a t a a&en-.Iea 01t h e Var
(1) Provide

E

t r a c e r element i n H

( 2 ) Give s e r i o u s considerat,ion t o i n c o r p o r a t i o n of a
t r a c e r elelrent i n HE and T m u n i t i o n Tor tank

EZ.

- 38 R-3-S- T-X-I-C -T-E-D

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-C-.

70.

Crimping of Fixed Ammunition.

a. The Arm Ground Force E e u i p e n t Review 3oard recommended
improving crimping. 78
b. I n t e r v i m e e s u n i v e r s a l l y r e p o r t e d s e p a r a t i o n of 7% proj e c t i l e s from h e i r c a r t r i d g e cases. Separation of 7 h p r o j e c t i l e s
seeined less e x t e n s i v e . Adoption of t h e German method of crimping around
t h e e n t i r e c i r c u m f e r e n c e of t h e c w t r i d g e c a s e was suggested.
c . There vmre n o r e p o r t s of s e p a r a t i o n of 90.m p r c j a c t i l e s .
This nay h a v e b e e n due t o t h e liniisdd employment. of M26 tanlrs i n t h c
Europzan ' h e a t o r .
d. It is reco.iuncncied t h a t a p p r o p y i a t e a g e n c i e s of t h e Var
Department g i v e h i c d i a t e a t t e n t i o n t o development of improved c r i m p i n g
f o r f i x e d amrtanitioc.

71.

Crimping Tool f o r 105mji Howitzer Amrrunition.

a. The l0jm hovii;zers mointcd i n t a n k s consti-Lute t o o small a
p j r c e n t a g o o f t h o t o t a l numbcr of 1 C 5 m h o w i t z e r s t o warrant p r o d u c t i o n
of f i x e d a x n u n i t i o n f o r Chc tsnk ho-&tzcrs.
b. Tho s e m i - f k - d a r m u n i t i o n can cause some r e d u c t i o n i n t h e
r a t e of f i r e b x a u s e of p r o j e c t i l e s becoming wedgod a u t of line i n t h e
s h c l l c a s x . Many i n t c r v i e ? , e e s r e n o r t e d t h a t t h o y had bcen i s s u e d a
crimping t o o l , n h i c h a p p a r e n t l y had beer, procured i n t h e European T h e a t e r .
Since Charga V I 1 i s normally f i r e d , t h i s t o o l r e c e i v e d i-xlensive employmcnt

.

I i s reconurmended that a p p r o p r i a t e agcnci2s of t h e Tv'!ar
c. :
Ddpartment p r o v i d e a s t a n d a r d crimping t o o l f o r 1051,m h o v i t z e r a m u n i t i o n
on t h c b a s i s o f one p c r 1051x1
howitzer t a r k .
72. &munition Lo,:;
a . The Army Grcund Foms E q u i y w n t X e v i w Board, The European
Tnuatar of O p e r a t i o n s , and Twclfth Unitvd S t a c c s Arqv Group rocomended
a c t i o n 3 2 t a k e n t o rcducd t h c d i f f i c u l t i a s cacszd by Pariations i n muzz l e v a l o c i t and p?r?oO'mancc botwsw different l o t s cf t h o sainc t y p o of
anmunition. 1

f

b. Expurioncc h a s sho1.r. t h a t the rango dispersion 'uetvccn di:f s r u n t a m u n i t i o n l o t s , cveii a t d i r e c t l a y i n g r a n g e s , is s u f f i c i c r > L to
causc misscs. Under combat cc:iditicns, it i s n o t f o a s i h l c t o s o t i s t r l but< rcsupply Loads t h a t cach bank h a s only a m u n i t i o n of .the sane l o t .
Vhin s t o t h ~ ga t a n k , i t inay be p o s s i b l c t c s e g r e g a t e t h o rounds by l o t
i n t h e stowage r a c k s . HoyiJavar, th;l c o n s t r u c t i o r . o f stomiec bir.6, t h e
p o s i t i o n of thi: l a a d c r w i t h r e s p e c t $0 thcm, t h c s i z c OS Lhc; l o t i d o n t i i i c b t i o n markings, and t h o nocassit,y c f h i g h r a t c s of f i r 3 mako it impossible f o r thif l o a d e r t o Yclcct rounds by l o t number.

It i s rmonunended t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e a g e n c i e s o f t h e Yar Ccc.
partment wsiw a h i g h p r i o r i t y t o r e d u c t i o n i n v a r i a t i o n s betvucn ponder l o t s and t o i n c r e a s i n g t h o ciuantlty of m u n i t i o n i n any onis l o t .

73.

Amnunitinn f o r Training,.

F u r s o n n d in'cerviswdd s t r e s s 3 d tho confusion ca.xjad by
a.
f i r i n g , i n t r a i n i n g , ammunition Raving a d i f f a r o n t t r a j c c t o r y from t h a t ,
c f ainmunition ,mod i n k t t l c .

- 39 R-&S-T-R-I-C-T-Z-D
.--

b. It i s raconmcndod khat t h e \Tar EGpartmmC t c l t c t h e n:cdesary
o c z i m t o ~ l l o ~ i ! l a tthe sourcc of t h i s conl'usior..
$;

___

SS2TICjiq 2

.
I

PROJECTILES
~ L L . &oii

R.%~ci;ig,

8.
The Army Ground Force EqEipment Reviev Doard recomended
development of hyper v e l o c i t y armor p i e r c i n g (IlVkP) p r o j e c i i l e s , a s vrell.
a s Coiitiniie~i development 3f r e g u l a r armor p i e r c i n g ariunuiuticn
and
AFC), and o f hOlloi;-shaped charge f o r a r t j l l e r y projeotiles.'72 The
Xuropean Theat,es of Operatirins and Ti;elft,h United S t a t e s L r n y Group recmmelxled development of hd.101: charge f o r " a l l c a l i b e r s froin 7 5rm up".73

11. The d e s i r e d armr p i e r c i n g p r o j e c t i l e must have a p r o p e r
t?alance between a r m r penetratio; and accuracy,. Intervie:!s reveal ed
t . h a t c f r e c t i v e n m s a f t e r p e i i o t r a t i o n is secondary. Tke fo1lov.j.i-lg evaluat i o n o: currant1:f standard -c:eapons i n d i c a t e t h e accuracy required:

(1) The accuracy of '761171 H'IAP i s excellent.74.
( 2 ) The accurccy of lO5m honiSzer HEAT i s u n s a t i s f a c tory.75

( 3 ) While '%mi M62

14zs p r e f e r r e d because of i t s Z l a t t e r
t r a j e c w w y , parsonnsl intervcewer; considered t h e accuracy of 75m AFC. E61 s a t i s f a c t o r y .

( 4 ) L n t a r ~ i e ~ ~ r er e ps o r t e d t h a t most tank f i e h t i n g t c o k
p l a c e a t ranges under 1530 y a r d s . ic raigss up to
approxinstcly 17MJ yards, the t h e o r e t i c a l c r o b ~ b iilt y
of h i t t i n e a tank. n5.en t h e range is ueterndned correctl.y, is t h e same f o r bgth 75nm P.PC. bf61 and 7 6 "
AFC I$&!. 76

.

-

I

c . I t is higkly der;irs.bLe thaz o n l y one type o f armor p i e r c i n g
a r m m i t i o n be includsd ir. t h i b s s i c Load. Because 0:' i t s g r e a t e r effact . i v e n e s s a f t c r g e n e t r a t i n n , a n :iPc (armor piercing cap) type p r o j e c t i l e
i s ccxsiderec: t h e i d e a l . If an A W type p r o j e c t i l e capable of t h e neces:;arg armor p e n c t r ' a t i o n cannot be p o d w e d , e i t h e r XZAT o r HVkP project i l e s shculd be p r o v i i e d . Inclusion of HVA!' or H E b i n t h ? b a s i c l o a d
(It has been ass h o u l d be i n accordance with t h e following p r i n c i p l e s .
r,w.ed t h a t b o t h W A F m d IiLA'J, havinz t h e necease;y p e n e t r h t i o n , c a n b e
d eveloped ) :

.

(1.j I n ordi:r t o have only one tjrpe of ir;im piercing amn u n i t i o n i n a tank, HSAT o r f1VL.P should comp1.etelg
r e p l a c e AX. The l a t t e r i s not required f o r a n t i concrete r d s s i o n s s i n c e 1% with a concrete p i e r c i n g
fm;2;ci s sniisfactor$.77
p r o d u c i e i n s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t y t o meet
e r c i n g requirements, it shwiid be selT because o f h i g h e r p o s s i b l e n1uzz1.i:

velouit,g.

( 3 ) If l!VAP cannat be procluczd i n s u f f i c i e n t q u a r - t i t y , t h c
n e c e s s i t y f o r h.ol.dlr,g amnunition types t o a miniinum
ciictates E e l e c t i o n of tiiiiZT. Eoiuever, t h e accuracy o f
HbAT nius'b be a t least equivalent t o t h a t o f 75mn APC.
1,161. If t h i s recpirement mi-not he m e t W A ? should
ba selectod.

- it0 &E-S-T-R-14 -.--.- -T-E-D

I-C-T-%I!
-WL-S-T-It.-.--

(4) If an iIEAT

round of s a t i s f a c t o r y acruracy and g r e a t e r
e f f e c t i v e n e s s t h a n HVAP a t l a r g e angles 02 a t t a c k c a n
be developed, it should be s e i s c t e d .

8. The Amy Ground Force Zxipiiient Review h e r d recol.rended
developn.ent of a high explosive round having:

“ s u f f i c i e n t velocitjr t o i n s x e pic-point accllrscy <.E d i r e c t
f i r e . Ini’iial v e l o c i t y should be t h e h i s m s t p o s s i b l e consistect w i - h good fragnentation, c o n t r o l of r i c o c h e l , and
minimw glln t u h e erosion.1~7g
b. A l a r g e m a j o r i t y of personnel i.ntervie:.:ed considered 75”
HJ3, M48, supercharge, t h e i d e a l high explosive round fo: t a n k m . 7 9
E x p l o s i v e c o n t e n t , c a n t r o l of r i c o c h e t , and e s s e o f adjusti!;ent ~ ~ i e r a
c o n s i d e r e d more important t h m high velocit,y. Fen i r k e r v i w r e e s p r e f e r r e d t h e h i g h v e l o c i t y , 7 6 ” HE, ~42Al.

c.
i s obvious.

The n e c e s s i t y for maximum b u r s t and fragmentation e f f e c t
Two other v i t a l reqt‘iremeats a r e not a s c l e a r :

(1) The t e r m i n a l vel.ocity must be such that t h e gunner
can maxe range changes “equel t o the depth of t h e
burst or. t h e groimd.”80 A gunner can do t h i r w i t h
75m fl3, MhBa supsrcharge. It i s n o t 2 o s s i J l e w i t h
7 h . HE, Will, the terminal veloc5.t.g I s t o o high,B1
( 2 ) I n general, more er’fective f i r e i s obLained v i t h a
DELAY fuze than w i t h a SI;Pi;;P.CljTCK setti.ik.81a Tine

mLzzle v d o c i t g and delay eiement i n tki! fuze nist be
such t h a t t h e r e s u l t i n g richochet is eas; t o a d j u s t .
Ricochets with 7 5 m HZ, N,8, suyerchzrge wid1 .05
second d s l a y f u z e a r e s a t i s f a c t o r y . Thocje v i t h 76m1
HE, M 4 2 A l and .O5 second delay fuze t r a v e l t o o f a r
hefsre biirsting.
d. The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s recorrmended by t h e Army Ground F o r c e
Review Board ;nay re~u1.ti n p r o j e c t i l e s of t o 3 h i g h a aiuzzls v e l o c i t y .
T h e r e f o r e , it i s recamended t h a t high explosive p r o 2 e c t i l e s developed
f o r tan!< guns have t h e followir!g c h a r a c t a r i s t l c s :

(1) aubuazle v e l o a i t y , explosive content, f r e s i e n t a t i o n ,
and c o n t r o l of r i n o c h e t sLnilar t o 75rm HE,
supercharge, r a t h e r than t o 76mn HF., l~Yt2111.

m,

(2)

Muzzle ire!.ocity such t h a t t h o gunner can IMke range
changes equal to t h e depth o f t h e D u s t on t h e ground,
a t all. ranges.
DELAY fuze such t h a t r i c o c h e t s d o
not have il g r e a t e r length of t r a v e l and h e i g h t of
b u r s t then .those of 75nm HE, W8, supercharge, w i t h
.05 second de1,iy fuze.

( 3 ) hiuazle v e l o c i t y and

( 4 ) b;-j” er.plcsive content and fragmentation c o n s i s t e n t
nit3 muzzle v e l o c i t y and accuracy not l e s s t h a n t h a t
of 75m HE, L W , supercharge.

7 6 . Raduced Charge+Hiph Explosive.
a. ~~mGround Force $quipmeit Review BDard recommended a
duced charce HE round llfor use by t a n k d e s l r o y e r s i n i n d i r e c t

- 41 -

e

R-&s-T-+I-C
-T-&U
I_.___

~

b.
Personnel i n t e r v i e l i e d unanimously s t a t e d t h a t a reduc?d
charge RZ round v!as uiinecessarj f o r u s e by t a n k s . i n t r o d u c t i o n of a
;edcceo c h a r g e r o u ~ df o r t h s 76.7~~1
gun i n t h e Europcan T h e a t e r ciiused
confusion amotig tank c r e ~ ! s . ~ 3It is recommended that r e d w e d cIiary,e
h i n o t be p r o v i d e d f o r t a n k c , egcn i f they r e p l a c e t e n k 510sti-ozei-.-?Is
Lie flnj a r a n t i - t a n k 1. leap on,

a. All pe;:soni?el ii?i;s:.vi.wed s t a t - d :hat a mi-ely screstiiiig
such a6 EC b a s e e j a c c i o n o r e.:iission, was n o t needed f o r tank
Caiinoa. On 3 October 1944, t h e European Theater of Oporations inj'orr:red
t h e 'Var Department t h a t .Ltiis t y p e of air;nunition was n c t iieeded f o r t a n k
p ~ s . ~This
~ , p o s i h i o n 112c i 4 t e r a t s d i n Mzrch l'J$5.85
s.ioi:a,

w l l .li:cod by a l l pei' o x e l b e c a u s e
b. 'Yhi?.e phosphorons "18:s
of i t s combined c a s u a l t y , incendlar:v,, and srmke
' &stances
Irere r e p o r t e d i n vrhicii it hnd caitsad enemy c r e k s t o abandon t h e i r t a n k s .
d fev i:Tl:c.nriowJees had a c t u a l l ; ? seen white phosphorous set a taidi on
f i r s . Its e r i p l o ~ n o n t a c a i n s t tanks resul.ted f r o m t h e l a c k of ernor
pierciiip r u u r d s capabl? o f ?cnetr,\ting heavy 3aririan f r o n t a l armor.
C.
Ir. sonjurict?iCjn u i t h iLs o t h e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , all. personne: c o n s i d e r e d the .5ncend.iainy v w e r t i e : : of whi:e
phos$iaraus s a t i s f a c tory l o r nornal u s e j i . e . mploymxit :leainst personnel, , i ; u i l d i n p , e t c .
t i i d riot vanL it repiacetl by a p u r d y i n c e n d i a r y p r o j e c t i l e . B
. : , : a j o r i t y d e s i r e d i t augmenied by a flane producing round. Tfle
reiisori f o r t h i s dermnd i s t h e d e s i r e for a r e l i a b l e m a n s of s a t t i n , :
tnrilcs on ii1.e in t h e absence of i n arnur p i e r c i n g rolltid, 1:aving 'tk6
requircci perfor!nance.87

Q wopean '&,cater of Operations a!id 'i4felWi U~iik,?u
d. T ~ G
S t a t e s Army Group reco~woiendr;?.im?roveo incenciiary f Lll.orz for %ll
t y p e s of i r t i l l a r g ~1ell.s.
lltd
e . The General Board, U r L t o d S t a t s s Forces, Suroyan Tlloater
r.econmends tlist:
(1) F u r e P j s c r e e n i n & sl:iokr:, such a s 75!11rfl€iC base emission.
hi89 or 105h HC base e j e c t i o n L?&? not bc p r o v i d e d f o r
te:k cannon.
( 2 ) Irqiraved i n w n d i e r g f i l l e r s f o r arLiJ.?.e q r s h e l l s not
repl.ace :!bite phospkorous f o r tank ca,mo:i u n l e z s such
f i l l e r hac Lhe casualty and moke p r o g e r b i e s of whiti+
ohc s!>n D roil s ,

( 3 ) I,,y?rovr?d incentiiary fil.l.t.rc Cor a i - t i l . 1 ~ :s~h e l l s be
u t l l i e e d . f3r an incendiar:/ r0ur.d for la< camon, t o
augiiient ' h i t e ,p!iosohorous,
i f armor pierc3xLg
rouridj Iiaviii: the racjiircd ? e r f o r m n c e c:ir:not be
daveloped rrnd i f such iricendiary f i l l e r i.s a inore
r e l i a b l e ::ieans oi s e t t i n g ta.nlcs CII f i i - e thm v h i t o
phosphorous.
3

-___

'7$.
I l . l w n i n a t i n g S~.h e l l . Devdo?rnefit of il1wi:inating s h e l l -713,s
recoinmended i n paraeraph 11, above.

79. Canistcr.
The Ani17 Ground Pcrcg Equipment Review Board rocoimimidi:d
a.
developnicnt d improved c a n i ~ t o r . ~ 9The Zui-opoan Yrieater of 0pei.stions
and T$iel.fth U n i t e d S t a t s s Army Grolip

- 47 I<-E-S-T-R-I-C

-T-E-D

a. Fursoimol i:?tzr-vimz?33cortsidorzd Lhc fol1oc:ing disiribution
s s t i s f a c t o r v , as a goti?ml ruls, €or tank guns: high d o l a s v i e
701;;
arnor pi.orci:ig - 20%; v h i t d phcsohorous
1.0$; I n g m x o l , c h c s 5 f i g cf 75riio., 76mn and V h i t a n k ani1
UY'SS nrc cs,.!parablu to -she c m a d i t i i r
tank c!cst.rgyycr amnun.ii;ion i n Lhe ::uropc.ar. ciir,qpaign frojii Junk 19th
through January l'jL5, a d to t h u p u r c a n t a g c s rsconmnci.?d by the Z i m p a n Ttioxtcr cf 0 p m a t i o i i s . 9 1

-

-

D3ta o n a.nmiu^.ition x p i l n c k d by 105x11hoi.itzur inauntid i n
Y'hi: pt;rcunttlges rmomcndcci by t h o b r o pc;n T h e a t u r o f C p s r z t i o n s ?."11.:;
t o botri a r t i l l o l T and tank ho>,:itzcrs
and incluc'; 90% h i z h d : ~ l . o s i v ~7.57;
,
v h i t 9 phosphorous, and .5X
Because o r t h e cmal.1 p r c e n ' q y 0: 11)5m.,i ho!vit%er,s mnouuited i n t a n k s ,
productiorr i n a c c o r d m c e w i t h t h e x p e r c a t a g e s should provids sui'fici-en; q i i a c t i t i e s nf w h i t e phosphorous and IiEAT t u meet tank requiremnetits.
However, as recormended by -';he Arriiored Section, F i r s t Unituc! S t a t e s
k r q , t h c baaaic lo;d rmot incl.r;dc 205 HEAT and 10% w h i t e phosqhorous in
s u i f i c i e n t rounds for one or t x o tarorder 1.0 p r o v i d s e;.ch Lank I
h.

x d i m tarks i s n o t :ivai'tablo.

gets.?3

c. It is recalr.lended t h a t ammunitior. f o r tank guns a n d hoi:<itzers be produced i n such c;ua,nl;ity -~lii?; b n s i c 1 3 a d s can i n c l u d e 7(J% hizh
explosive, 20% armor piercing, and lO:% .,bite !?:?oupkorous.

PU z s
Kt ,

zm-q-_F!iues.

The Amy Ground Fcr:e Rquiyxnent, Review EcaPd recomrieriiled
a.
that.: )'all t y p e s of jnproved f u z e s devsl.oned lor a r t i l l e r y c a m o n should
bs provided i n t,ank. .asmuiiit:ion,

.

b. N o r m 1 Lime f i x e Iias always been considered outsj.de t h e
scope o f -Lark [I;umerg.95 The i2teerviev.s rsveaied no reason f o r c h a n g i n ~
this p01icy.96 %le u s e o f present, proxin,ity (VT) fuzes is ~ . i x i t e ct ~o
w t i l l e r y t y p e f i r i n g . The e x t e n t of t h i s f i r i n g bj Tank guns is t o o
l h k t e d t o r a r r a n t i n t r o d u c - d o n of fuzes ~uns!Lzecl t o d i r e c t 1 ayir.g.

- 1,3 R-&S-T-&I-C-'r-E-D
._. - - ~

I
_

61.


62.

69.

64.

65.
66.

67.

66,
bq

I

70.
71

.

72.

73.

74.
75.
76.

77.
78 ,

79.

80,

81.

83.a

I

R-ES-T-R-I-C
-. .-

I
I

-T-E-D
__-

82.

AGFEHBR, P a r t I, Annex N. par l 4 b .

83.

lnforniation m m o No. 6 APV&.W Suction, ETOLTSA, il. Docanbcr 194GS t a t e n w n t o f C o r p o r a l ''%?-lis, 761 TanK &tt,alion, rzcorciocl 3.r.
memorandum AFVK'I S e c t i o n , E,TGUSA, subjeci; "Report of T r i p to
Ar~niesl~
, 7 Deceifiber 19114.

E14

ETOUSA Cable Ex-51978.

I

85.

L t r SHA,s, s u b j e c t :
25 March 1945.


E6.

See also

E?.

See also r e p o r - t of Soard of O f f i c e r s ap:?ointed by S O 196 HC&
US Army, 19 JUL:: 1944, da.ted 30 J u l y 19W1.


88 *

XTOUSA Study, see note 30.


89.

AC-PS8dJ P a r t I, Annex N, par l & c .


90 *

ETOUbA Study, s e e nots 30.


91.

"%liii.inatior. of Non-Zsscntial iciui.:x!:ent

AGF Combat Observers ileport

itr Hqs ETOUSA, s u b j e c t :

by Col. George 16. Dean.


1 ~ A " i t i o i i TJa:;

o f Siipp?.ply", d a t e d

l?fLrst


3 ILirch


194.5.


.


92.

Ibid

93.

Ltr. Colonel P.C. Cains, Armored Officer, F i r s t US Army t.0 I.%. C o i .

W. N e i l , Armored O f f i c e r , P i f t o e n t h US Arw, 7 Febru?rg 194.5.


94.

AGFEIIRR, P a r t I, Annex IV. pir 1 4 d ( 2 ) .


95

FM 17-12, Tank Gunnery, 10 Julx 17&,

a

par 60b ( 2 ) .


96.

See a l s o docunient r e f e r r e d t o in n o t e 93.


97.

IPS, iiqs ETGUSA, frori? G-3 t o Orcinance, s u b j e c t :
Q d i t i e s " , 9 June 191:4.


98 *

IRS, Hqs ETOUSA, from JPVP?'.' Section t o G-3, s u b j a c t :
75.m APC, U61, k e r b Loaded, d a t e d 25 Ida:! 191;5.


99.

Fld 17-12,

100, I
b i d

"75nin i i n u n u ~ ~ ~ i i ; i o u

l'?c'i-eezii?g of


Tank Gunnery, 10 July 191r4, pal' 60b.


.


101. See a l s o .4GF C o m h t 0,servers Report by C U I . Georee M. Dean.


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