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Subcourse Number MP 1005
United States Army Military Police School
Fort McClellan, Alabama 36205-5030
6 Credit Hours
Edition Date: April 2006

We designed this subcourse to teach you how to use crowd control techniques and plan for and supervise
control forces during a civil disturbance.
There are no prerequisites for this subcourse.
This subcourse reflects the doctrine which was current at the time it was prepared. In your own work situation,
always refer to the latest official publications.
Unless otherwise stated, the masculine gender of singular pronouns is used to refer to both men and women.

Plan for, supervise and employ crowd control forces and techniques for a civil disturbance.

CONDITION: You will have this subcourse, paper and pencil.
STANDARD: To demonstrate competency of this task, you must achieve a minimum score of 70 percent on the
subcourse examination.


Subcourse Overview......................................................................................................................... i
Lesson 1: Plan Operations to Control a Civil Disturbance..........................................................1-1
Part A: Planning........................................................................................................1-1
Part B: Troop Support/Training..............................................................................1-13
Part C: Operational Techniques/Application of Force........................................... 1-17
Part D: Operational Tasks.......................................................................................1-28

Practice Exercise...................................................................................1-36
Answer Key and Feedback................................................................... 1-38
Lesson 2: Crowd Control Techniques......................................................................................... 2-1
Part A: Crowd Control..............................................................................................2-1
Part B: Neutralization of Special Threats............................................................... 2-11
Practice Exercise...................................................................................2-26

Lesson 3: Crowd Control Formations......................................................................................... 3-1
Part A: Types of Formations and Weapons..............................................................3-1
Part B: Unit Organization......................................................................................... 3-8
Part C: Squad Formations.......................................................................................3-13
Part D: Platoon Formations.................................................................................... 3-15
Part E: Company Formations................................................................................. 3-32
Practice Exercise
Lesson 4: Riot Control Agent Disperser......................................................................................4-1
Practice Exercise........................................................................................................4-8
Appendix: Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (M33A1)A-1
This lesson is designed to describe the nature and causes of disaffection and social unrest; define the potential
for social unrest in the United States; identify the types of confrontations; define crowd behavioral and
psychological influences; identify patterns of disorder.


Plan operations to control a civil disturbance.


You will have this subcourse, paper and pencil.


To demonstrate competency of this task you must achieve a minimum score of 70 percent
on the subcourse examination.


The material contained in this lesson was derived from the following publications: FM 319.15; FM 10-10; FM 3-19.4.

1. Mission of Military Forces during Civil Disturbances. The mission of military forces during civil
disturbances, both in CONUS and OCONUS, which cannot be overly emphasized, is to help local and state
authorities to restore and maintain law and order. This mission may be accomplished by breaking up
unauthorized gatherings and by patrolling the disturbance area to prevent the commission of lawless acts.
During operations to restore order, military forces may present a show of force, establish roadblocks, break up
crowds, employ crowd control agents, patrol, serve as security forces or reserves, and perform other operations
as required. Successful fulfillment of the missions will depend to a large extent upon sufficient planning,
training, police information, and coordinated actions of individuals and units.
2. Planning and Preparation. To be most effective, planning should be coordinated with local civil authorities
to provide a complete coverage of all matters pertaining to operations and ensure that areas requiring joint
efforts are properly considered. The provost marshal performs a key role in civil disturbance planning due to
the mission of restoring law and order assigned a military force in confrontation management operations. His
knowledge of police methods is particularly valuable to the commander and staff in their preparation to assist a
community to restore law and maintain order. Considerations should be given to the provost marshal as a
member of the advance party to further coordinate and represent the commander with civil police agencies.
Planning is a continuing process involving personnel, correct information, logistics, and operational
considerations. It provides for action to be taken before, during, and after disturbances. A military unit
preparing for confrontation management duty passes through two general phases: the planning and training
phase, and the alert phase.
a. The Planning and Training Phase. In planning for crowd control or civil disturbance operations,
planners must decide what data, equipment and training will be needed in order to respond to the
demonstration and restore law and order. This phase includes all preparations that are made prior to the
unit being alerted. Included in this phase are preparations of unit alert plans and standing operating
procedures (SOP), survey of areas and routes, preparation of plans for probable areas of disturbances,
preparation of equipment and crowd control devices to include both non lethal and lethal munitions,
training in confrontation management operations, and rehearsals of plans.
b. The Alert Phase. This phase may be a short time or may extend over a period of days. During this
phase, the unit is fully prepared and ready to move. Vehicles are loaded with equipment and ready for
movement. Soldiers are dressed in the prescribed uniforms. Weapons, ammunition, non-lethal munitions,
crowd control agent munitions, and supplies are ready for issue. Soldiers must be briefed on the situation
and mission to the extent possible in conformance with instructions from higher headquarters. Talks by

company commanders and platoon leaders must prepare the Soldiers psychologically for the forthcoming
c. National Guard Units. During the planning phase, National Guard units which may be subject to call
for duty should make the preparations prescribed in AR 135-100. Special attention must be given to the
orientation of personnel with regard to their status when federalized.
3. Alert Plan. Each organization which may be involved in civil disturbance should prepare a detailed alert
plan, based upon expected missions. It must be a logical development of the alert plan of the next higher unit.
The plan must provide for an orderly process by which the unit will be brought to a state of operational
readiness which will help it to perform its assigned mission promptly and efficiently.
a. The alert plan should be based upon local conditions and whether you are in CONUS or OCONUS. It
must be revised as a result of lessons learned and experience gained by rehearsals, or as necessary, to
conform to changes in the alert plan of the next higher headquarters. It should include such items as:
(1) Verification procedures for the warning order.
(2) Personnel notification procedures and places of assembly.
(3) Required actions for each element of the organization.
(4) Procedures for issuing special equipment, supplies, and material.
(5) Vehicle preparation.
(6) Security restrictions.
(7) Administrative details
(8) Tentative briefing requirements for unit personnel.
(9) Provisions for opening a unit journal and establishing a journal file immediately upon receipt of the
warning order.
(10) Coordination with civil authorities.
(11) Reconnaissance.
(12) Communications.
b. The alert plan must be thoroughly understood by every member of the unit. Each individual must know
his duties, those of his next senior, and the unit's mission. He must be prepared to replace his next senior.
4. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). Procedures for confrontation management operations should be
included in unit SOP. In addition, procedures for apprehension, search, detention of persons, seizure of
property, obtaining witnesses and statements, crowd control formations, identifying extraction and apprehension
teams and reserve forces to assist with crowd control when needed. Additionally it should also identify the type
of crowd control equipment to be utilized, and the procedures for employment and use of non lethal weapons
and munitions.

5. Organization. The development of an effective force capable of controlling civil disturbances depends
largely upon proper organization. The following five principles of organization should be considered in
planning for all civil disturbance operations:
a. Essentiality.
b. Balance.
c. Coordination.
d. Flexibility.
e. Efficiency.
6. Unit Integrity and Decentralized Control.
a. General. An important aspect of confrontation management is the great number of missions involved
which creates the need for forces to engage in a variety of operations at the same time. This is a factor
which must be thoroughly planned for and constantly evaluated in the development of an effective control
force. The need for immediate decisions is great and the requirement for direct supervision is important;
therefore, control must be decentralized. Commanders must develop small units capable of functioning as
separate teams, as well as part of the overall force. These small units must be responsive to the changing
situation and capable of immediate reaction based on the decisions of their leaders.
b. Unit Integrity. To use small unit capability to the best advantage, organizational development should be
based on unit integrity. For instance, for an infantry unit the squad should be considered the basic patrol
unit; this gives a platoon (minus the weapons squad) the capabilities of a total of three 10-man patrols and
the company (minus the weapons platoon) a total of nine. If smaller units are necessary, the fire team
concept should be used. Other types of units may need to organize in a similar fashion.
c. Decentralized Control. For proper development of decentralized control, clearly defined duties should
be assigned to the lowest possible level and adequate authority given to the responsible person to permit
him to do his job effectively.
d. One of the most important phases of civil disturbance planning is the selection of personnel for
confrontation management duty. Personnel selected for this duty should be selected using the following
(1) The ability to remain calm under physical, mental, and emotional strain.
(2) Respect all persons.
(3) Maintain an impartial, patient attitude.
(4) Be able to issue orders in a manner crowd members can understand.
(5) Must not show signs of fear.
(6) Be in a good physical condition.

e. The noncommissioned officer (NCO) has a tremendous duty in this area. The NCO is usually the
person closest to the Soldiers on a day-to-day basis and may be in the best position to see a man who may
have become unreliable for civil disturbance control duty. This type of observation is priceless to the
7. Logistical Planning.
a. General. Civil disturbance operations involve special consideration for logistical support depending on
whether you’re here in the United States or overseas. Logistical planning covers all phases of such
operations from preparation and training to the end of the mission. Planners must include provisions for
necessary supplies, services, and facilities, through local services, if necessary. These may include
provisions for food, beverages, ammunition, special crowd control equipment and sanitation facilities.
b. Equipment and Material.
(1) Individual and organizational equipment prescribed in common tables of allowances (CTA) and
tables of organization and equipment (TOE) for Soldiers and units usually are sufficient for civil
disturbance control operations. Additional you may add non-lethal munitions to your existing organic
weapons systems such as the M203. For example, adding the M9 pistol for the extraction and
apprehension teams, a M16 or M4 with a 203 attached, or a 12 gage shotgun with non lethal munitions
capabilities. The shotgun with non lethal capabilities can be utilized by the over watch personnel. Other
examples of additional equipment which may be needed are armored vehicles, mechanical crowd control
agent dispersers, floodlights, spotlights, searchlights, cameras of the Polaroid type, movie cameras,
public address systems, heavy construction equipment, aircraft, ambulances, first aid kits, firefighting
equipment, grappling hooks, ladders, ropes, special weapons, communications equipment, and recording
devices. Equipment that will not be needed should be left behind.
(2) Plans must also provide for a supply of barricade and roadblock materials and equipment such as:
heavy single strand wire, barbed wire, concertina wire, heavy stakes, heavy nails and spikes, and power
saws. Signs and sign making materials, including quick-drying paints, must be available for use with
barricades and roadblocks
(3) Unit-Accompanying Supplies. Preparation of unit-accompanying supplies and equipment is
important for rapid reaction in emergency situations. Among the items which must be provided for are
ammunition, food, water, gasoline, lubricants, spare parts, crowd control agents, maps, and
administrative supplies. Unit-accompanying supplies should be developed with unit integrity in mind.
A running inventory must be kept and complete inspections made as necessary. Based upon the
characteristics of each item, a procedure for periodic exchange of certain items should be established.
For example, crowd control agents, ammunition, foodstuff, and gasoline deteriorate in prolonged
storage. Retention of unserviceable materials will have grave consequences in the event of an
emergency. Further, ammunition should be kept apart by type as well as lethal and non lethal
c. Transportation. Plans must provide for all types of transportation needed in civil disturbance operations.
In developing transportation requirements, consideration must not be given only to requirements of
deployment, but must also include requirements within the disturbed area. Commercial buses for mass
transportation within the objective area, and the use of rental sedans should be considered. TOE vehicles
should be increased as necessary to provide sufficient flexibility and mobility for operational and support
elements. In this regard, transportation units are to be considered in the task force development.
d. Maintenance. Considerations should be given to expanding the existing maintenance capability of the
unit. Particular attention should be given to replacement of windshields, tires, rearview mirrors, lights, and

radio antennas. Coordination should be made with the field maintenance facility to establish maintenance
and evacuation procedures after the unit is committed.
e. Re-supply. Definite procedures must be established for re-supply in the objective area. Consideration
should also be given to the establishment of logistical contact teams in the objective area. These contact
teams should have direct communications with support units so that critical supplies can be obtained as soon
as required with a minimum of delay. Priorities for requisitions should be established to afford the
maximum response to requests for re-supply.
f. Loading Plans.
(1) Personnel Loading Plan. To ensure the disturbance control force arrives in the objective area
prepared for immediate employment, commanders must develop personnel loading plans around the
principle of unit integrity. Loading plans must be rehearsed and should become SOP within the unit.
Personnel loading plans must be developed for each mode of transportation mentioned above.
(2) Equipment Loading Plan. Attention to unit integrity also must be given the equipment loading plan.
Each element of the force must be escorted by its required equipment and a small reserve of
ammunition, crowd control agents, and basic supplies.
g. Medical Facilities. Plans must provide for the provision of emergency medical attention to military
personnel and civilians. Plans should provide for qualified personnel, ambulance service, medical and
civilian, whenever possible.
8. Operations Planning.
a. Prior to deploying the control force, a counterdemonstration working group should be developed to
coordinate the resources that will need to be employed by the task force (TF). Detailed planning for the
procedures used in civil disturbance operations at each level of command should include provisions to
implement plans of the next higher echelon. This working group should include:
(1) Public Affairs
(2) Joint military commission (JMC), if organized
(3) Provost marshal office (PMO)
(4) G2, Assistant Chief of Staff nG5 (Civili Afairs) (G5), Assistant Chief of Staff G-6 (signal) (G6)
(6) Civil Affairs
(7) Army Airspace command and control (A2C2)
(8) Chaplain
(9) Engineer
(10) Surgeon

(11) Fire support element
b. Plans should be prepared for each probable major operational area. These plans should be based on a
physical reconnaissance whenever possible. Each plan should indicate an assembly area with primary and
alternate routes thereto, tentative locations of road-blocks and observation posts, temporary quarters for
billeting and feeding, a patrol plan, a security plan for certain facilities, and other such details. Maps,
overlays, aerial photographs, and sketches should be obtained and necessary plans developed for
distribution and reserve stockpiling.
c. An outline should be provided for command and control of joint operations with civil authorities to
include joint patrols, exchange of equipment, etc. Full use of existing civil police operational limits will
prove helpful for adjusting and sending Soldiers for best area coverage.
9. Movement. Movement to the main areas must be considered in developing operations plans. The
disturbance control force is extremely weak during movement and could receive a substantial setback if rioters
disrupt the movement route and debarkation points. En route security, to include aerial observation, must be
provided at such places as over-passes, high buildings, and other vulnerable points. Further, the means of
movement is critical to the success of the operation because of the time factor involved. Normally, Soldiers will
be committed to civil disturbance missions on extremely short notice and must arrive promptly if the
disturbance is to be contained with minimal damage to property and injury to persons. Since rioters can apply
tactics which will delay the arrivals of Soldiers, the most direct routes are selected which are least vulnerable.
Alternate routes must be planned for.
10. Assembly Areas. Movement planning must include the advance selection of areas for assembly of units
and the accounting for personnel and checking equipment. Assembly areas should be sufficiently removed
from the disturbed areas to preclude their being engulfed by the riotous element.
11. Bivouac Areas and Billets.
a. The selection of bivouac areas and billets should be based on the following desirable characteristics:
(1) Close distance to disturbed area.
(2) Large enough to avoid congestion.
(3) Relatively easy to secure.
(4) Adequate primary and alternate routes available to the scene of disturbances.
(5) Adequate sanitation facilities.
(6) Communications facilities.
b. Whenever possible, maximum use of federal, state, or public property should be made in order to stop
extra claims for property damages and displeasure among the public. The use of public schools provides
excellent billeting, communications, water, and sanitary facilities. However, if school is in session, use of
schools may act as an irritant to the public. National Guard armories and Reserve Centers are ideal if
12. Command Posts. Locations for command posts should be selected in advance and plans prepared for
staffing and equipping them with a minimum of delay. Consideration should be given to both the main

command post and to tactical command posts within the various subdivisions where rioting is most likely to
occur. Security measures must be taken to ensure command posts are not penetrated or overrun be unruly
elements. Collection of military and civil police command elements from highest to lowest level represents the
best solution to the problem of command and control because of joint aspects involved. Consideration should
be given to use of police precinct stations for collocated command posts because of their strategic locations
throughout the entire area. Collocation of command posts in this manner facilitates continuing coordination
between military and civil authorities.
13. Army Aircraft. Operations planning includes consideration for the use of Army aircraft (helicopters and
fixed-wing) for command and control, communications, observation, reconnaissance, en route security,
distribution of crowd control agents, controlling the movement of units, removing casualties, movement of
Soldiers, re-supply, dropping leaflets, airborne loudspeaker broadcasting, and other appropriate requirements.
Plans should include searchlight-equipped observation helicopters to be used in organizing ground patrols to
ensure complete coverage day and night.
PART B - Public Relations and Information.
1. Public relations.
a. Civil disturbance plans must include provisions for furnishing commanders in the area of operations with
the personnel and equipment resources necessary to conduct information activities.
b. In order for public relations with the press to run smoothly, plans should provide for:
(1) Giving accredited media representative's locally devised press passes that will make their passage
through police lines and military checkpoints easier.
(2) Coordinating press requests for coverage of operations in the disturbance area to include
arrangements for furnishing military personnel to act as press escorts where necessary.
(3) Establishment of a press room by the public affairs officer of the task force commander. This
facility should be used for periodic press briefings and as a central point for giving the press unclassified
information in the form of fact sheets and other background data concerning the operation.
(4) To keep Soldiers informed, plans should include:
(a) Arrangements for preparation and issuance of a daily fact sheet by the public affairs officer of
the force commander.
(b) Arrangements for giving participating units free copies of local and regional newspapers, if
(c) Answer press questions.
(5) Battalion and larger size units in the area of operation must be capable of:
(a) Responding to press questions or providing the public affairs officer of the next higher
headquarters with correct data about the unit.
(b) Providing press escorts.

2. Information Planning.
a. General.
(1) Due to the sensitivity and importance of information collection, analysis, and dissemination; all
personnel engaged in civil disturbance operations must be familiar with and follow the policies of the
Department of the Army.
(2) At the national level, the Department of the Army relies upon the Department of Justice to provide:
(a) Civil disturbance threat information required for support planning throughout the Army for
military civil disturbance needs.
(b) Early warning of civil disturbance situations which may exceed the capabilities for control by
local and state authorities.
(3) Army information resources are not used for the collection of civil disturbance information until the
Department of the Army has made a determination that there is a distinct threat of civil disturbance
beyond the capability of local and state authorities to control. Even after this determination has been
made, the Army does not acquire, report, process, or store civil disturbance information on civilian
individuals or organizations whose activities cannot, in a reasonable manner, be related to the distinct
threat of a civil disturbance which may require the use of federal military forces (in accordance with AR
(4) When the Department of the Army or higher authority directs federal Soldiers to be placed on
standby or be committed to help in restoring order, those troop elements involved are responsible (upon
order) for processing civil disturbance data obtained by liaison personnel.
(5) The production of data, when authorized, is accomplished under the supervision of the intelligence
officer; however, the collection effort required is a coordinated and continuing one on the part of all
concerned. The collection effort must be based on essential elements of data required for sound local
planning and the conduct of operations. The collocation of command posts and the establishment of
joint operation centers make the collection and exchange of information run smoothly. Rapid
distribution or this data is vital to enable a quick and effective response by the task force.
b. Collection.
(1) Military information elements having counterintelligence resources will maintain the ability to
collect civil disturbance threat data during the period in which there is a distinct threat of actual civil
disorder requiring the use of federal military forces.
(2) On activation by the Department of the Army, military intelligence elements having
counterintelligence capability will:
(a) Establish and maintain contact with suitable local, state, and federal authorities.
(b) Collect civil disturbance data concerning incidents, and estimate the capability of civil
authorities to control the situation. This can be achieved through direct contact with civil authorities.
(c) Report collection results to the Department of the Army in accordance with current plans.

(d) Keep appropriate commanders informed.
(e) Provide intelligence support to the Personal Liaison Officer Chief of Staff of the Army.
(f) Recommend methods of overt collection, other than liaison, if required, to the Department of the
Army for approval.
(3) Military intelligence elements may employ methods of collection other than liaison only on order of
the Department of the Army.
(4) Covert agent operations are not used to obtain civil disturbance data on persons or organizations
without specific advance approval of each operation by the Under Secretary of the Army.
(5) Basically, the following vital elements of data will be required for sound planning and operations
once approval has been received:
(a) Objectives of elements which are a distinct threat to cause or are causing civil disturbances.
(b) Times and locations of disturbances.
(c) Cause of disturbances.
(d) Existence of persons, groups, or organizations which have distinctively threatened or are
creating disturbances.
(e) Estimated number of persons who will be or are involved in civil disturbances.
(f) Assembly areas for crowds.
(g) Presence and location of known leaders and persons who are a distinct threat to cause civil
(h) Organization and activities planned by the leaders who are a distinct threat to cause civil
(i) Source, types and locations of arms, equipment, and supplies available to the leaders who are a
distinct threat to cause civil disturbance.
(j) Use of sewers, storm drains, and other underground systems by the elements who are a distinct
threat to cause or are causing civil disturbances.
(k) Identification of new techniques and equipment not previously used by elements that are a
distinct threat to cause civil disturbances.
(l) Attitude of general masses towards:
(a) Groups causing civil disturbances.
(b) Civil law enforcement authorities.
(c) Federal intervention to control the disturbance.

(m) Possible threat to public property including private utilities.
(n) Communications and control methods employed by elements referred to in paragraph 1 above.
PART C - Request for Federal Support/Training
1. Request for Federal Support.
a. Providing military support to state and local governments to assist them in quelling a civil disturbance or
riot requires close coordination through a host of state and federal agencies. It requires a though briefing of
Soldiers at all levels on what they can and cannot do with respect to law enforcement. Civil authorities must
be briefed on the restrictions placed on federal forces by the Constitution of the United States, federal
statutes and laws.
b. Under the Constitution of the United States and United State Codes the President is empowered to direct
federal intervention in civil disturbances to:
(1) Respond to state request for aid in restoring order
(2) Enforce the laws of the United States.
(3) Protect the civil rights of citizens
(4) Protect federal property and functions.
c. The Secretary of Defense retains approval for federal support to civil authorities involving the use of
DOD forces, personnel, and equipment. The Secretary of the Army is the Department of Defense executive
agent is the approval authority for federal emergency support in response to natural or man-made disasters
(except weapons of mass destruction [WMD]). The Directorate of Military Support (DOMS) plans and
executes the DOD domestic support mission to civil authorities. The DOMS is the DOD primary contact
for all federal departments and agencies during DOD involvement in most domestic support operations.
DOMS is also the staff agency responsible to the Chief of Staff, Army and Secretary of the Army for
recommending to them appropriate measures necessary to cope with civil disturbances and terrorism and to
transmit the approved recommendations to Department of Defense agencies for execution and to supervise
the execution. The missions and functions of DOMS are outlined in AR 500-50. Additional roles of
responsibilities of various agencies can be found in FM 3-19.15
Prior to activating federal military forces there is a sequence of steps that must occur. When data begins to
show that a disturbance may develop into a situation that will require the help of federal forces, several
actions are introduced at the federal level while state and local law enforcement agencies attempt to contain
the disorder. Such actions may include increasing the readiness posture of forces named to help the
jurisdiction concerned.
d. As the situation worsens and the state employs its National Guard, the U.S. Attorney General would send
his personal agent to the scene of the disorder. This agent is named as the Senior Civilian Representative of
the Attorney General (SCRAG) and is the organizer of all federal activities in the area of the disorder,
including contact with local civil authorities. At the same time, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army would
send his personal liaison officer (PLOCSA) to the scene along with members of the Department of the
Army Liaison Team (DALT) that serves as his planning staff.

e. At the same time the PLOCSA and DALT are sent, the Chief of Staff might order the task force
commander with his key staff officers and unit commanders to the disturbed area for reconnaissance. These
military personnel would try to blend in by wearing civilian clothing and using rental or police
f. Should the disturbance continue to increase beyond local and state government capabilities, the state
legislature or the governor would send a request to the President for help by federal Soldiers. The Attorney
General of the United States has been named by the President to receive and organize requests from states
for federal military aid.
g. The task force commander and the PLOCSA would report their findings and recommendations to the
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, who in turn passes the data to the Secretary of Defense. The Senior Civilian
Representative from the Attorney General, after consultation with the PLOCSA and the task force
commander, makes his recommendation to the Attorney General. Following consultation with Department
of Defense officials, the Attorney General, as an organizer of all federal civil disturbance activities, makes
the recommendation to the President for using federal forces to help in restoring law and order.
h. Before the President can send federal Soldiers, he must first issue a proclamation prepared by the
Attorney General. The proclamation orders the crowd to leave the scene peaceably within a specified
period of time. At any time during this sequence, the Attorney General may seek informal Presidential
approval to pre-position federal Soldiers in the area of the disturbance. By policy, pre-positioning of less
than a battalion does not require Presidential approval.
i. The President's executive order triggers the employment of the task force; this move is fulfilled in a
minimum amount of time as a result of sound planning and realistic training.
j. With a letter of instruction as guidance, the task force commander will start operations to subdue the
disturbance. The letter of instruction specifies command and control, rules of application of force, policy on
custody and detention of civilians, limitations on searches, and required reports. The commander supports
the local authorities but he does not take orders from them.
k. After federal Soldiers are committed, the Department of the Army transmits to the state governor and
others concerned, messages announcing the federalizing of Army and designated National Guard and Air
National Guard units to active duty. These forces, once federalized, are placed under the command of the
task force commander. Throughout the operation, the task force commander consults with the Senior
Civilian Representative from the Attorney General regarding military operations and decisions, when
feasible. He promptly advises the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, on action taken as a result of the consultations.
The Senior Civilian Representative from the Attorney General, in consultation with the task force
commander, establishes and maintains liaison with civil authorities in the areas of operation and is the
primary coordinator for all federal activities. After the disturbance has been reduced to the point that civil
authorities are again capable of maintaining law and order, the decision to redeploy federal forces is made
with the same care and coordination that took place prior to deployment. The announcement to redeploy
will usually be made by the Secretary of the Army; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, will order federal forces
back to home stations and the National Guard and Air National Guard will be returned to state control.
2. Training.
a. The best made plans are of little value if the men carrying them out are not capable and well-trained.
Therefore, all supervisors must ensure that each person is trained and equipped to handle the various tasks
that he may be required to handle during a civil disturbance control mission. Civil disturbance training must
be incorporated into the annual training program. The training must be intensive, realistic and sustained to

better prepare the Soldiers to perform the civil disturbance mission. A lack of individual training in civil
disturbance operation may result in adverse effect to the point of endangering lives, especially the lives of
b. There are two basic areas of training to be considered in this lesson: individual training and unit/team

Individual Training.
a. Soldiers involved in civil disturbance duty require training to adjust themselves to the noise and
confusion created by large numbers of people facing them. Countless other elements contribute greatly to
anxieties and tensions. Individual Soldiers will be shouted at, insulted, shamed, belittled or called abusive
names. They must learn to ignore these taunts and not allow personal feelings to interfere with the
fulfillment of their mission. Any unauthorized actions taken against the demonstrator, may result in
unfavorable publicity blaming the control force as using brutal tactics. Additionally, Soldiers can expect
objects to be thrown at them, but must learn to avoid these objects; they must never throw objects back.
Soldiers should understand that the well-disciplined fulfillment of orders is the most effective force applied
against troublemakers. They must be instructed in all aspects of self-control so they may be mentally
prepared for participation in civil disturbance operations.
b. Psychological influences.
(1) The action of civil disturbance participants and the general civil disturbance environment combine
to impose strong pressure upon members of the controls force. Just as the crowd may be swept into
violence by such psychological influences as hoping to remain anonymous, the transference of moral
responsibilities, and the release of deep set emotions, reactions of the control force may be improper
because of the effect of such factors on them. Control force personnel must be made aware of these
factors so they do not become victims of their influence. For instance: control force personnel at Kent
State fired at a group of students. As far as can be determined, no one gave the order to fire and no one
knows who fired first, but the actions of one or more persons were certainly imitated by other members
of the control force.
(2) Civil disturbance operations and the emotional involvement and stress they create cause potentially
dangerous situations which can lead to the excessive use of force by control force personnel. You must
learn to expect the actions of civil disturbance participants and to operate in this stress environment.
Above all, you must control your emotions and guard against excessive response and the urge to get
c. Unit Training.
(1) In the development of a unit training program for civil disturbance, many considerations should be
addressed in term of resources that are available. An analysis of the units personnel, of who is trained
and who is not, what Soldiers have real life experience and have graduated from the Non lethal
Individual Weapons Instructor Course (INIWIC), type of equipment that is available, non lethal
capabilities, times and locations to conduct training. Additionally you must look at incorporating the
units SOP in civil disturbance (depending on your theater of operations, CONUS and OCUNUS).
(2) The Unit training program should utilize the seven step approach found in FM 7-0 and 7-1, and be
based on the unit's METL, expected contingencies, prior training and the proficiency of the unit. The
training program should not only cover the items described above but also cover all aspects of civil
disturbance operations and should entail more than developing mechanical skill in crowd control

formations. Training should emphasize protection of fire-fighters, their equipment, residents of the area,
use of non lethal weapons and tactics and other people trying to control the disturbance. Training should
also include techniques of operations in those areas where you are most likely to be used, as well as
procedures for neutralizing special threats.
(3) The purpose of training the units in civil disturbance training is to evaluate their capability to
respond and carry out their assigned mission to quickly and deliberately execute the disturbance control
procedures required to prevent loss of life and property and regain control; of a civil disturbance.
Training should focus on, but is not limited to:
(a) Instructors.
(b) Individual and collective drills.
(c) Leaders.
(d) Equipment.
(e) Weapons.
(f) Munitions.
(g) Live-fire range exercises.
(h) Qualifications and familiarization.
(i) Soldier training exercises (STXs)
(j) Culminating exercises.
(4) Generally speaking, the basic unit training objectives are:
(a) Unit training is designed to develop persons to function as a team. To be effective, this training
must include all members of the unit.
(b) Unit training must cover all aspects of civil disturbance operations. It must include more than
developing mechanical skill in riot control formations.
(c) Rehearsals of alert phases, loading plans, and operations plans should be held as often as deemed
necessary to reach and keep the required degree of skill.
(d) Integrated and concurrent training, stated in the appropriate ARTEPs should be included in unit
training. Additional information on range set up and non-lethal training can be found in FM 319.15.
d. Weapons and Special Equipment. Personnel armed with special equipment must be well trained in its
use. Examples of these special items may include the following: crowd control agent dispersers, non lethal
weapons and munitions, grenade launcher, shotguns, sniper rifles, cameras, portable public address systems,
night illumination devices, firefighting equipment, grappling hooks, ladders, ropes, armored personnel
carriers, and roadblocks/barricades. It is important that every member of the control force be trained in
using his assigned weapon and special equipment.

e. Special Procedures. There are numerous threats, such as sniping and bombing, which may be
encountered during civil disturbance operations, which will require a specialized response to safely and
effectively neutralize them. Experience shows the effectiveness of these countermeasures depends upon
control and precision in execution. These in turn depend upon the quantity and quality of prior planning and
proper training for handling such events.
f. Leadership. The conduct of civil disturbance operations places unusual demands on leadership skills.
Control force supervisors should be made aware of these unusual demands and be prepared to cope with
them. Therefore, training for civil disturbance operations should not be restricted to the Soldier.
Commander and staff, at all levels, must examine their own experiences and degree of skill in these matters,
to determine training required to reach operational readiness.

PART D - Operational Techniques/Application of Force
1. Operational Techniques.
a. General. In assisting civil authorities in the restoration of law and order, military forces will be called
upon to take action in a multitude of situations of varying magnitudes. The application of the principles
discussed in this lesson will contribute in great measure to the successful accomplishment of a civil
disturbance mission.
b. Minimum Force. The commitment of military forces to enforce civil law must be considered as a drastic
last resort, and their involvement must be limited to that degree justified by necessity. In combat situations
Soldiers are taught to fight and eliminate threats. In civil disturbance, Soldiers must deal with
noncombatants that have internationally recognized rights. These rights must be respected while
maintaining public order. The use of force must be restricted to the minimum degree consistent with
mission fulfillment. The use of excessive or unnecessary force may subject the responsible person to civil
or criminal liability and may serve to increase public sympathy for the demonstrators.
(1) The commitment of large numbers of Soldiers in a civil disturbance operation should not be
misunderstood as the application of unnecessary force or the application of more than minimum force.
Early and massive commitment of Soldiers has in the past prevented, in many instances, the worsening
of a low-level civil disturbance into a violent confrontation.
(2) When actually committing forces in a civil disturbance operation, consideration must be given to the
relative merits of deploying forces in maximum number on a "high visibility" or "low visibility" basis.
There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches; however, the determining factor should be
the mood of the riotous element--the approach that is expected to produce the strongest deterrent effect
upon their desire to commit further violence.
c. Operational Considerations. Military forces must be prepared for commitment in a civil disturbance role.
An integral part of this readiness is the preparation of appropriate plans of operation. In developing these
plans, commanders and staff must consider certain basic principles which are considered applicable to the
execution of civil disturbance missions.
(1) Objective Area. The objective of military forces in civil disturbance control operations is the
restoration of law and order within the area of operations. To fulfill this objective, the area of operations
should be filled with well-disciplined, well-equipped, and well-trained Soldiers. Action must be taken

to hold back attempts by rioters to cause injury and damage to persons and property, and all persons
succeeding in such acts of lawlessness apprehended and turned over to civil police.
(2) Positive Action. The successful application of the positive action principle depends to a great extent
on getting correct data. Actions must be directed at defeating the overall purpose of the unruly element.
They must be designed so that the commander is in the position of gaining and exercising the initiative
with an ultimate objective of imposing his will upon the unruly group. Plans must be flexible enough
that advantage can be taken of rapidly changing situations, while recognizing the requirement to be
prepared to meet unexpected developments. When applying this principle, stick strongly to rules of
engagement, standards of conduct, and fair treatment of civilians.
(3) Mass. Proper consideration should be given to the commitment of sufficient forces at the proper
time and place. It is important in this regard, therefore, that forces prevent or subdue successfully and
rapidly any and all acts of disorder and lawlessness. When forces are committed piecemeal and in
inadequate numbers, they may not be able to cope with the situation. If successful in their acts, rioters
will gain confidence and further acts of violence will be pursued, causing the disturbance to worsen.
Vital to the proper application of the principle of mass is the need for good intelligence and close
observation of the crowd and mob behavioral patterns. The most critical areas depend largely on the
local situation and the reasons for the disturbance. In general, however, the business and industrial areas
are most vulnerable to acts of violence.
(4) Economy of Force. This principle should not be considered as in conflict with the principle of mass.
It should, instead, be considered as complementing the principle of mass. Skillful and discreet use of
force will assist the control force to apply both principles with minimum outlay of resources. The key to
applying both of these principles at the same time and successfully is the use of highly mobile, wellequipped reserve forces. Plans should call for the situation of the disturbance area with patrols equipped
with non lethal capabilities to gather information and create the psychological impression of the control
force being everywhere. However, the entire force should never be committed for this purpose. Patrol
forces should be instructed to handle only acts of lawlessness which they are sure they can cope with
and call for help in the more serious disturbances. Reserve forces should be strategically placed
throughout the area and be capable of responding quickly to these calls for help.
(5) Maneuver. Proper maneuver is vital in gaining and maintaining the advantage. In a civil
disturbance operation, the object of maneuver is to employ force in such a manner as to give them the
advantage and thus achieve results which are least costly in men and material. This involves the
selection of patrol areas and the control of critical routes to ensure freedom of movement. It also
involves the choice of key terrain where a crowd may be more easily controlled. Finally, military forces
should be able to move easily to help them reach the scene of any disturbance quickly.
(6) Unity of Command. Unity of command assures unity of effort by the action of all forces toward the
common goal of restoring law and order. While unity of command is best achieved by vesting, a single
commander with the required authority to fulfill tasks that must be done, it is not always possible.
Because of legal sanctions, local, state, and federal forces cannot be united under one commander in
civil disturbance operations. Federal military forces to include the National Guard when federalized will
not fall under the control of any local or state agency. Therefore the establishment of joint operations
centers, and the recognition of each other's capabilities and limitations, will create a positive attitude and
will contribute to unit of effort.
2. Application of Force.
a. General.

(1) Civil disturbance operations by federal forces will not be authorized until the President is advised by
the highest officials of the state that the situation cannot be controlled with nonfederal resources
available. The mission of the control force is to help restore law and order and to help maintain it until
such time as state and local forces can control the situation without federal help. In performing this
mission, the control force may have to actively participate, not only in subduing the disturbance, but also
in helping to detain those responsible for it. Control force commanders are authorized and directed to
provide such active participation, subject to restraints on the use of force.
(2) Prior to committing any federal forces in the quailing of civil disturbance whether in CONUS or
OCONUS commanders should train and continually brief the control force on the rule of engagement
(ROE). The commander is responsible for drafting, interpreting, disseminating, and training the control
force on the ROE. The staff Judge Advocate (SJA) should be included in the ROE development to
ensure that it will not improperly constrain actions, but still will remain consistent with domestic and
international laws, polices, and orders of the chain of command.
(3) If non lethal weapon and munitions are to be utilized, they should be addressed within the ROE and
disseminated to the lowest level, preferable to platoon and squad levels. This requires that all personnel
have a clear understanding of the ROE and the commander's intent.
(4) While serving with a multinational operation under the preview of the United Nations (UN) charter
or customary international law the UN will may mandate certain restrictions on the use of force. By the
use of overwhelming force during a civil disturbance under the UN may compromise diplomatic efforts
to reach a peaceful solution. Commanders must beware that any confrontation of the ROE made by
soldiers can have strategic political implications on current and future operations.
(5) The primary rule which governs the actions of federal forces in helping state and local authorities to
restore law and order is that the control force use only the minimum force required fulfilling the mission.
This chief principle should control both the selection of appropriate operational techniques and the
choice of options for arming the control force. In carrying out this principle, the use of deadly force is
authorized only under extreme circumstances where certain specific standards are met. To emphasize
limitations on use of firepower and to restrict automatic fire, rifles with only a safe or semiautomatic
selection capability or modified to such a capability will be used as a basic weapon for Soldiers in a civil
disturbance area.
(6) By utilizing the scalable effects concept in response to a gathering crowd or demonstration, the use
of force policy must be clearly understood by the soldiers or control force that they may only use the
minimum amount of force to quall the situation without the graduated response, which may cause a
escalation of hostilities or violence. Commanders should consider using the following scalable effects
(a) Try to persuade the crowd to quietly disperse by talking to the leaders of the demonstration.
(b) Use translators as necessary.
(c) Let the first approach to the leaders or demonstrator by the local or state authorities (governor,
mayor or law enforcement personnel).
(d) Pass out handbills requesting that the crowd return home.
(e) Use video tale and still cameras to photograph individuals and events for later use in trails.

(f) Give warning before moving to the next level of force.
(7) All personnel, prior to participation in civil disturbance operations, need to be trained and briefed as
(a) The specific mission of the unit.
(b) Rules of engagement and use of force governing the application of military force as they apply
to the specific situation.
(c) A psychological orientation on the local situation, specifically addressing types of abuse which
military personnel may be expected to receive and the proper response to these types of abuse.
b. Use of Deadly and Non-deadly Force.
(1) Commanders are authorized to use non-deadly force to control the disturbance, to prevent crimes,
and to detain persons who have committed crimes; but the degree of force used must be not greater than
that reasonably necessary under the circumstances. The use of deadly force, in effect, invokes the power
of summary execution and can, therefore, be justified only by extreme circumstances. Accordingly, its
use is not authorized for the purpose of preventing activities which do not pose a significant risk of death
or serious bodily harm. If a mission cannot be accomplished without the use of deadly force, but deadly
force is not permitted under the guidelines authorizing its use, accomplishment of the mission must be
delayed until sufficient non-deadly force can be brought to bear. All the requirements of paragraph (b),
below, must be met in every case in which deadly force is employed.
(2) The use of deadly force is authorized only under conditions of extreme necessity and as a last resort
when all lesser means have failed or cannot be reasonably be employed. Deadly force is justified under
one or more of the following circumstances:
(a) Self- defense and defense of others. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to
protect law enforcement or security personnel who reasonably believe themselves or others to be in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.
(b) Assets involving national security. When deadly force reasonably appears necessary to prevent
the actual theft or sabotage of assets vital to national security. DoD assets shall be specifically
designated as “vital to national security” only when their loss, damage, or compromise would
seriously jeopardize the fulfillment of a national defense mission. Examples include nuclear
weapons; nuclear command, control, and communications facilities; and designated restricted area as
containing strategic operational assets, sensitive codes, or special access programs.
(c) Assets no involving national security but inherently dangerous to others. When deadly force
reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of resources, such as
operable weapons or ammunition, that are inherently dangerous to others; i.e., assets that, in the
hands of an unauthorized individual, present a substantial potential danger of death or serious bodily
harm to others. Examples include high risk portable and lethal missiles, rockets, arms, ammunition,
explosives, chemical agents, and special nuclear material.
(d) Serious offenses against persons. When deadly force reasonably appears necessary to prevent
the commission of a serious offense involving violence and threatening death or serious bodily harm.
Examples include murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault.

(e) Arrest or apprehension. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to arrest,
apprehend, or prevent the escape of a person who, there is probably cause to believe, has committed
an offense of the nature in (2) through (4) above.
(f) Escapes. When deadly force has been specifically authorized by the Heads of the DoD
Components and reasonable appears to be necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner, provided
law enforcement or security personnel have probable cause to believe that the escaping prisoner
poses a threat of serious bodily harm either to security personnel or others.
(3) Every Soldier has the right under the law to use reasonably necessary force to defend himself
against violent and dangerous personal attack. The limitations of this paragraph are not intended to
infringe on this right, but to prevent the unauthorized or random use of other types of deadly force.
(4) In addition, the following policies regarding the use of deadly force will be observed:
(a) Give an order to halt.
(b) Warning shot will not be fired.
(c) When a firearm is discharged it will be fired with the intent of rendering the person(s) at whom it
is discharged incapable of continuing that activity or course of behavior prompting the individual to
(d) Shot will be fired only with due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders.
(e) In the case of holstered weapons, a weapon should not be removed from the holster unless there
is reasonable expectation that use of the weapon may be necessary.
(5) Even when its use is authorized, deadly force must be used only with great selectivity and precision
against the particular threat which justifies its use. For example, the receipt of sniper fire, however
deadly, from an unknown location can never justify "returning the fire" against any or all persons who
may be visible on the street or in nearby buildings. Such random response is far too likely to result in
accidents among innocent bystanders or fellow law enforcement personnel; the appropriate response is
to take cover and try to locate the source of the fire so that the threat can be neutralized.
(6) Task force commanders are authorized to have live ammunition issued to personnel under their
command. The individual Soldier will be instructed, however, that he may not load his weapon except
when authorized by an officer, or provided he is not under the direct control and supervision of an
officer, when the situation would justify the use of deadly force. Keeping control over the loading of
weapons until such time as the need for such action is clearly established is of critical importance in
stopping the unjustified use of deadly force. When possible, command and control arrangements should
be specifically designed to facilitate such careful control of deadly weapons.
(7) The presence of loaded weapons in tense situations may invite the application of deadly force in
response to being annoyed which, while subject to criticism, is not sufficient to justify its use; and
increases the danger that the improper discharge of a weapon by one or more persons will lead others to
a reflex response on the mistaken assumption that an order to fire has been given. Officers should be
clearly instructed, therefore, that they have a personal obligation to withhold permission for loading until
circumstances show a high probability that deadly force will probably be necessary and justified under

the guidelines previously discussed. Strong command must be exercised to assure that the loading of
weapons is not authorized in a routine, premature, or blanket manner.
(8) Positive control over weapons must be exercised at all times. Individual Soldiers will be instructed
that they may not fire their weapons except when authorized by an officer, or provided he is not under
the direct control and supervision of an officer, when circumstances would justify the use of deadly
force. He must not only be thoroughly familiar with the rules for use of deadly force, but he must also
realize that whenever his unit is operating under the immediate control of an officer, that officer will
determine whether the firing of live ammunition is necessary.
c. Command and Control.
(1) The chain of command and areas of responsibility must be clearly defined at all levels. Whenever
practicable, the assigned unit boundaries should coincide with the local police subdivisions to simplify
coordination of activities in the area. Boundaries are usually located in streets or alleys with
coordinating points at street intersections. When a street is named as a boundary, responsibility for both
sides of the street is given to one unit to ensure proper coverage. Arrangement should be made to have
civil police and Soldiers operate together. In addition to the joint action by police and Soldiers in the
streets, arrangements should be made to exchange liaison officers at each headquarters from company
through division on a 24-hour basis. Arrangements should also be made for the collocation of military
and civilian police command elements.
(2) A written copy of special orders must be given to Soldiers upon their arrival on the scene. These
orders, along with the restrictions in effect for the operations, must be understood and complied with by
all Soldiers. The populace must be treated fairly in all cases. Any incident of unnecessary property
damage or bodily harm will create anger which may result in increased acts of violence.
(3) Commanders at all levels should ensure that the Soldiers establish the immediate impression that
they are well-disciplined, well-trained, and fully ready to fulfill their mission. This initial impression
must then be maintained throughout the operation. Appearance is extremely important and the Soldiers
should wear Kevlar helmets, web gear, and carry weapons at all times when outside buildings. Rest
areas should not be located near assigned posts in public view. The psychological impact on the civilian
populace of being faced by an alert, well-disciplined military force effectively deters some potential
rioters and looters. Soldiers assigned to stationary posts and motorized or foot patrols should be relieved
from those duties often since alertness fades quickly in this type of duty.
(4) To ensure that the Soldiers remain alert and observe the orders and instructions in effect, it is
important that commanders at all levels get on the ground with the Soldiers to supervise their activities
and to provide guidance in questionable cases. Having the commander on the ground with Soldiers is
also an important morale factor and strengthens the Soldier's sense of accomplishment.
d. Apprehension.
(1) The apprehension of an individual lawbreaker or groups of violators is a vital function during civil
disturbance operations. Because of the legal considerations involved, civil police should be used to
make the actual apprehension whenever possible. When military forces detain or take a civilian in to
temporary custody, he will be turned over to civil police as soon as possible.
(2) Military personnel should be instructed not to ask questions at the scene. No questions should be
asked of the suspect other than identification inquiries such as name, place of residence, or place of

employment. Questioning pertaining to the incident could create legal complications which might
prevent a subsequent conviction.
(3) Personnel must promptly report to their superiors, follow-up in writing all important data concerning
the detention of civilians, including the names and locations of witnesses. DD 2708, Receipt for Inmate
or Detained Person, may be used for this purpose. Photographs taken at the scene and attached to the
report are very valuable for identification purposes and for later use in court testimony. The report
should be retained at the appropriate headquarters, and used as a basis for preparing a report to the civil
police. Any physical evidence obtained, together with evidence tags and receipts completed as required,
will be delivered with the detained person.
(4) Violators must be treated fairly and impartially. Minimum force necessary should always be a
guiding principle. Consideration must be given to the safety of innocent bystanders, the seriousness of
the incident, and the weapons of the violators. Attitudes and commands are especially important. An
offender may respond to firm statements regarding the disadvantage to him of further action. If the
desired response is obtained, the apprehension or detention should be made using clear and concise
commands with the exercise of due caution and vigilance.
e. Handling and Processing of Detainees.
(1) It is important that military commanders give special consideration to the proper procedures in
handling detainees even though this problem normally is the primary concern of civil authorities. The
large numbers of offenders which may be apprehended or detained in an area of civil disorder poses a
special problem for disturbance control forces. If time permits, prior formal arrangements concerning
details of handling civilians taken into custody should be made; if this cannot be done, arrangements
should be formalized at the earliest possible time.
(2) Detainees should be quickly processed and removed from the scene of the arrest. This procedure
should include a quick search, out of sight of onlookers, if possible. They should then be separated prior
to removal from the area. The separation is based on the amount of custody needed to secure the
detainee, sex, and age. Injured prisoners must be removed to medical facilities. Female personnel must
be provided to search female detainees. It is especially important that names and addresses of witnesses
be recorded by apprehending or detaining personnel.
f. Army Detention Facilities.
(1) The Army will not operate facilities for confinement, custody, or detention of civilian personnel
apprehended for violation of local or state laws as long as civil confinement facilities, operated by the
Department of Justice, state, or local agencies are sufficient to accommodate the number of persons
(2) When it appears that available local facilities are insufficient, due to the large number of persons
apprehended or detained, and this fact can be verified by the person or agency responsible for the
facilities, temporary confinement/detention facilities may be operated with prior approval from DA,
specifically, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. These facilities will be operated only until custody of the
persons detained can be transferred to and assumed by civil authorities. They will not be used for the
confinement of persons charged or convicted under civil jurisdiction.
(3) Temporary confinement/detention facilities can be developed from local federal facilities provided
they are adaptable to the requirements of custody and control. Such facilities should be established, if
possible, within the affected area; this will conserve time, transportation, and escort personnel.

However, if no suitable federal property is available within the affected area, they can be located
elsewhere on any property under federal control as long as the persons to be detained are apprehended in
the affected area. Whenever such temporary facilities are established during civil disturbance control
operations, the Army is responsible for providing those personnel, facilities, and supplies necessary for
the custody, control, health, comfort, and sustenance of persons detained.
(4) Officers and key NCOs specifically trained and experienced in confinement operations are required
to operate such facilities. Guards and support function personnel operating under the direct control of
such officers and NCOs need not be specifically trained or experienced in confinement operations as
long as they are under close and continuing supervision of trained responsible personnel. Whenever
females are detained, they must be held in physically separate detention facilities and under the control
of selected female guards operating under the supervision of trained and experienced confinement
(5) Temporary detention facilities should be constructed and arranged to provide for adequate custody,
control, and safety of detainees. It is advisable to use existing permanent-type buildings. Where
sufficient permanent structures are not available, only that amount of new construction required for
temporary custody, control, and administration of prisoners should be accomplished. Temporary fieldtype facilities provide compartments to assure effective control.
(6) The same operational procedures that apply to the operation of installation confinement facilities
and treatment of detainees apply to these temporary facilities except that those policies and procedures
establishing training, employment, mail and correspondence, and administrative discipline requirements
will not apply. Detailed guidance in procedures for confinement of detainees is contained in EPW
Operations, FM 3-19.40.
g. Special Equipment. Certain items of equipment available to military and civil police forces can do much
to limit injuries to civilian and military personnel and destruction of property. These items increase the
psychological effects of a show of force and offer additional protection and versatility to civil disturbance
forces during the operations.
(1) The 12 gage shotgun is a pup action shotgun currently in the non lethal capabilities set (NLCS)
inventory. The pump action shotgun is chambered to take up to 3-inch shells. The 3-inchchamber
allows for the use of M1012 and M1013 NL munitions. This shotgun also provides a visually distinct
alternative to standard military weapons that may be desired based on mission considerations.
(2) The shotgun, as in the case of other firearms used in civil disturbance operations, is fired only on the
orders of a qualified superior officer when lesser measures of force are not effective, or when the
individual Soldier has no other means of protecting his life.
(3) The M7 is a 66-millimeter vehicle-mounted NL grenade-launching device that is mounted on a
HMMWV. It is a indirect fire support system that can deliver the M99 blunt trauma grenade that creates
a sting-ball effect. The M315 installation kit is used to install an M7 discharger on the turret ring of
appropriate HMMWV variants. An adjustable bracket allows the launch angle to be depressed for
engaging targets at ranges of 50, 75 and 100 meters. The system enforces standoff distances and deters
potential threats.
(4) The M1012 is a single projectile round made of hard rubber that is shaped like a bomblet and
designed to be fired at a single target. With the muzzle velocity of 500 feet per second, the M1012 as
the effective range of no closer that 5 meters and no further that 30 meters. Engagement inside of 5
meters could result in serious bodily injury or death. Beyond 30 meters the kinetic dissipates to the

point where the round becomes ineffective.
(5) The M1013 is a multiple projectile round with .23 caliber hard rubber pellets that is designed to be
fired at and employed with the purpose of affecting multiple targets. With a muzzle velocity of 900 feet
per second, the M1013 has an effective range of no closer than 5 meters and no further that 30 meters.
Engagements of less than 5 meter can result in seriously bodily injury or death. Beyond 30 meters the
kinetic dissipates to the point where the round becomes ineffective
(6) The midsize riot control disperser (M37) is the size of a standard fire extinguisher that uses
compressed air to force the RCA out to a range of 30 feet. It has the capacity to employ 18 burst of
RCA into a hostile crowd while maintaining excellent standoff capabilities. The M37 can be refilled
and is rechargeable. It can be refilled with CR solution (liquid agent) or CS (dry agent). For the purport
of training the M37 can be filled with water and CS can be substituted with talcum power.
(7) The Squad riot control agent disperser (M33A1) is designed to provide crowd control and protection
at the squad level. It is capable of projecting a ballistic stream of RCA's beyond 25 feet in up to 25 halfseconds burst. It consists of a frame and harness assembly, compressed-gas cylinder (agent container
assembly) air pressure assembly, gun and hose assembly, multi-jet spray unit, and check valve assembly.
The M33A1 can be refilled and is rechargeable. For training purposes, CR can be substituted with water
and CS and be substituted with talcum power.
(8) The above mention items are but just a few of the non lethal weapons and munitions available to the
commander and unit to utilize during a response to the civil disturbance, and can be utilized to train and
prepare Soldiers. Additional non lethal weapons and munitions as well as protective gear can be found
in FM 3-19.15.
3. Vehicles. Armored vehicles and transport vehicles add to the readiness of the crowd control force. The use
of these vehicles increases flexibility, reduces troop commitments, and provides protection for personnel. In
considering the use of vehicles, however, it must be remembered that they should be secured by foot elements.
a. Armored Security Vehicles (ASV) can be used in several ways to keep the effects of civil disturbances at
a minimum.
(1) Their use adds a considerable psychological effect to riot control formations while providing added
protection for Soldiers. They provide a readily accessible barrier for Soldiers to crouch behind if
necessary, and excellent protection for those inside.
(2) Their use as mobile command posts offers the added advantages of security, communication, and
(3) They are well adaptable to roadblock operations providing the advantages listed above, while at the
same time providing an excellent barrier.
(4) Their use for patrolling an area of violence adds to the psychological effect, and allows Soldiers to
maneuver in close to snipers in order to make an apprehension.
b. Standard military transport vehicles can be modified with sandbags, armor plating, wire screening, or
similar materials to give some protection against sniper fire and thrown objects. They provide mobility and
communication capability for area coverage. Soldiers should be deployed with ample vehicles to provide
sufficient flexibility to handle all situations in an area of civil disturbance. TOE allowances should
probably be increased for this purpose.

3. Other Equipment. In addition to the special equipment discussed above, certain other items should be available
for use in operations within the disturbance area.
a. Armored vests and protective masks are required for anti-sniping operations and at other times when
violence is expected. Flexibility is an important consideration. For example, the limitation on visibility
must be considered when requiring the use of protective masks, and the limitation on mobility when
wearing the armored vests.
b. Successful conduct of the overall operation may depend on other items. Auxiliary lighting should be
available to include hand-portable lights, vehicular-mounted searchlights, spotlights, flood-lights,
flashlights, flares (with caution toward fires), and vehicle headlights. Prefabricated wood or metal barriers,
or suitable materials, such as wire or ropes, may be used to block off an area; signs should be provided to
supplement these barriers. Evidence equipment, including movie and still cameras with telescopic lenses,
and recording devices should be obtained and placed into position.
c. Other items of equipment should also be provided. Helicopters should be used for observation,
communication relay, illumination, resupply, reserve displacement, and numerous other tasks. Adequate
firefighting and fire protection equipment are vital in civil disturbance.
d. Provisions should be made for appropriate communications equipment for use at the scene and between
the scene and the operations headquarters. Every available means of communications to include public
address systems--both hand-portable and vehicle-mounted--should be used.
PART E - Operational Tasks
1. General. In any civil disturbance operation, certain tasks must be accomplished to reach the ultimate
objective of restoring and maintaining law and order. To do this, action must be taken to gain control of the
situation. Control forces must perform certain tasks that will develop a physical and psychological environment
which will permit law enforcement personnel to enforce the law and maintain order. The importance of having
a high degree of flexibility and selectively in the response cannot be overemphasized. It is just as important that
the tasks selected be completed only after a careful evaluation of the situation. This evaluation must consider
the particular uniqueness of the situation. In this respect, the commander selects those tasks that are most likely
to reduce the intensity of the given situation. Therefore, not all tasks will apply in all situations, but control
force commanders and unit leaders must identify those tasks which must be performed and then develop plans
and procedures for their accomplishment. The operational and integrated tasks listed below are discussed in
detail in the paragraphs and lessons to follow.
a. Operational Tasks.
(1) Isolate the area.
(2) Secure likely targets.
(3) Control crowds or mobs.
(4) Establish area control.
(5) Neutralize special threats.
b. Integrated Tasks.

(1) Gather, record, and report information.
(2) Apprehend violators.
(3) Maintain communications.
(4) Maintain mobile reserves.
(5) Inform the public.
(6) Protect the fire service operations.
(7) Process detained personnel.
2. Isolate the Area.
a. This task includes the restriction and sealing off of the disturbed area. The objectives of sealing off the
disturbed area are to prevent the disorder from spreading to unaffected areas, to prevent escape of persons
bent on expanding the disturbance, to speed up the exit of the uninvolved, and to exclude unauthorized
personnel from entering the affected area. In order to prevent the disturbance from expanding in size and
strength, it is critical to prevent the inflow of extra demonstrators or curious onlookers into the disturbed
b. When military forces are committed to helping the civil authorities in controlling civil disturbances, the
situation will be beyond the capability of local law enforcement agencies and a scene of major disorder
should be expected. This disorder may be characterized by small, dispersed groups which are looting,
burning, and generally causing havoc in the area, or it may be characterized by large groups participating in
varying degrees of illegal conduct. The initial action taken by military forces to control the disorder is
critical and should include the immediate isolation of the disturbed area.
c. The initial commitment of control force personnel may be required to clear a building or an area in order
to isolate the persons creating the disturbance from those not yet motivated or actively involved. The
primary emphasis should be on identifying what area and who has to be isolated.
3. Isolated Techniques. There are several techniques to use when isolating a disturbed area.
a. Barricades and Roadblocks. Barricades and roadblocks are physical barriers which deny or limit entry
into and exit from the disturbed area. They can be used to totally deny passage of people and vehicles or to
permit certain designated categories of persons and vehicles to pass. They must be positioned so as to
prevent their being bypassed, surrounded, or cut off from support. In many cases, it may be impractical to
physically seal an area due to the physical and geographical considerations, such as in the case of a college
campus or a suburban area.
b. Barricades Against Personnel. Civil disturbance operations contingency planning should provide for the
availability of portable barricades which slow down the passage of personnel. Concertina wire is a suitable
material for rapid construction and effectiveness, although wooden sawhorses, ropes, and other field
expedient devices may suffice. Concertina wire should be used sparingly and only under serious
circumstances as it is indicative of violent disorders.

c. Roadblocks Against Vehicles. The erection of effective roadblocks which cannot be easily breached by
vehicles requires large, heavy construction materials. One item that can be stockpiled in advance is 55gallon drums to be filled with water or earth on site. Other materials include sandbags, earthworks, trees, or
heavy vehicles. Several roadblocks placed at intervals of 25 to 50 feet provide sufficient depth to prevent
breaches by heavy or high-speed vehicles.
d. Construction Considerations. The construction of barricades and roadblocks should provide cover from
small arms fire where this threat is likely. Provisions should be for night illumination of approaches to the
position; however, care must be taken not to silhouette the personnel manning it. Construction materials
which would chip or shatter upon impact by thrown objects should be covered with canvas or sandbags to
prevent injuries from flying fragments. Warning signs should be placed in front of the position directing
authorized personnel not to approach the position. One technique of providing a quickly erected barrier is
the use of vehicles parked bumper to bumper; however, this procedure may subject the vehicles to damage
by a hostile crowd. Another device which may be effectively used both as a barricade and a part of a
formation is the use of a locally built frame of wood or metal with wire covering.
e. Perimeter Patrols. Perimeter patrols should be established to prevent entry or exit from the disturbed
area, particularly by persons or groups trying to bypass barricades and roadblocks. These patrols operate
along the outer operational boundary of the disturbed area. Perimeter patrols can be integrated with area
patrol routes within the disturbed area.
f. Pass and Identification Systems. Unit, installation, or municipal contingency planning should include a
pass and identification system providing for the entry and exit of authorized personnel to and from the
isolated area. Procedures should be established for press personnel, emergency medical personnel, public
utility work crews, and for any other personnel who have a legitimate purpose for entering and exiting the
isolated area. Consideration must be given to those persons residing within the disturbed area who must
travel to and from work. An effective pass and identification system requires careful and detailed planning
as a contingency measure.
g. Public Utility Control. Ensure that civil authorities have established a means for controlling public
utilities to include street lights, gas, electric, water, and telephone services so that they may be turned on or
off to support the tactics employed by the control forces.
4. Secure Likely Targets.
a. General. Certain buildings, utilities, and services are critical to the economic and physical well-being of
a community and require security to prevent disruption of essential functions. In addition, certain facilities
and buildings have become symbolic targets to radical or extremist elements and should be identified and
afforded protection with the priorities established. Among the likely targets to be attacked are control force
command posts, billeting areas, and motor parks. Another potential problem in civil disturbance operations
is the threat posed by dissident elements intent on doing bodily harm to control force personnel and civilian
dignitaries in the disturbed area. When such threats exist, military personnel may have to be committed to
security operations. In particular, security must be placed on armories, arsenals, hardware, and sporting
good stores, pawnshops, and gunsmith establishments, or other places where weapons or ammunition are
stored. To conserve manpower, consideration may be given to evacuating sensitive items, such as weapons
from stores and storing them in a central facility. Priorities for physical security must be established to
prevent waste of available forces on less important facilities or those which have their own physical security
forces. The degree of security necessary to protect various buildings and utilities is determined by
considering the following:

(1) The importance of the facility to the overall well-being of the installation or community. Examples
of this consideration include the loss of water or electrical power which would endanger the health of the
community, the destruction of government buildings which would disrupt the functioning of
government, and dissident capture of communications media which would provide a psychological
advantage for further spread of the disorder.
(2) The vulnerability of the facility to acts of violence. Planning should estimate the possible degree of
risk expected during a civil disturbance based on the facility's physical layout, type construction, and
existing protective measures.
(3) The intent and capability of the demonstrators. This consideration is an analysis of the destructive
intent and capability of dissident elements. This includes determining likely targets and the degree of
violence such activity will likely entail.
b. Security Techniques. The techniques for securing likely targets consists of providing physical control,
the procedures for which can be found in FM 19-30, Physical Security. Military forces are ideally
organized and equipped to perform this task; security of government buildings and public utility facilities is
a normal mission for military forces in most types of civil disturbances. This releases civil police to operate
within the disturbed area in their law enforcement capacity. Security techniques used to fulfill this task fall
into two broad categories as discussed below.
(1) Use of Personnel. This category includes employment of sentinels, walking guards, and
checkpoints. Military personnel used in this manner should be committed jointly with existing guard
forces from the protected facility or agency. Consideration should be given to the possibility of
increasing existing guard forces capability with additional equipment. When manning fixed security
posts, guard teams must be of sufficient size to fulfill their mission and protect themselves until help
arrives; however, availability of reserve forces in lieu of stationary guards should be considered in an
effect to conserve guard forces.
(2) Use of Material. This category includes use of perimeter barriers, protective lighting and alarm
systems, and intrusion detection devices. These are designed to deter and detect intruders and/or to slow
down access to a facility by unauthorized personnel. Various measures of this type may or may not be
in effect at the time of the civil disturbance. Military emergency planning should anticipate the
requirement for the quick employment of additional physical security measures.
5. Building/Area Searches.
a. General. The conduct of a building/area search can be a hard and dangerous operation, especially when
searching for a sniper. Whenever possible, searches should be performed by a special reaction team which
has been trained and equipped for such an operation.
b. The command element of the team should establish a central location for coordination of all elements.
Communications should be established and maintained with the force securing the area and with
observation posts.
c. Deployment of Security Element. The security element should be positioned on the immediate perimeter
of the area or building to observe any activity and all exists. The security element should also establish a
preferred route of entry in to the building or area.
d. Preparation for the action element prior to their entry into the area or building should include the

(1) A briefing on the area of building through the use of maps, drawings, and knowledgeable residents.
(2) Equipment and communications checks.
(3) The issuance of an operations order.
e. Commit the Action Element to the Area or Building. When committing the action element to an open
area, crowd control agents should be used to saturate the area prior to entry. The action element should
enter the area on one side of the perimeter established by the cover element and then proceed through the
area towards the other side of the perimeter. When committing the action element to a building, the
following methods of entry can be utilized.
(1) Enter at the top when possible.
(2) If entry at the bottom is necessary, an armored personnel carrier should be used.
f. Whenever a search is conducted, whether of a building or an area, it must be done systemically.
(1) In an open area, the action element should maneuver and search under the protection of cover, firing
only when necessary to protect life and property. Either the security or action element may use crowd
control agents to aid the advance of the action element. The security element on the opposite side should
remain in position as the noose closes. The purpose here is to force the sniper or other dissidents to
withdraw making themselves vulnerable to capture by the security element. The techniques used for
neutralizing dissidents/snipers in an open area will require close coordination and communication
between all elements involved.
(2) In an apparent unoccupied building the military working dog (MWD) should be used whenever
possible. A well-trained MWD with its highly developed sense of smell can pinpoint the location of a
dissident/sniper quickly and with a minimum of risk to members of the search force. When the MWD is
not available, each room should be searched by at least a two-man team. One may throw a crowd
control agent grenade in, wait for it to discharge, then enter quickly and place his back against the
nearest wall. The second person follows and searches the room in detail. If available, a third person
remains in the corridor to ensure that the suspect does not move from room to room while the two others
are conducting their search. The action element leader should be kept informed of the team's progress.
When using riot control agents to help in the clearing of a building, grenades of the non-burning type
should be used to avoid the possibility of fire.
(3) In an occupied building, when the dissident's/sniper's location is unknown, all suspected rooms
must be searched. The action element should try to have occupants submit voluntarily to the search of
their rooms. At the same time, occupants should be questioned in an attempt to pinpoint the sniper's
location. If occupants will not submit voluntarily and there is probable cause to believe that the
dissident/ sniper is located in the room, a complete physical search of the room or rooms should be
conducted. Use of the patrol dog will help in conducting such searches.
(4) In a building occupied or not, where the dissident's/ sniper's location is known, the action element
should proceed directly to the immediate area of that location. If the dissident/sniper refuses to exit
voluntarily, crowd control agent grenades should be thrown or projected into the room from the outside
by the security forces. If this is not practical, the door should be opened or broken down and crowd
control agent grenades thrown into the room. If crowd control agents cannot be used, the patrol dog in

his attack role can again be effectively used in subduing and capturing the dissident/sniper with a
minimum of risk to the search element.
During the course of this lesson you have learned that if your personnel are not trained or adequate plans have
not been made, your control forces cannot be relied upon to react properly. Civil disturbances cannot be
predicted as to the exact time or place they will occur, but, you can assist the commander with the planning
considerations necessary to manage and effectively control these disorders.

Lesson 1 Test
The following questions are multiple choices and/or true/false. You are to select the one that is correct. Show your
choice by CIRCLING the letter beside the correct choice directly up the page. This is a self-graded lesson exercise. Do
not look up the correct answer from the lesson solution sheet until you have finished. To do so will endanger your ability
to learn this material. Also, your final examination score will tend to be lower than if you had not followed this
1. When developing plans for use of Military Forces in a civil Disturbance role, which of the following IS NOT an
operational consideration?

Psychological influences.
Economy of force.

1. A military unit preparing for Civil

Disturbance missions passes through two general phases. These phases are:

Logistical and alert.
Alert and operational.
Planning/training and alert.
Planning/training and operational.

1. When selecting bivouac or billeting for the Soldiers during a civil disorder, which of the following should be

They should be located far away from the disturbed areas to minimize the stress placed on the demonstrators.
Only one route to and from the disturbed area is necessary.
Communications facilities should be restricted to avoid rumors which could be picked up by the media.
Use federal, state, or public property in order to prevent excessive claims for property damages.

1. When involved in individual training, the Soldier should be subjected to:

Excessive crowd noise.
Quiet demonstrators.

1. When military personnel apprehend a suspect during a civil disturbance, any questions should be limited to:
A. Questions pertaining to the incident.
B. Questions about other demonstrators.

C. Questions about future demonstrations.
D. Questions about their identification.
1. For proper development of decentralized control, clearly defined duties should be assigned to the lowest possible
A. True.
B. False.
2. The mission of military forces during civil disturbances, both in CONUS and OCONUS, which cannot be overly
emphasized, is to help local and state authorities to restore and maintain law and order.
A. True.
B. False.
1. Officers and key NCOs specifically trained and experienced in confinement operations are not required to operate
temporary detention facilities.
A. True.
B. False
9. What two items can be utilized with the shotgun?

M7 66-millimeter projectile with M315 installation kit.
M1012 single projectile and M1013 multiple projectile.
M33A1and M37 riot control dispenser.
40 millimeter projectile with M774 installation kit.

10. Who retains the approval for federal support to civil authorities involving the use of DOD forces, personnel and

Director of Military Support
Defense Coordinating Officer
Secretary of Defense
State Coordinating Officer


Correct Answer and Feedback



Psychological influences. (page 1-18)



Planning/training and alert. (page 1-4)



Use federal, state, or public property in order to... (page 1-10)



Excessive noise. (page 1-15)



Make identification inquires. (page 1-24)



True. (page 1-6)



True. (page 1-4)



False. (page 1-25)



M1012 single projectile and M1013 multiple projectile (page 1-25)



The Secretary of Defense. (page 1-14)


In this lesson you will learn to use crowd control techniques and supervise immediate action to be taken upon
contact with an explosive device.

Use crowd control techniques and react to a explosive device.

CONDITION: You will have this subcourse.
STANDARD: To demonstrate competency of this task, you must achieve a score of 70 percent on the
subcourse examination.
REFERENCES: The material contained in this lesson was derived from the following publication: FM 3-19.15;
FM 3-19.10; FM 3-19.4.
Confrontation management operations will require control forces which can effectively confront a variety of
crowds and mobs. Fast, effective crowd control is vital in every type of civil disturbance. Of equal importance
is the maintenance of crowd control once order has been established.
1. Control.
a. Manner of Control. A suitable manner of controlling various types of crowds will be influenced by
many variables. These include:
(1) The current strength level of the civil disturbance.
(2) Public opinion.
(3) Current policies.

(4) Crowd mood, intent, composition, and activity.
(5) Capabilities and readiness of control forces.
(6) Immediate and long-range benefits of control force action.
(7) Weather, terrain, and time of day.
b. Crowd Control Options. In today peace keeping and peace enforcement environment the use of firearms
may not he the viable solution when US military forces are face with separating two belligerent, hostile
ethnic groups or preventing the spread of civil unrest. Crowd control options are often combined.
Consideration of the variables listed above will show the control force commander the general nature of the
most suitable manner of controlling a particular crowd. Four crowd control options are available to the
commander, based on his objective with a particular crowd. These options are available to provide the
commander the flexibility of action. In order to advance this flexibility, there are numerous techniques
available from which the commander may select and employ in various combinations. The commander has
the capability of selectively tailoring his response for whatever crowd situation with which he is confronted.
A prime consideration in selecting an option or options will be the effect of the response on reducing the
strength of the existing situation. The four crowd control options are listed below.
(1) Monitoring. This option consists of watching the crowd's progress and development by control
force teams. Monitoring helps the commander to gauge the crowd's activity and intent in relation to the
larger civil disturbance and possibly to influence the crowd through persuasive means. Monitoring is a
continuous task that will last through out the duration of the demonstration, and can provide the
commander with vital information that would help defuse a situation and prevent it from escalating
beyond what it should have or cause a response to be inadequate based on the situation.
The commander may task observation team to monitor crowd activities to gather information.
They report on the size, location, mood, and developing situations. The observation team can consist of
a marksman, a radio operator, and an observer with binoculars. The team must provide timely
information back to the commander so he may influence the out come of a situations with simple
negations. Monitoring is particularly suitable for large, nonviolent demonstrations where more decisive
action is not possible because of crowd size or where the strength of the situation would increase. This
option is also suitable as a temporary measure pending the arrival of additional control forces.
Techniques for fulfilling this option include passive observation of the crowd and the communication of
interest and intent to leaders.
(2) Disperse. This option consists of action taken to fragment a crowd and is especially applicable to
small crowd situations in a congested urban environment. Its selection should include the consideration
that such dispersion may increase and spread lawlessness rather than reduce it. Therefore, the
commander should establish control over the routes of dispersal, and area or areas into which he plans to
disperse the crowd; provide security for those facilities which might become likely targets for small
groups; and be prepared to follow up the dispersal operation with the apprehension of small groups still
active in the area. Techniques for fulfilling this option would include the proclamation, show of force,
use of crowd control formations, and use of crowd control agents.
(3) Containing. This option consists of restraining a large number of persons within the area that they
are presently occupying, thereby containing any further aggressive activity. This option would be
suitable in a college campus situation, to prevent demonstrations from spreading out to surrounding

communities, and to prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the campus. Containment would
also be the suitable option where the systematic apprehension of crowd members is considered. Crowd
control formations, perimeter patrols, and barriers are effective methods to accomplish containment. In
all instances, caution must be used to avoid "fight-or-flight" syndrome common to people feeling
trapped with no escape.
Armored vehicles, armored security vehicles (ASVs), and up-armored HMMWVs are adaptable to
roadblock operations as they can serve as barriers, as well as protect Soldiers inside and outside the
manning of roadblocks, by giving the Soldiers something to crouch behind if object are thrown.
(4) Blocking. This option consists of the physical denial of a crowd's advance upon a facility or area
which is the potential or actual target of dissident activity. Crowd control formations, principally the
line and barricades, are the most appropriate techniques for this option. Barricades, such as vehicles,
concertina wire, and water-filled barrels can be erected to block or channelize the movement of the
crowd. These devices, when used in combination with Soldiers and other crowd control techniques, are
useful in accomplishing the options of containment or blocking.
c. Techniques for Crowd Control. There are numerous techniques designed to provide the commander
with flexibility of action in accomplishing crowd control. He must select a combination which will
produce the desired results within the framework of the selected crowd control option. The most common
techniques appropriate for military usage are discussed below.
(1) Observation. This consists of deployment of persons or teams to the periphery of a crowd for the
purpose of monitoring its activity. It includes gathering data on crowd size, location, mood, and
reporting on the developing situation. This technique includes posting persons on strategic rooftops and
other high terrain overlooking the crowd. This latter measure provides additional security to control
force personnel should they become committed to other crowd control operations. Such a team may be
composed of an expert marksman, a radio operator, and an observer equipped with binoculars. Care
must be taken to assure that committed control forces are aware of the locations of such teams to prevent
their being mistaken for sniper elements.
(2) Communication of Interest and Intent. In certain situations, effective communication with crowd
and mob leaders and participants may enable the commander to control the situation without resorting to
more severe actions. When planned and organized demonstrations, marches, or rallies within the
disturbed area are announced, the control force commander in coordination with local authorities should
meet with organizers of the activity in order to communicate the interest of the control forces. The
following matters, as appropriate, should be discussed.
(a) Parade or demonstration permits.
(b) Location of demonstration and routes of march.
(c) Time limits for the activity.
(d) Provision of marshals by activity organizers.
(e) Prevention of violence.
(f) Safety of all concerned.
(3) The task force commander and local authorities should also communicate to the activity organizers

their intent to cope with violence, unlawful actions, and violations of restrictions imposed on the
activity. It is intended that, by this communication between activity organizers and control force
personnel, the demonstration, rally, or parade will occur without incident through the mutual
cooperation of all concerned. The intentions of control forces will not be effective if delivered as an
ultimatum. A limited, begrudging dialogue with activity organizers reduces the opportunity for
authorities to learn the plans of the demonstrators. It must be remembered that if this communication is
not effected, the activity organizers might well hold the demonstration in defiance of local authorities,
thereby creating a potential for violence that might not have existed if this technique had been
d. Channelization. Pressure can be brought to bear on the dissident leadership to channel the crowd into an
area which will minimize the disruption when the following requirements are met:
(1) When communications have been established with the dissident leadership.
(2) When the intent and nature of the crowd activity is known.
e. Diversion. When communication exists with the dissident leadership, consideration may be given to
efforts to divert the leadership of the crowd itself from its stated or obvious objective. The diversion should
support the objectives of the control force either by reducing the strength of the crowd situation or
motivating the crowd to seek an area more easily controlled by the control force.
f. Cooperation. Decreasing the potential disruption of the crowd activity may be accomplished by an active
attempt on the part of the control force to obtain cooperation of the dissident leadership. Whenever there is
an attempt by the crowd leadership to seek permission and cooperation of the local government, every effort
should be made to maximize this cooperation by demonstrating an attitude of facilitation. This may be
accomplished by helping the leadership to organize a peaceful demonstration while establishing guidelines
which will minimize the impact of the demonstration on the community.
g. Selection of Force Options.
(1) The commitment of federal military forces must be viewed as a drastic last resort. Their role,
therefore, should never be greater than is absolutely necessary under the particular circumstances which
exist. This does not mean, however, that the number of Soldiers used should be minimized. The degree
of force required to control a disorder is often inversely proportionate to the number of available
personnel. Doubts concerning the number of Soldiers required should normally be resolved in favor of
large numbers since the presence of such large numbers may prevent the development of situations in
which the use of deadly force is necessary. A large reserve of Soldiers should be maintained during
civil disturbance operations. The knowledge that a large reserve force is available builds morale among
military and law enforcement personnel and helps to prevent overreaction to annoying acts by unruly
(2) In selecting an operational approach to a civil disturbance situation, the commander and his staff
must follow the "minimum necessary force" principle; for example, crowd control formations or crowd
control agents should not be used if the area filled with manpower would be sufficient.
(3) Every effort should be made to avoid appearing as an alien invading force and to present the image
of a restrained and well-disciplined force whose sole purpose is to help to restore law and order with a
minimum loss of life and property and due respect for those citizens whose involvement may be purely
accidental. Further, while crowd control personnel should be visible, tactical, or force concentrations
which might tend to excite rather than to calm should be avoided where possible.

(4) The normal reflex action of the well-trained combat Soldier to sniper fire is to respond with all
firepower available. In a civil disturbance, this tactic endangers innocent people more than snipers. The
preferred tactic is to allow a special reaction team (SRT) who is trained for this type of mission, to enter
the building from which sniper fire starts. Keeping with the controlling principle that the team must use
only the minimum force necessary to fulfill the mission, the commander may select any one of the
following options for arming his Soldiers:
(a) Riot Shield. In the hands of a well trained soldier, the riot shield can be utilized as both a
defensive and offensive weapon when contact is made with an aggressive crowd. The primary use
of the riot shield is for defense of the line. However, each riot shield holder must be proficient in
its retention. The Soldier holding the shield must be trained to react when a demonstrator grabs the
top of the shield by slapping with his strong hand and gives the following command" Get back",
"Get away" "Stop". If a rioter grabs the bottom of the shield the Soldier should be trained in
forcefully dropping to one knee and pinning the rioters' fingers to the ground.
(b) Baton. The baton is most effective in a crowd control operation and is considered the primary
weapon for crowd control operations. The baton is considered to be an offensive weapon with
reduced lethality and unlike the rifle, the loss of a baton to the crowd does not create a serious
threat. Soldier must be trained with the riot baton to the point its various techniques are automatic
to them. This training must also include the vulnerable points on the body so they can avoid areas
that may cause permanent injury or death when struck.
Currently there are two types of riot batons, wooden and expandable. The most common one is the 36 inch
hickory riot baton with thong. There is also the 24-inch to 36 inch expandable riot baton, which has been added
to the nonlethal capabilities set. Each Solder within the control force need to be proficiently trained in all
techniques for blocking and striking. Improper use of the riot baton by an untrained Soldier has the potential
for creating a greater problem than what already exist.
(c) Shotgun. The 12 gage shotgun is a pump action shotgun currently in the nonlethal capabilities
set (NLCS) inventory. The pump action shotgun is chambered to take up to 3-inch shells. The 3inch chamber allows for the use of M1012 and M1013 NL munitions. This shotgun also provides a
visually distinct alternative to the standard military issues weapon.
(d) Rifle. The rifle, if capable of automatic fire, must be modified to prevent automatic operation.
Keeping with the controlling principle of using only the minimum force necessary to fulfill the
mission. If the Soldier are equipped with their long weapons and are in the front lines of the
formation, the weapon should be carried across their back from left to right with the muzzle of the
weapon pointed down and the butt of the weapon pointed up. The weapon should be cleared and
the magazine in the proper ammunition pouch.
(e) Non lethal weapons and munitions. Nonlethal weapons and munitions are an additional asset
afforded to the commander in civil disturbance and are preferred over lethal force. The showing of
force with nonlethal weapons and munitions may assist in crowd dispersing, separate, or leave the
area with minimal causalities. This nonlethal capability set (NLCS) is a well-rounded, versatile
package of both equipment and munitions. NLCS are dived into four distinct categories: personnel
protection, personnel effectors, mission enhancers and training devices
(f) While each of the above options represents an escalation in the level of force, they are not
sequential in the sense that a commander must initially select the first option, or proceed from one
to another in any particular order. So long as the option selected is appropriate, considering the

existing threat, the minimum necessary force principle is not violated.
1. The rifle and rifle with bayonet attached have extremely limited offensive use as both may
constitute deadly force. The primary value of the rifle or the rifle with bayonet attached is the
psychological impact on the crowd. While the use of fixed bayonets can add considerably to
this effect, the danger of intentional or accidental injury to demonstrators or fellow control
force personnel prevents such use except with extremely violent crowds.
2. Fire by selected marksmen. Fire by selected marksmen may be necessary under certain
circumstances. Marksmen should be pre-selected, trained, and thoroughly instructed. They
may be placed on vehicles, in buildings, or elsewhere as required.
3. Full firepower. The most severe measure of force that can be applied by Soldiers is that of
available unit firepower with the intent of producing extensive casualties. This extreme
measure would be used as a last resort only after all other measures have failed or obviously
would be impractical, and the consequence of failure to completely subdue the crowd would be
an imminent overthrow of the government, continued mass casualties, or similar grievous
4. Shotgun. The riot shotgun is an extremely versatile weapon; its appearance
and capability also produce a strong psychological effect on rioters. It is particularly suited to
certain applications in civil disturbance operations. When used with No. 00 buckshot
ammunition, it is an excellent point target weapon extremely effective at limited range. By
varying the nonlethal munitions' M1012 and M1013 the weapon can be employed with
considerably less possibility of serious injury or death. This provides the commander with a
desirable flexibility in selecting the ammunition most appropriate under the existing conditions
(g) The measures described in paragraphs 1 through 5 below, may be applied in any
order as deemed suitable by the responsible commander as long as his application is consonant with
prescribed confrontation management techniques outlined earlier.
(1) Proclamation. A public announcement is considered an excellent medium to make known to a
crowd the intentions of the control force commander. In some cases, such an announcement makes
further action unnecessary. An announcement puts the population on notice that the situation
demands extraordinary military measures, prepares the people to accept military presence, tends to
inspire respect from lawless elements and supports law-abiding elements, gives psychological aid
to the military forces trying to restore order, and shows to all concerned the gravity with which the
situation is viewed. In making a proclamation, a commander may consider imposing a time limit.
However, the situation may change, and not imposing a time limit may leave the commander other
options as he sees fit, as long as the proclamation is specific in its instruction.
(2) Show of Force. A show of force is effective in various situations in civil disorder control
operations. A show of force may as simple as Soldier dismounting from buses or trucks in plan
sight of the demonstrators, but must be far enough away to prevent a provoked attack of thrown
objects. When a crowd has gathered in a large area, show of force can take the form of marching a
well-equipped, highly disciplined control force into their midst. When persons are scattered
throughout the disturbance area in small groups, a show of force may take the form of motor
marches of Soldiers throughout the area, saturation patrolling, and the manning of static posts or
similar measures.
(3) Employment of Crowd Control Formations. Crowd control formations are used to contain,

disperse, block or break up a non conforming crowd; these crowd control formations are more
effective in urban areas than they are in open fields or parks. When this method is utilized in urban
areas, it is easy to disperse or split the crowd into small groups, isolate instigators, or funnel a
crowd into a desired area. The use of such formations is part of the show of force and has a strong
psychological effect on any crowd.
(4) Employment of Water. Water from a high pressure hose may be effective in moving small
groups on a narrow front such as a street or in defending a barricade or roadblock. Personnel
applying water should be protected by riflemen and in some cases by shields. In the use of water,
the factors discuss below should be considered.
(a) Water may be used as a flat trajectory weapon utilizing pressure, or as a high trajectory
weapon using water as a rainfall. The latter is highly effective during cold weather.
(b) The use of a large water tank (750 to 1,000 gallons) and a power water pump mounted on a
truck with a high pressure hose and nozzle capable of searching and traversing will enable
Soldiers to use water as they advance. By having at least two such water trucks, one can be
held in reserve for use when required.
(c) In using water, as with other measures of force, certain restraints must be applied. Using
water on innocent bystanders, such as women and children, should be avoided; ways to escape
must be provided; and the more severe use, flat trajectory application, should be used only
when absolutely necessary.
(d) Fire departments are normally associated with lifesaving practices rather than maintenance
of law and order. In order to maintain this image, fire department equipment will not be used
for riot control and crowd dispersal.
(e) Use of Crowd Control Agents. Crowd control agents are extremely useful in civil disorder
control operations because they offer a humane and effective method of reducing resistance and
lessen requirements for the application of more severe measures of force. Task force
commanders are authorized to delegate the authority to use crowd control agents and other
forms of non lethal force at their discretion.
2. Establish Area Control.
a. General. Acts of violence, such as looting, arson, and vandalism, are greatly reduced when the physical
and psychological influence of lawlessness is defeated. In establishing effective area control, commanders
must recognize the problem of widespread looting and arson that has accompanied most large urban
disorders. Performance of this task consists of reducing or eliminating those conditions which contribute to
the outbreak or continuation of lawlessness in the disturbed area.
(1) Looting. When dealing with persons involved in looting, extreme care and adherence to the
principle of minimum force must be observed. Looting may start at any time or place as an isolated
incident and spread quickly throughout the affected areas. Looting is not limited to any particular sex or
age group; it includes the very old, the very young, women, and children. For example, many children
may be looting without any idea of how serious their actions are. In the control of looting, unit leaders
must recognize that deadly force is not authorized.
(2) Anti-looting. Unit commanders must be familiar with anti-looting measures which can be taken by
civil authorities, such as boarding up broken or unbroken windows, covering windows with photo-

luminescent particles, and by the prompt posting of looting penalty proclamations. Anti-looting actions
that can be taken by military forces include the establishment of foot and motor patrols, the posting of
fixed guard posts, and the lighting of likely areas for looting. Guards at fixed posts will be briefed not to
leave their posts to pursue individual looters on foot, but to remain on post and prevent looters from
approaching their areas of responsibility. All guards must be briefed that looters will not be fired upon
nor will deadly force be used to catch looters.
(3) Protected or Sensitive Commercial Establishments. A main consideration in the conduct of civil
disturbance operations is to prevent liquor, drugs, weapons, and ammunition from falling into the hands
of rioters. Therefore, liquor stores, drug stores, sporting good shops, pawn shops, and hardware stores
are main targets for looters and must be kept under close observation by means of foot and motorized
patrols. Normally, businesses of this type must be identified in advance and included in emergency
(4) Arson. Arson is generally defined as a crime of purposely setting fire to a building or property.
Acts of setting fire to buildings, property, etc., often follow disturbances. Certain situations may arise in
controlling arson where the use of deadly force is authorized and necessary.
b. Area Control Techniques. The techniques (see figure 2-1) most suited to the task of area control include
the following:
(1) Saturation Patrolling. Alert, aggressive patrolling deters the assembly of crowds, provides data on
the developing situation, and creates a psychological impression that the control force is everywhere.
Patrols are particularly valuable in preventing overt arson and for prompt reporting of fires and other
violence. Whenever possible, patrols should be used with existing civil police patrols to concentrate
forces and provide for a military/civilian communication capability. This gives the Soldiers the
advantage of early area familiarity and provides civil police aid to the military patrol members. Patrol
routes for mounted and dismounted patrols should be varied, both as to patterns and times, to prevent
snipers, arsonists, and looters from being able to select a safe time to conduct their activities. Patrol
members must stick to proper standards of conduct and fair treatment of civilians at all times; they must
realize that they are performing an important community relations function as well as a control function.
Depending upon the nature and location of the civil disorder, several types of patrols can be used
(a) Motor Patrols. Because of their speed and mobility, motor patrols are able to provide the
commander with timely ground reconnaissance, provide extended enforcement coverage, and respond
to calls for aid from other patrols and guard posts. Radio communication should be maintained with
the control force headquarters. Motor patrols may be used to make periodic contacts with foot patrols
and stationary posts which may lack communication means. All motor patrols should be equipped
with fire extinguishers with which they may put out small fires, thereby preventing larger fires and
reducing the necessity for calling the fire department. The vehicle should be modified with sandbags,
wire screens, or similar materials to protect against sniper fire or thrown objects. Motorized patrols
should consist of three vehicles with three personnel per vehicle.

(b) Foot Patrols. Depending upon the degree of violence and extent of activity in the patrolled area,
foot patrols may range from two- to four- or six-man elements or squad-size units. Foot patrols are
more useful in areas where the population movement is heavy and/or the area to be patrolled is small.
Foot patrols must be able to protect themselves and control a limited number of disorderly persons.
(c) Air Patrols. Air patrols can perform reconnaissance and surveillance missions over the disturbed
area. They are an excellent means of providing timely data on the actions of dissidents, extent of
damage, status of access routes, location and condition of road barriers, and other important data.
They can help the commander in the direction of the overall control effort within the disturbed area.
(d) Water Patrols. Water patrols can be used where the disturbed area contains or is bordered by
navigable water. Water patrols function in a similar manner to motor patrols.
(2) Imposed Restrictions. Except in the unlikely event of martial law, federal military forces will not
have the authority to impose restrictions such as a curfew on the civilian population. Certain
restrictions, however, may be imposed by civilian authorities to help in the control of lawlessness.
Military leaders should be prepared to recommend which restrictions are of substantial value in
comparison with the burden of enforcement. The most commonly used restrictions include:
Curfew. The curfew is a control measure which has proved highly effective in many civil disturbances. Its
purpose is to restrict the unauthorized movement of personnel on streets and public places during specified
periods of time, especially during the hours of darkness. Joint planning with civil authorities regarding the
imposition of a curfew should provide for:
(a) Coordination of the initiation, enforcement, and termination of a curfew.
(b) Public announcements of the beginning and ending of curfews. Civilian authorities make these
announcements through local mass media, pamphlets, and public address systems to ensure
maximum exposure.
(c) Curfew exemptions and guidance on who should receive them, including written authorization
or passes.
(d) Provision for the apprehension and disposition of curfew violators.
(3) Sales Restrictions. Restrictions on the sale, transfer, and possession of sensitive material such as
gasoline, firearms, ammunition, and explosives will help control forces in minimizing certain forms of
violence. Limiting the availability of weapons to the potential sniper or terrorist may reduce the
likelihood of such violence. The effective enforcement of these restrictions, however, requires extensive
planning and the commitment of adequate manpower to this effort.
PART B - Neutralization of Special Threats
1. General. Lessons learned from past civil disturbances show that control forces will be frequently exposed to
special threats which pose grave danger to both the control force and to the general community. Special threats
include such acts as bombing and sniping. Three general steps are required to neutralize all special threats.
a. Take immediate action. The first concern is the person or the control force unit or team encountering a
special threat, such as sniping, is personal safety and safety of others in immediate danger. Individual
soldiers and control force leaders should be trained and rehearsed on the immediate action to be taken upon

encountering sniping, a bomb threat, or an explosive device. The immediate action step specifically avoids
hastily attempted, disorganized, responses that will likely further danger the control force and the public.
b. Secure the area. Before the identified threat can be effectively neutralized, the danger area must be
secured. The control force unit or team on the scene or reinforcements should be used to isolate the area to
stop the escape of perpetrators and to prevent the influx of unauthorized personnel from the control force
and from the general public. In addition, the entire area may have to be cleared of persons endangered by
the threat. In the case of sniping, if evacuation of personnel from the danger area is not possible, warnings
to seek cover should be issued using public address communications.
c. Employ special teams. Poorly trained and equipped control force personnel should not try to destroy a
threat. Operations requiring the removal of a sniper from a barricaded position or the removal of an
explosive device should be performed by selected teams of specially trained, specially equipped personnel.
Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units should be used to destroy explosive devices.
2. Bombs. During civil disturbances, control forces should be trained to recognize fire bombs, pipe bombs, and
other devices. They should also be trained and rehearsed in the immediate action necessary when discovering
an explosive device. The actual destruction of the bomb should be accomplished by the EOD unit or civil
police bomb unit. Two specific steps (See Figure 2-2) are required when an explosive device is found:
Take Cover

a. Immediate Action. The individual soldier or control force unit or team that discovers an explosive device
(1) Take Cover. All personnel should immediately leave the area and seek cover wherever possible.
(2) Warn. Notify all personnel to clear the area.
(3) Report. Inform the appropriate personnel of the situation so that aid can be sent to the scene.
b. Secure the Area. After the individual soldier or control force unit or team has taken the immediate
action, steps should be taken to secure the area. If the control force unit or team is capable, they may be
used to secure the area. The senior member of the element responsible for securing the area should consider
the following:
(1) Isolate. Establish roadblocks or checkpoints as necessary to keep unauthorized personnel out of the

(2) Evacuate. Ensure that all personnel are out of the danger area.
(3) Alert. Notify fire, local police bomb squad, (if not available notify the military EOD), and medical
personnel and direct them to a staging area for quick deployment.
(4) Control Utilities. The close down of all gas, electric, and water service to the affected area should
be accomplished by qualified personnel familiar with the utilities and the area.
c. After the area has been secured, the EOD unit or civil police bomb unit should be escorted to the location
of the device. The actual destruction and disposal of the explosive device should be accomplished by an
EOD unit or civil police bomb unit.
d. Bomb Threats. Bomb threats may increase during civil disturbances or during other times of tensions
and crises. Frequently, warning calls or notice have been given when an explosive device has been actually
planted to avoid loss of innocent lives. However, on occasion, cranks, deranged persons, or disgruntled
employee may make threats or give fake notice following an actual explosion to cause activity or business
to stop by forcing evacuation. If a prank call is successful in causing evacuation, more threats will follow.
Safety must always be resolved in favor of evacuation. Most bomb threats are received by telephone
operators in industry and educational facilities. It might also be expected that bomb threats will be received
at rumor centers, police headquarters, and joint operational facilities during civil disorders. If possible, each
facility should be provided with a telephone tracing capability. Telephone switchboard operators and others
likely to receive bomb threats should be trained to accomplish the following:
e. Activate the telephone tracer system.
f. The person receiving the phone call may be the only person to have a conversation with the person who
has knowledge of the explosive device. Therefore it is extremely important that the receiver of the call
records or writes down the conversation word for work so that no important information is forgotten or
missed. By writing down the exact wording or electronically recording the conversation, and utilizing FBI
Form 6-136 (Bomb Threat Checklist) the person receiving the call can ask specific questions from the caller
such as:
(1) Bomb location.
(2) Time of explosion.
(3) What will cause the bomb to explode?
(4) Type of device, to include physical description.
(5) Sex, approximate age, and attitude of caller.
(6) Strange speech, accent, etc.
(7) Distinguishing sounds or background noises coming from the caller's location.
(8) Reason for the bomb placement.
NOTE: See Figures 2-3 for front and back of the FBI Bomb Data Sheet.

g. Inform the appropriate personnel of the threat (EOD or local police bomb unit).
h. Actions Upon Receipt of Bomb Threat. Upon receipt of a bomb threat, the responsible commander
should accomplish the following:
(1) Alert. Notify the necessary control force elements, civil law enforcement or military police, fire and
medical service personnel, utilities personnel (water, gas, and electricity), and civil police bomb squads
or military EOD units and direct them to report to a staging area near the threatened facility.
(2) Isolate. Establish roadblocks or checkpoints as necessary to keep unauthorized personnel out of the
area. Isolation should take place at a safe distance from the area to prevent danger from an explosion.
(3) Evacuate. The senior occupant of the building makes the decision to evacuate. Control forces may
only make a recommendation to evacuate. If the decision is made to leave, it should be done in an
orderly fashion using a bomb evacuating plan, a fire plan, or appropriate announcements and directions
to building occupants. Such a plan should name a building or area which provides shelter from the
elements. Care must be taken not to create panic. Before leaving the building, occupants should check
their immediate locations for any unusual or out-of-place objects or packages. Employees should be
advised to take their briefcases, overcoats, and like items with them as they leave.
(4) Organize Search Elements. Selected occupants of the building (familiar with its layout) and control
force personnel should be organized into search elements. They should not be equipped with hand held
radios, instead if they need to communicate with each other or personnel outside the danger area, they
should utilize on the of the following methods:
(a) Voice.
(b) Runners.
(c) Whistles.
(d) Field phones.
(e) Hand signals (if one point is visible by all)
(5) There are two types of searches that can be conducted, a supervisor search or a search team search.
(a) Supervisors Search: A supervisor search can be conducted by the supervisor and a few
volunteers that are familiar with the overall layout of the building and can be conducted without the
building being evacuated, by utilizing a quick–pace method to look for suspicious items. This
search can be useful only if the areas are well organized and not cluttered.
(b) Search Team Search: A search team search requires that the building be evacuated until after
the search has been completed. The team should consist of two personnel who volunteer and are
assigned to familiar with the area they are searching. It must be stressed that they know if an object

is supposed to be there or not. For this reason, law enforcement and EOD should not conduct the
initial search of the building.
(6) Searches should be made of public access areas such as utility areas, hallways, administrative areas,
mess areas, outside of buildings, shipping or loading areas, vehicles parked near the facility, supply
rooms, under stairwells, and accessible closets and storage areas. Suspicious objects or packages found
during the search should be reported. They should not be handled. Even when a bomb is located, the
search should continue since there may have been more than one bomb.
i. Whenever the bomb itself or a suspicious object or package is found, the EOD or civil police unit should
be notified and used to destroy the bomb or suspect package. Further guidance in this subject area will be
found in FM 19-10.
j. Arson is not usually the first of the special threats to happen. Arson itself is reasonably easy to handle
in that fires can be seen and their size is readily definable. The following measures will help the control
force in stopping arson, arresting arsonists, and limiting the damage resulting from both acts of arson and
accidental fires.
(1) Preventive measures include convincing local members of the importance of security. This consists
of selling them on the importance of creating a security atmosphere through the installation of lighting,
alarms, gates, and other measures. Once a disorder has started, increased surveillance, through
saturation patrolling, and stationary guard posts, and isolation of the affected area by the use of
barricades and roadblocks will help in controlling arson. Patrols are especially effective in preventing
overt arson, in giving notification of the location of fires and conducting spot checks of persons acting
in a suspicious manner or searching for materials and devices used to set fires. Roadblocks and
barricades reduce the movement of persons in the affected area and also provide an opportunity for
searches of suspicious persons for materials and devices needed for arson. Control force commanders
may find it helpful to develop lists of known and suspected arsonists from the files of civil law
enforcement agencies and distribute this data to all control force personnel. Consideration should be
given to forming specially trained teams or arson experts such as specialists from police, fire and
insurance agencies to investigate promptly all acts of suspected arson and attempted arson and to help
control forces at the scene of arson incidents.

(2) The use of deadly force may be required to prevent acts of arson which would cause loss of human
life or destruction of facilities vital to public safety. However, only the minimum necessary force should
be used, and commanders are required to carefully weigh all alternatives and ensure that all other means
have been expended or are not feasible prior to authorizing the use of deadly force.
(3) Some general methods for controlling the use of accelerants as starting devices for fires are as
(a) Solicit active cooperation of vendors of various types of flammable liquids.

(b) Provide police protection to stations selling fuel in the disturbed area.
(c) Limit sale of gas in portable containers to 5 gallons.
(d) Protect gasoline supply in service stations abandoned because of civil disorders.
(e) Station auxiliary police in unattended fire stations.


3. Snipers.
a. Counter-sniping.
(1) Soldiers committed to civil disturbance control operations must be well-trained and rehearsed in the
quick action that must be taken to stop sniper fire. Actual termination of the sniper should be
accomplished by a special reaction team. The success of this team would depend upon the quantity and
quality of prior planning and the proper preparation for handling such incidents. (See Figure 2-5)
(2) Immediate Action. The individual soldier or control force unit or team that encounters sniper fire
should accomplish the following:
(a) Take Cover. All exposed personnel should immediately seek cover whenever possible.
(b) Warn. Notify all bystanders to clear the area or seek cover.
(c) Identify. Ensure that sniper fire has, in fact, been encountered. Automobile backfires,
firecrackers, light flashes, accidental weapon discharges, random firing by control forces, or distance
sounds of firing may all be misidentified as sniper fire at your position.
(d) Report. After verifying the sniper fire, inform the appropriate personnel of the situation so that
help can be sent to the scene if required.
(e) Locate. Try to fix the exact position of the suspected sniper or snipers. Inform the special
reaction team leader of the sniper's location.
(f) Do not, during any of the immediate action steps, return the fire unless a positively identified
target is available and the requirements for the use of force can be met. If firing is necessary, it is
accomplished by a selected marksman acting on orders from an officer or the senior person present..

The military leader must make every effort to prevent a disorganized mass return of fire that will
likely endanger innocent persons. When crowd control formations are being used, the threat of
sniper fire increases. Members of the control force should be aware, however, that persons in the
crowd may try to disrupt the formation by the use of loud noises, such as fireworks or bursting paper
bags. Members of the control force should be alert to such tactics to prevent disruptions during
attempts to maintain order.
b. Securing the Area. After the individual soldier or control force unit or team has taken immediate action,
steps should be under-taken to secure the area. In most situations, however, it will be necessary to commit
reserves or other control force elements. Regardless of what forces are used, the senior member of the
element responsible for securing the area should accomplish the following:
(1) Isolate. Notify all control force units not committed to the termination of the sniper to stay clear of
the danger area. Establish roadblocks or checkpoints to keep unauthorized personnel out of the area to
block the escape routes of the sniper. Isolation should take place far enough away from the danger area to
prevent exposure to sniper fire.
(2) Evacuate.
(a) When meeting a sniper in a lightly populated area or building, make an announcement advising
residents to clear the area or building using a specific exit. Those personnel exiting the building or
area should be screened and identified since the sniper may well be one of them. Witnesses and those
suspected of involvement with the sniper should be detained. Some residents may be unwilling,
unable, or afraid to leave the area or building. A second announcement should also be made advising
the remaining residents to seek cover, remain still, and stay away from exposed areas and windows.
(b) When meeting a sniper in a heavily populated area or building where evacuation is impractical,
make an announcement to warn all residents to seek cover, remain still, and stay away from exposed
areas and windows.
(c) Observe. Establish observation posts on rooftops and in windows or adjacent high buildings.
Communications should be provided to the observers. A selected marksman, under appropriate
orders, may also be used with the observation posts.
(d) Support. Be prepared to provide necessary support to the special reaction unit. Such support may
1. Establishment of a staging area for emergency and support equipment as well as for the team.
2. Establishment of a command and communications center for the coordinated control of the
3. Control of crowds.
(3) Employment of the Special Reaction Team. The actual search for and apprehension of a sniper is a
difficult and dangerous operation. It should be performed by a special reaction unit which has been
trained and equipped for such operations. The procedures outlined in this paragraph are suitable for the
team or for other control force elements assigned to terminate sniping when a team is unavailable.
(4) Establishment of a Command Post. The command element of the team should establish a central
location for the coordination of all elements. Communications should be set up and maintained with the

force securing the area and with observation posts. In addition, continuous communications between the
action and security elements must be maintained once they are deployed so that the progress of the search
team can be monitored and so that the cover team does not mistake persons in the search team for the
(5) Deploy the Security Element. In order to observe sniper actions and all exits, the security element
should be positioned outside the immediate area. In addition, the security element should establish a
preferred route of entry into the area or building for use by the action element. The security element's
selected marksman should be positioned at a location giving him the best possible observation and field
of fire. If necessary, the selected marksman may fire at the sniper or snipers when they can be positively
identified as snipers, when they are continuing fire, and when the requirements of the use of deadly force
are met. This fire should be accomplished only by the selected marksman under the guidance and orders
of the commander.
(6) Prepare the Action Element for Entry Into the Area or Building. Preparation should include:
(a) A briefing on the area or building through the use of maps, drawings, and knowledgeable
(b) Equipment and communications checks.
(c) The issuance of an operations order.
(7) Prepare and Issue Warnings and Instructions to the Sniper. The sniper should be given enough time
to surrender.
(8) Attempt to Force the Sniper Into the Open. In open terrain or when meeting a sniper in a small
unoccupied building, use crowd control agents in an attempt to force the sniper into the open where he
can be taken into custody with less risk. Before using crowd control agents directly into the sniper's
location, saturate the areas and rooms adjacent to the sniper. This will prevent him from using unaffected
(9) If the sniper cannot be forced out, commit the action element to the area or building.
(a) When committing the action element to an open area, crowd control agents should be used to
saturate the area prior to entry. The action element should enter the area on one side of the perimeter
established by the cover element and then proceed through the area toward the other side of the
(b) When committing the action element to a building, the following methods of entry can be used:
1. Entry at the top. Whenever possible, buildings are entered and searched from the top down.
A sniper who is forced to the top may be cornered and fight desperately or escape over rooftops;
one who is forced down to the ground level may try to withdraw from the building, leaving
himself open to capture by the security element. Various means may be used to gain entry such
as ladders, drainpipes, vines, toggle ropes, grappling hooks, roofs of adjoining buildings, or
public utility vehicles designed for work on tall structures. Helicopters may also be used to
deploy the action element on top of buildings.
2. Entry on middle floor. Sometimes it is impossible to enter a building at the top. In these
instances, entry should be made at the highest possible point using the techniques described

above. The floor on which entry is made should be thoroughly searched and secured first. The
action element then moves to the top floor and searches from the top down.
3. Entry at the bottom. When entry must be made at the ground level, armored personnel
carriers should be used to gain entry and provide protection. Smoke may also be used to hide
movement. When entering single-story buildings, it may be preferable to use crowd control
agents to saturate the building before the action element enters.
(c) Search the Area or Building. A systematic search for the sniper must be conducted.
1. In an open area, the action element should maneuver and search under the protection of cover,
firing only when necessary to protect life and property. Either the security element or the action
element may use crowd control agents to aid the advance of the action element. Fire by selected
marksmen may also be employed, if necessary. The "base of fire" technique (massed firepower)
should NOT be used since it is destructive and creates hostility among innocent persons who
suffer property damage or injury. The security element on the side of the perimeter where the
action element entered the area should gradually close the perimeter as the action element moves
forward. The security element on the opposite side should remain in position as the "noose"
closes. The purpose of this action is to force the sniper to withdraw, leaving him open to capture
by the security element. The techniques used for terminating a sniper in an open area will
require close coordination and communication between all elements involved.
2. In an unoccupied building, when the sniper's location is not known, all rooms must be
searched by at least two men. One man may throw a crowd control agent grenade, then enter
quickly and place his back against the nearest wall. The second man follows and searches the
room in detail. The action element leader should be kept informed of the progress made.
3. In an occupied building, when the sniper's location is unknown, all suspected rooms must be
searched. The action element should try to have occupants submit voluntarily to the search of
their rooms. At the same time, occupants should be questioned in an attempt to pinpoint the
sniper's location. If occupants will not submit voluntarily and there is probable cause to believe
that the sniper is located in the room a search should be conducted as described above.
4. In a building, occupied or not, where the sniper's location is known, the action element should
proceed directly to the immediate area of the sniper's location. The rooms near the sniper's
location should be checked first to ensure that the sniper has not moved. Once the rooms
adjacent to the sniper have been cleared, crowd control agents should be introduced into the
sniper's room by either the action element using bursting-type grenades or the security element
using grenade launchers from the outside of the building. The door to the sniper's room should
be opened or, if necessary, broken down. Before entering the room, allow time for the sniper to
exit the room. If he does not do so, proceed with caution into the room.
5. Apprehend the Sniper. Whenever possible, the actual apprehension of the sniper is left to the
civil police with help provided by military forces.
4. Integrated Tasks.
a. General. There are many additional tasks which must be fulfilled along with the five additional
operational tasks. Some are more important than others and the following inclusions by no means exhaust
the list of these integrated tasks. The extent of their use will depend on the nature of control force
involvement in the civil disorder.

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